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Note from the Editor in Chief

We are happy to inform everyone who pursues to publish their research papers, written in an impartial manner and analyzes the historical past without political bias.

Reconstructing the Past: Journal of Historical Studies aims to foster recovering historical past without fear or favor, based not only on the historical methods and methodology, but also on an interdisciplinary approach.

Our purpose is for provide a forum for scientific research without political overtones.

Kind regards,

Professor Huseyn Baghirov

Founder of the Western Caspian University

**STRENGTHENING NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CULTURAL COHESION:
WARTIME FOLKLORE STUDIES IN SOUTHWEST CHINA****Selina J. Gao**

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Abstract. Folklore studies were closely tied to the emergence of the modern nation states and often used to rebuild national identities. In China, nationalism held an obvious appeal as the people confronted national crises and became increasingly influential in the twentieth centuries. It was not only directly related to the rising interest in folklore from the late 1910s and early 1920s, but also became the dominant theme of the folklore research during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Leading scholars of folklore studies looked to the past in order to strengthen cultural cohesion for the nation as a reaction to Japanese imperialism. Folklore studies in the southwest region under Nationalist control thrived and progressed in related theories and studies of minority customs. Scholars adopted a multi-disciplinary approach and rallied around folklore as a nationalist tool to demonstrate the connection between disparate communities within China. This work examines the great influence of nationalism on folk studies, shining a light on folklorists' activities, folklore organizations, and primary publications during China's War of Resistance against Japan.

Keywords: *folklore studies, modernity, nationalism, Second Sino-Japanese War, Southwest China*

Folklore Studies and Nationalism

Folklore emerged as a new field of learning in the eighteenth century, when philologists in Germany and antiquarians in England began to take a close look at the ways of the lower classes [Dorson (1972): 1]. The term *folk-lore* entered the English language in the mid-nineteenth century and the meaning of it was the lore of the people. *The Handbook of Folklore* described folklore research as the study of elements of archaic culture surviving in the modern age.¹ Folklore not only embodied the primal origins of the nation, but also linked the past to the present. That is why it was seen as a resource for the creation of a new national culture.

Folklore studies became a wide-spread academic pursuit in the nineteenth century Europe and North America. It was closely tied to the emergence of the modern nation states. Alan Dundes writes, “[t]he serious studies of folklore found an enthusiastic audience among individuals who felt nostalgia for the past and/or the necessity of documenting the existence of national consciousness or identity.” [Dundes (1980): 1]

¹ This handbook was published by the English Folklore Society. This society was founded by George Laurence Gomme in 1878. It was one of the first organizations in the world devoted to the study of folk culture.

Later, folkloric evidence of the primordial and persistent national spirit was evoked by nationalist movements worldwide. In the work of the nation-builders, folklore mostly served two functions: it provided both historical information and a model for future action. The concept of folk was often tightly linked to the rise of modern nationalism.

In China, nationalism emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and became increasingly influential thereafter. It held an appeal as Chinese people faced a national crisis. After the Xihai Revolution, the new republic was not able to build a strong nation-state, therefore many nationalist scholars turned their attention to the role of the modern media in the construction of nation state by discovering Chinese culture and enlightening Chinese people. They believed that China needed to strengthen itself in order to survive in the world of competitive nation-states. They also believed that the Chinese nation could be integrated through the mobilization of mass sentiments, especially those sentiments that strengthened individual identification with a set of goals common to the nation [Hobsbawm (1990): 141-142].

These modern scholars agreed with Western theories that the quality of the common people would finally decide China's destiny [Fitzgerald (1996) 106-108]. They were eager to find a new way to save the Chinese nation after they have rejected the Confucian culture and have been frustrated by Western imperialist ideologies. For them, "traditional culture," in particular the folk culture, was useful in a nationalist discourse to reach through to the masses or to respond to the cultural dilemmas of Westernized intellectuals. Under the circumstances, the concept of folklore and folk ideas were introduced into China from the West.

Nationalism was closely related to the rising interest in folklore from the very beginning in China, and it also became the dominant theme of folklore studies afterwards. In Wolfram Eberhard's *Folktales of China*, Richard M. Dorson writes "[t]he relation between the study of the folklore and the rise of nationalism is beautifully illustrated in China" [Dorson (1968): v]. Chinese scholars turned to the past in part as a reaction to foreign imperialism, but also to create a sense of an independent cultural identity for the nation [Gao (2019): 14].

Folklore Studies before WWII

Folklore studies emerged in 1918 at Beijing University (Peking University). This elite institution, known in Chinese as Beida 北大. The May Fourth intellectuals were convinced that they could save China from below, by awakening the social consciousness of their countrymen [Schwarcz (1986): 24]. These scholars called for a critical re-evaluation of China's cultural heritage in light of modern Western standards and were determined to accept Western science, democracy, and culture as the foundation of a new order. Disillusioned with the "high culture" represented by Confucianism, young Chinese intellectuals found hope in the "low culture" of the common people. The new intellectuals thus began to redefine the status of folk culture and their relationship with it. They developed a romantic view of the folk, arguing that this rich and untapped folk culture could be used as an alternative to Confucianism to convey new ideas that retained a Chinese cultural identity while furnishing urgent solutions to China's myriad of problems.

The initial stage of modern Chinese folklore research began as it had in other nations with the collection and survey of folk literature [Gao (2019)]. In the early of 1918, budding folklorists opened the Folksong Collecting Bureau (*Beida geyao zhengjichu* 北大歌謠征集處) at National Beijing University as a vehicle to collect folksongs from the public. Its mission was to set up a crowdsourcing framework for folk material collection that amateur enthusiasts could follow. The bureau's initial efforts were met with a positive response, prompting the formation of the Folksong Research Society (*Geyao yanjiuhui* 歌謠研究會) in 1920 and then two years later the launch of *Folksong Weekly* (*Geyao zhoukan* 《歌謠周刊》) to share this work with readers at and around National Beijing University. In short order, a small, but growing number of professors joined the movement, rules and regulations for collectors were modified based on experiences gained in the field, the invitation to submit folk materials was extended to a nationwide audience, and other influential journals and newspapers pledged to devote space to folklore discoveries. There was a conservative backlash at Peking University over the publication of this supposedly vulgar material in the campus paper, but it was nowhere near sufficient to snuff out popular demand for more [Gao (2019): 45]. Over the ensuing years, a growing number of researchers, newspapers, and publishing houses influenced by the folklore activities at Beijing University, joined in the folklore field by writing monographs, starting new columns, and publishing books.

However financial crisis and political tension at Beijing University forced many intellectuals to leave Beijing. Many of them moved to the south China following the Chinese National Revolution initiated by the Nationalists in Guangdong in 1925. These scholars found a new home at Xiamen and Zhongshan Universities. At the end of 1927, the Folklore Society² was founded at Zhongshan University (中山大學 Sun Yat-sen University). This Folklore Society was composed of diligent scholars who had a significant influence on Chinese society through their remarkable publications and the public support, especially from 1927 to 1933.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the folklore studies activities vigorously increased within China, particularly in the south. Scholars from all over the country not only wrote for the *Folklore Weekly* (*Minsu zhoukan* 《民俗周刊》) and other folklore series published by Zhongshan University, but also established scores of folklore associations and created corresponding local folklore publications. Heavyweight intellectual Gu Jiegang served as the founding president of Chinese Folklore Society from 1927, guiding affiliated historians, anthropologists, and other scholars in their efforts to establish a firmer academic framework for folklore study [Gao (2019): 103]. Most importantly, scholars in Hangzhou produced a massive volume of significant work, carried out many valuable investigations, and undertook many remarkable academic projects. In 1935, folklore activities entered a renaissance era at Beijing University and Zhongshan University. The Folksong Research Society and the Folklore Society were re-established one after another.

² It was the first official organization with “*minsuxue*” (民俗學 folklore) in its title in China. *Minsuxue*, the modern Chinese term for “folklore,” is precisely a modern term: it was not part of the Chinese language until 1913. Zhou Zuoren adopted into modern Chinese from Japanese.

Unfortunately, the war brought all of these positive developments to a halt. After the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao 盧溝橋) Incident near Beijing on July 7, 1937, an accidental skirmish between Japanese and Chinese forces that quickly expanded into a full-scale war, the whole situation in China took a sudden turn for the worse as the KMT rapidly lost ground on all fronts. Beijing and Tianjin first fell into Japanese hands, then the flames of the war spread to Nanjing, Wuhan, and Changsha; finally, Guangxi was thrust into a state of emergency. By year's end all of China was thrust in the abyss of war. It was no longer tenable for most folklore institutes and publications to continue their work, while the Chinese intelligentsia grew increasingly divided over the question of how to live and work in wartime.

Folklore Studies in Nationalist Controlled Areas

The war splintered the Folklore Movement even as folklorists and other related scholars continued their research and investigations in both Japanese-occupied areas and Nationalist-controlled territories during the eight-year War of Resistance against Japan. A small group of dedicated scholars persisted in carrying out independent folklore investigations and writing despite extremely adverse conditions in Japanese-occupied Beijing and Shanghai. Their freedom of movement was severely curtailed and there were dire consequences to publishing anything that might offend the occupation authorities. In Nationalist-controlled areas, folklore studies progressed in related theories and began to explore minority customs in southwest China. Academics operating there had been forced to the border regions by the fighting, which led them to discover and study non-Han groups that likely would have been overlooked if not for the wartime academic migration deep into the interior.

Wartime folklore studies in Nationalist-controlled areas flourished by contrast, continuing to develop academically. The region's geography and the folk customs and practices of its people inspired new characteristics in folklore studies as the field became closely integrated with other interdisciplinary studies, such as anthropology and ethnology. The fall of Northeast, North, East, and part of Central China to Japanese occupiers forced most of countries leading colleges, universities, and research institutions to relocate into the big Southwest region of China.³ Among these institutes, the National Southwestern Associated University (Xi'nan lianda 西南聯大) gathered many famous experts and was second to none.⁴ The intellectuals who had been engaged in folklore research at Beijing University and Qinghua University relocated with their institutions to

³ These research institutions notably moved in Yunnan (雲南), Guizhou (貴州) and Sichuan (四川) provinces and finally converged in Chongqing (重慶), Kunming (昆明), Chengdu (成都), Guilin (桂林), Guiyang (貴陽) and other cities, which became well-known cultural cities of China at that time.

⁴ After Beijing and Tianjin were occupied by the Japanese, Beijing University, Qinghua University (清華大學) and Nankai University (南開大學)—some of the most prestigious, modern educational institutions of higher learning and research in China—moved to Changsha in Hunan Province and merged to form Changsha Temporary University (長沙臨時大學). In February 1938, Japanese forces bombed Changsha, forcing the three schools to move again, this time to Kunming, where they formed the National Southwestern Associated University. When the war of resistance ended with victory over the Japanese, the National Southwestern Associated University returned to north China campuses in Beijing and Tianjin.

Kunming. The Great China University (Daxia daxue 大夏大學) in Shanghai moved to Guiyang as well, while The Academia Sinica also set up a wartime home in Sichuan province. This massive influence of human capital and physical resources transformed the Southwest into China's wartime academic heart.

Naturally, changes in the research environment led scholars to gradually shift the focus of their investigations away from the culture of the central plains, comprising the middle and lower reach of the Yellow River, to the minority cultures in the southwest border region. Yunnan and Sichuan were population-dense regions and home to many different minorities. Yunnan alone had almost 30 national minorities, and the Achang nationality could be only found there. Similarly, Sichuan was the sole inhabited area for the Qiang nationality as well as the home to the biggest Yi community in all of China and the second biggest Tibetan community. All of their unique folk customs and practices fascinated intellectuals engaged in research on nationalities, dialects, and minorities' cultural characteristics. Transplanted ethnologists, archaeologists, anthropologists, sociologists, historians, litterateurs, linguists, and folklorists were quickly drawn in by lively folk culture they discovered in the southwest region.

Most of these scholars had received a specialized overseas education before the outbreak of hostilities. They responded to the disaster of war by redoubling their efforts to modernize China's folklore study, displaying a keen national sensibility and consciousness in their academic thought as they unified western ethnological theory with China's reality. Their research showed a strong consciousness of synthesis regarding different western ethnological schools and theories as these scholars advocated adopting any kind of material or methodology from any subject so long as it was related to their research topic and could be used in their studies. Scholars advocated and practiced this "comprehensive orientation" in their academic explorations. In the folklore field, this comprehensive orientation also became mainstream in research conducted during this period. The methodology and theory of ethnology and anthropology especially were widely adopted in folklore studies. This work appeared in a number of academic journals that accepted folklore investigation reports and research papers for publication, including *Journal of Ethnological Studies* (*Minzuxue yanjiu jikan* 《民族學研究集刊》), *Chinese Language Monthly* (*Guowen yuekan* 《國文月刊》), *Southwest Frontier* (*Xi'nan bianjiang* 《西南邊疆》), *On Frontier Politics* (*Bianzheng gonglun* 《邊政公論》), *Frontier Humanities* (*Bianjiang renwen* 《邊疆人文》), *Frontier Studies* (*Bianjiang yanjiu luncong* 《邊疆研究論叢》), and *Southwest Studies* (*Xi'nan yanjiu* 《西南研究》).

Folklore Survey in the Southwest Region

The move to the Southwest stoked many scholars' interests in the minorities' history and present situation, leading them to set up numerous investigation teams to carry out field surveys. The proliferation of these groups showed that the war in fact stimulated folklore studies wherever scholars could conduct their work freely beyond the reach of the Japanese military. In the spring of 1938, Great China University established an investigative office for researching the society and economy of the minorities in

southwest China. This office also edited *Social Journal* (*Shehui xunkan* 《社會旬刊》).⁵ One year later, the investigative office was renamed “Social Research Department” and its emphasis shifted to the study and survey of social conditions and folklore material. The department dispatched people to different places to carry out investigations and published many reports of these investigations [Gao (2019): 178-179]. From February 1940, the Social Research Department added a new semi-monthly edited publication, *Social Study* (*Shehui yanjiu* 《社會研究》).

In 1938, the Research Institute of History and Philology at the Academia Sinica sponsored *Collected Papers on Anthropology* (*Renleixue jikan* 《人類學集刊》) to highlight significant new research. In the winter of 1940, Rui Yifu and Hu Qingjun (胡慶鈞), a graduate student, left for Xuyong County to do a field survey of wedding and funeral etiquette and customs in the residence of Yaque Miao (雅雀苗 Pheasant Miao). During this investigation, they collected ceremonial songs that were very valuable for the research on Yaque Miao’s customs and their oral literature, but, unfortunately, this material was not published for 20 years [Rui & Guan (1962)]. Ma Xueliang, an Assistant Researcher at the Academic Sinica, spent a considerable amount of time in the Yi nationality area in Yunnan to learn its language and carry out ethnological investigations. Ma advocated Bronislaw Malinowski’s theory of collecting folk material in a three-dimensional reality.

In the spring of 1938, the National Southwest Associated University organized a “Hunan, Guizhou, and Yunnan travel team” composed of 200 people who set out on foot when the university moved to Kunming. Making the best of a bad situation, professors and students formed all manner of small groups tasked with carrying out surveys while the team was en route to Yunnan. The folksong group was one of them. Wen Yiduo (聞一多) supervised members investigating minorities’ folk customs, languages, costumes, folksongs, and folktales. One of his students, Liu Zaoji published *A Collection of the Folksongs in Southwest China* (*Xinan caifeng lu* 《西南采風錄》). This book not only collected popular love songs, but also improvisational folksongs on the resistance against Japan and the intense reflections of the people’s discontent and sentiment at that time. Zhu Ziqing (朱自清) praised Liu’s collection for not only helping promote the understanding of folksong’s origins, development, and changes, but also providing precious material that shed light on social customs [Zu (1946)].

Compared to the individual folk collecting in the 1920s and early 1930s, the folklore surveys and collecting activities in the southwest region during the War of Resistance against Japan not only expanded the scope of folklore study, but also boosted its academic sophistication by introducing methodology and theory from other subjects. As a special researcher group, the scholars from the fields of ethnology, anthropology, sociology, and other disciplines, made an indelible contribution in the field of folklore studies. They were strong in scientific field survey and competent in investigations in different minorities’ areas, but most importantly, the material they collected withstood the test of time. These scholars used their research to unite foreign theory and methodology with Chinese traditional textual research, taking synthetic studies as their

⁵ It stopped publication after the 40th issue because the newspaper office was bombed by Japanese forces.

research orientation. However, these scholars were conducting folklore studies from different standpoints ranging from sociology, anthropology to ethnology. None really concentrated exclusively on folklore studies, and furthermore, nor had any of these scholars had devoted their entire academic life to the Chinese folklore enterprise. Therefore, the achievements of this group were limited by the nature of the school itself and did not fully develop in a meaningful way.

The Restoration of the Chinese Folklore Society

In November 1937, Chongqing became the Kuomintang's Provisional Capital and one of the important home fronts during the war. The city became home to important members of the government and a large cohort of scholars converged there in short order, including high profile folklorists Gu Jiegang (顧頡剛), Lou Zikuang, and Luo Xianglin (羅香林). Lou, the Kuomintang's head of chancery in Zhejiang province, arrived at Chongqing earlier than others and was responsible for *Folkways Weekly* (*Fengwu zhi* 《風俗志》). He had tied his fate more closely to that of the government than any of his contemporaries and was forced to flee to Taiwan in May 1949 as the KMT retreated from mainland China. Lou remained dedicated to folklore studies from his new home in Taiwan, where he founded The Oriental Culture Supplies Society (Dongfang wenhua gongyingshe 東方文化供應社) and The Oriental Culture Book Company (Dongfang wenhua shuju 東方文化書局). He later organized and published a series of folklore books that were published in previous years and made an indelible contribution to the preservation of precious resources. He earned the title of the patron saint of Chinese folklore for his efforts.

In September 1943, Gu and Lou created another monthly journal, *Natural Conditions and Social Customs Magazine* (*Fengtuzazhi* 《風土雜誌》)⁶, with the stated objective of “researching human society, and introducing local conditions and customs.” The contents of this magazine included research works on the folktales, legends, myths, and folksongs of various nationalities. During the Chongqing period, Gu also wrote many works on folklore. Of note was *his Critical Discussions of Ancient History* (*Gushi bian* 《古史辨》) [Volume 7], which was written in Chongqing and had a strong impact on Chinese myth studies.

Lou also consulted with Gu about the restoration of the Chinese Folklore Society thanks to the generosity of Gu and other folklorists who had raised the sizable sum of 200,000 yuan for the society's funds by the end of 1943. In January 1944, they re-established the Chinese Folklore Society in Chongqing and on January 31 launched *Folklore* as its new mouthpiece. The journal oriented itself towards folklore, ethnology, cultural history, and social history. Gu wrote that the purpose of *Folklore* was to guide the transformation of the social traditions according to circumstances in order to create a new social atmosphere which would adapt to China in the present age, and finally to complete the task of constructing rites and regulations [Gao (2019): 183]. In addition, the

⁶This magazine produced three volumes of 13 issues in total that ran until October 1949.

Chinese Folklore Society also created *Folkways* (*Minfeng* 《民風》), mostly publishing folksongs, proverbs, social customs, legends, and some research papers.⁷

The restored Chinese Folklore Society in Chongqing was an authoritative and national organization based on its membership. It had undertaken some folklore work even though research conditions were very poor, and it held considerable influence over the Chinese Folklore Movement in Southwest and South-Central China. The academic atmosphere of the folklore circle was enlivened thanks to the influence of the newly founded Chinese Folklore Society. *Thousand-word Newspapers in the Chinese National Language* (*Guoyu qianzi bao* 《國語千字報》) was created with the backing of the Kuomintang's Ministry of Education in Chongqing in 1942 and published folklore material to a wide audience. Around 1940, the supplement of *Guiyang Daily* opened a column, "Social Study", which published many folklore articles.⁸ On September 30, 1943, *Record of Local Conditions and Customs* (*Fengtu shizhi* 《風土什志》) began publication in Chengdu. On September 1, 1945, *Folksong Collecting Monthly* (*Caifeng* 《采風》) was created by the Sichuan national *liyueguan* (禮樂館 rites and music centre) and published five issues all together. *Xikang Guide Monthly* (*Kangdao yuekan* 《康導月刊》) was a publication that originated in Xikang province, but it was published in Chengdu on September 25, 1938. Almost every issue included pieces on the folk customs, folktales, and folksongs of the Tibetan nationality in Xikang and Xizang provinces.

The Demise of Folklore Studies: Politics in the New Era

During the Second Sino-Japanese War, in the Communist bases, a New Literature and Art Movement began with the collection and organization of folk literature and art, then remoulded them into anti-Japanese and social reform messages. This New Literature and Art Movement was a highly politicized mass social movement rather than a purely academic enterprise.

It was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that took advantage of the Second Sino-Japanese War to remould folk arts and traditions to strengthen national cohesion, rouse the national spirit, and raise people's morale. In doing so, they stripped away and discarded the academic foundation its practitioners had been building since the end of World War I. This reimagined folklore, "new art and literature" as it was called by the communists, became a tool to unite the people and a weapon to attack the enemy. To adapt to exigencies, the CCP specially emphasized folk literature and art's social function but neglected or concealed its inherent aesthetic value and folklore significance. The New Literature and Art Movement was carried out with an unequivocal class and popular nature in the communist anti-Japanese bases, especially after Mao Zedong's "Talks at the Yan'an Conference on Literature and Art" in May 1942. As American Folklorist Dr. Richard Mercer Dorson argued, "the propaganda possibilities of folklore for Communist ideology, first appreciated in Soviet Russia in 1936, did not long escape the Chinese

⁷ Due to the chaos caused by the war, there are no remaining issues, and nobody was able to recall how many issues had been published.

⁸ The 3rd to 50th issues can still be found in the Beijing Library and most of these articles addressed minorities' folk customs in Guizhou.

Communists, who perceived in folklore a splendid opportunity to identify their cause with the great anonymous mass of seven hundred million people” [Dorson (1968): xii].

This New Literature and Art Movement successfully forged an alliance between intellectuals and the masses and helped the Chinese Communist Party finally win large-scale peasant support. After the eight-year Anti-Japanese War, China descended into civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists. The Chinese folklore movement, which focused on academic studies, endured on a small scale, but was gradually replaced by the Communist New Literature Movement as the Nationalists retreated and the sphere of Communist control expanded. The Communists’ cultural policy emphasized almost exclusively “revolutionary folklore” or “remoulded folklore” to serve their political aims and the working class. Wartime cultural policy endured in Chinese folklore studies after 1949. Ultimately, the folklore movement finally died out with the Nationalists political failure in mainland China and modern folklore studies completely lost its academic independence to the communist revolution.

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**THE ISLAMIC COMMUNAL LANDS *IJMA*:
IN THE CASE OF MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN AZERBAIJAN**

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Abstract: Land properties and the legal regimes that they are subject, provide important data on the legal, social, economic and military aspects of a given country and characterize its economic features. In the countries of the Middle East, the system of land tenure, based on Sharia Law, was formed during the period of the Arab Caliphate and, with minor changes, lasted for centuries.

The aim of this paper is to examine the main essence of the Islamic communal land property- *arazî-i ijma* or *arazî-i āmma* in the medieval and early modern Azerbaijan, based on the several documents of the title-deed - *qabale*. This research proposes a concept that being land in the public benefits, *arazî-i ijma* was one of the forms of private ownership- *mulk* lands.

Keywords: *Islamic land properties, ownership, communal lands, ijma, qabale*

Introduction: Historical Background of the *Ijma* Lands

The proprietary rights on the means of production were all times the most important factors that affect the formation and regulation of the social relations in the historical process. In the medieval and subsequent early modern period the proprietary rights on the lands, the main means of production for that period, had a decisive influence on the dynamic of all aspects of society: the nature of production function, relationship between authorities and subjects, interaction between different social groups and etc.

Islamic property rights and land ownership in the Muslim Caucasus and Azerbaijan during Middle Ages and early modern period is widely studied in the historiography. Namely such historians and orientalists as V. Zakhoder, I.P. Petrushebskiy, A.K. Lambton, V. Minorsky, Z.M. Bunyadov, A.D. Papazyan and other scholars devoted a large number of works to this issue, where authors explore the land ownerships in the Muslim counties, including Azerbaijan. Even so, it is impossible to assert about solution of the issue. Diverse terminology concerning the Islamic land ownership and their use for different meanings, moreover, lack of concrete definition in some cases and transformation of land properties in length of time led to the formation of contradictory claims among scholars.

There is no doubt that the land ownership forms of Middle Eastern countries, including Azerbaijan, started their formation during the Sassanid Empire and were evolved during the Arab Caliphate in the 7th to 9th centuries AD. These forms of land property, formation of which were completed during the Caliphate, existed in Azerbaijan, as well as in the Muslim Caucuses until the Tsarist Russian conquest of the region in the first half of the 19th century.

According to the most of researchers, who works on the issue, forms of land tenure and land rights in the Muslim societies derived from the Islamic doctrine of dual ownership [Папазян (1972): 81; Петрушевский (1949): 78; Рахмани (1981): 124; Эфендиев (1981): 207]. According to the Islamic concept of land and legal basis, the whole universe, including lands, was created by Allah and belong him. Leaders of the Muslim communities, imams, caliphs and rulers claim themselves as shadows of Allah on the Earth and must carry out the mission of his vice-regents and under Islamic Law they have higher right on property [Папазян (1972): 81-82; Рахмани (1981): 124].

It is obvious that in the Muslim societies this doctrine defined all property rights during the medieval and early modern periods. But it is unacceptable to link land ownership only with the Islamic law. For example, in ancient Egypt, long before existents of Islam, pharaohs associated themselves as sons of god (the Sun God- Ra- B.S.) and preserved all rights on property on their hands. The same situation could be observed in the European countries. In the Carolingian Empire and after its collapse in France, in Germany and partly in Italy, observing lord-vassal relations (feudalism pyramid- B.S.), we see that higher property rights owned by the king [Rutger Kramer (2019)]. That is why the assertion that the ownership of land in the Muslim countries was formed on the basis of Islam, vice-versa, in Europe on a secular bases, has no foundation.

Communal Ijma Lands in Azerbaijan During the Rule of Safavid Dynasty

Historiography consists of various points of view on the land tenures during the reign of Safavid dynasty. According to B.N. Zakhoder, I.P. Petrushevski, O. Efendiyev and other authors during the mentioned period there were five forms of land tenure in Azerbaijan- *dīvān* lands, *khasseh* (*kāṣṣa*) or *khaliseh* (*kāleṣa*)- crown property, *waqf* lands, *mulk* and communal lands. [Заходер (1944): 75-76; Петрушевский (1949): 78; Эфендиев (1981): 207]. In addition to these tenures A. Alizade and A. Rahmani considers *tiyul*, the state granted lands as a 6th form of land tenures [Ализаде (1956): 167; Рахмани (1981): 125]. Although these land tenures were indicated as the main forms in the Soviet and Azerbaijani historiography for a long time, lately we consider a new attitude to the issues. In his book “Economic life of Safavid Empire” Nizami Suleymanov divides forms of land ownership into two groups being main and derivative on the basis of the three requirements of property rights - the possession, use and disposal rights [Suleymanov (2006): 55]. The author includes *divan*, *khasseh* and *mulk* to the main group of lands; *waqf*, *ijma* lands and *tiyul* were included to the derivative group [Suleymanov (2006): 55-56]. He considers owner’s possession, utilization and disposal rights on the *divan* lands, *khasseh* and *mulk* lands as a complete form, in contrast to them, *waqf*, *ijma* and *tiyul* lands as an incomplete one. In my point of view N. Suleymanov’s suggested groups of lands are more acceptable with some corrections than suggestion of the conservative historiography.

The communal lands- *arazî-i ijma* or *arazî-i āmma* were one of the land tenures recorded in the XVI-XVII centuries Safavid Empire, including Chukhur-Saad, one of its administrative units. There are different opinions on these lands in the historiography. In second volume of "History of Azerbaijan" indicates that the communal lands *ijam* had a status of state lands and owned by peasants, these lands covered pastures, oil-bearing lands, cemeteries and etc. [Azerbaijan Tarixi (1998): 217]. Prominent Azerbaijani historian Z.M. Bunyadov, who worked on the Caliphate period, indicated hayfields, fuel

collected places, cemeteries and others as the communal lands, but he didn't specify their status [Bunyadov (2007): 152]. I.P. Petrushevsky who studied medieval agrarian system of Azerbaijan had conflicting views on communal lands. Classifying land tenures, the author specified communal lands as separate form of lands [Петрушевский (1949): 78], but describing mulk land, which is freehold land, he indicated communal land- *arazî-i ijma* or *arazî-i āmma* as a type of mulk [Петрушевский (1949): 229-233]. O. Efendiyeu characterizes *jamaat-i dehi* as property lands of certain village's community, but he didn't specify the legal basis of this property [Эфендиев (1981): 207]. A. Rahmani also indicates communal lands under term '*jamaat*' and specifies this land as a community property, but he didn't explain the property rights of community [Рахмани (1981): 129]. B.M. Arutyunyan and M.K. Zulalyan both separated communal lands as a specific form of landownership and underlined that village communities had autonomy in some issues [Арутюнян (1940): 34-35; Зулалян (1971): 20-22]. Unlike them A.D. Papazyan supposed that such lands belonged to the village community on the legal basis and to each member of community, moreover they managed these lands as private property [Папазян (1972): 181-188]. N. Suleymanov considering communal lands as type of derivative land tenures writes that *ijma* lands actually being the state lands were on the possession and disposal of the state and they were under the joint utilization of peasants [Suleymanov (2006): 56]. In other words, the author tried to stress that village community has only the right for the utilization of the land.

As we see there is not a unanimous opinion on the common *ijma* land property in the historiography. It is undeniable that all property rights on land belonged to the state in the Safavid Empire, including Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, the state was a guarantor of the possession, utilization and disposal rights on lands. Both I.P. Petrushevsky's and A.D. Papazyan's points of views on the communal property *ijma* lands much closer to the truth than other scholars.

In my opinion, communal *ijma* land was a form of *mulk* and it could be called a *collective mulk*, in other words collective property. Some extent documents prove that village community had all right for the possession, utilization and disposal of lands were provided. In this case, *qabale*- the title deed, constituted in 1506 by the Nakhchivan Sharia court, is crucial. This document states that it is determined on the basis of the decrees of previous rulers and the documents, compiled by the *qadi*, as well as the testimony of authoritative people of Nakhchivan, *tumen* of the province Azerbaijan that village Dibkend of Deresham *mahal* belongs to the *icma*, community of mentioned village based on the *mulk* property [Персидские документы (1968): document N13, 292-296]. The borders of the village indicated in details, moreover this *qabale* stresses that no one has the right to raise a lawsuit against the village. As we see this *qabale* clearly reflects that the village Dibkend is a property of its community. Interestingly, not only land, but also all substance on this land, its irrigation system, mills, the butter production enterprise, pastures and etc. are indicated as a mulk of the village community [Персидские документы (1968): document N13, 294]. The court decision in H. Ramadan, 964 (28 June - 27 July 1557), which is pointed out in this *qabale*, underlines that this village Dibkend didn't belong to the crown lands *khaliseh* and one more time prescribes villagers as its owner [Персидские документы (1968): document N13, 296]. As we know, after the end of Ottoman-Safavid war in 1555 a special committee was sent to the region to check the state's land fund and for re-registration of the public lands.

Namely this committee has identified property right of Dibkend village to its community, moreover it defined main property tax of the village and its additional part for that year. It should be noted that alongside with Dibkend, the other two villages of Deresham mahal – Bashkend and Ortakend were properties of their community.

In order to determine the legal basis of communal lands in Azerbaijan during the Safavid dynasty we analyzed also *qabale* of 1576. According to this document Murad Bey sold his property Mehri village to its community- *ijma* for 316 tuman [Персидские документы (1968): document N24, 325-331]. Purchased land was declared the property of the village community and each *reaya* – taxpayer of the village in the document of sale. It is an undeniable fact that all possessions purchased on the basis of *qabale*, which is a legal document of Sharia court became private property. This proves once again that Mehri village was transferred into private property. It is necessary to note that Mehri village, which was previously belonged to the *khasseh* – crown lands and was purchased by the village community in 1576, mentions as a crown land in the sources on the XVII century [Персидские документы (1968): 380].

Another valuable document, which proves mulk status of communal lands is *qabale* dated back to 1587. It becomes clear from the text of this *qabale* that the community of the village Savadan sold their pasture Kilavakishi to the community of the village Mehri for 7500 dinars [Персидские документы (1968): document N 26, 333-335]. In this document the borders of the pasture were pointed out in details and transition of its ownership was marked with accuracy. The *qabale* of 1587 certifies possession and disposal rights of the village community on the communal property.

B.M. Arutyunyan also pays attention on the facts about the sale of property belonging to the community by the community itself. According to the author, in 1722 the community of the village Oshakan sold one third of the irrigation water of their property to Catholicos Astavasatur and in 1740 the community of the village Kanakir sold 200 somars (50 hectares - B.S.) of sown area to the monastery Gegard [Арутюнян (1940): 34-35].

Some decrees of the 17th century that have come down to our time are of great scientific importance in terms of revealing the essence of the form of *ijma* land. One of these decrees was signed by Shah Safi I in Rabi'ul-Sani 1043 AH (October 1633) and refers to the Sheki province. It is clear from the text of the decree that the governor of Sheki, Aslan Sultan, forcibly took half of the properties belonging to the subjects of Sheki and began to use them for cultivation, but not content with that, he continued to collect property tax from the subjects for those properties he occupied. The subjects who gathered in front of the palace complained about the arbitrariness of the Sheki governor to the Shah [Т.М. Musəvi. (1977): documents N-3, 66-67]. The *Ijma* lands, mentioned as "Properties belonging to the Sheki subjects" in the decree, undoubtedly belong to the village community. This fact is also confirmed by the fact that the complaint was signed collectively, not individually. Examination of the decree shows that it was considered necessary to pay the property tax *maljahat* to the state treasury for community lands belonging to rural communities. At the same time, the illegal occupation of community lands was considered unacceptable. Shah Safi I entrusted the objective investigation of the complaints of the subjects to the lawyers of Shirvan beylarbeyi and gave instructions: if it is seized contrary to the law and still accumulates wealth at the expense of those properties, they should decide that the refuge of that emirate should put the subjects'

properties at their disposal and take back as much wealth as those properties have according to the rules [T.M. Musəvi (1977): document N-3, 67]. The decree of Shah Safi I shows that the inviolability of the community lands at the disposal of the subject, like any property, was protected at the state level, and individual officials ensured the protection of the rights and powers of the community properties and property owners.

It is necessary to add that making comparison the Safavid land property system with the Ottomans one, one can conclude that the lands of the Ijma resemble the lands of the *Miri Arazi* in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, in both states, this form of land ownership was subject to the intervention of the authorities and both state system and Sharia law regulated these lands. An important point between the two systems, the state system and the Islamic Sharia, is that the provisions on inheritance are final and unchangeable. The fact that the provisions of the land of the miri arazi and the laws of transfer to which it is subject, may change over time depending on the land policy of the state or the conditions of the time. [Abdurrahman Yazici (2014): 469]

Conclusion

Scrutiny on the historical literature, particularly special documents *qabale*, the title deeds, prove that communal *ijma* lands were in fact a form of *mulk*, more precisely they have been a form of collective *mulk*. The fact that the rural community was free to buy, sell and lease property belonging to it, including land plots, pastures, kishlaks, irrigation system, as well as all other property on these lands, indicates that the rural community had the property right to use, as well as to manage this property. In ensuring these rights, the legal documents of the Sharia court and the decrees of the ruler acted as guarantors. In cases when local officials have exceeded their powers and interfered with community lands, their prevention at the state level and the restoration of the rights of the village community on that property also document the inviolability of collective property.

Although the documents, considered in the research, relate to the Sheki region and Chukhur-Saad Beylarbeklik, a similar situation could be observed in the other administrative-territorial units of the Safavid state. But still, it is important to find additional evidence that would prove existence of such collective form of *mulk* in other territories of the Safavid Empire, including Azerbaijan.

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**POLITICAL PORTRAIT OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT, WORKING IN
THE SOUTH CAUCASUS IN 1918- 1919**

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Abstract: In the political arena of the South Caucasus region, throughout the period of existence of the independent republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia (1918-1920), many historical names flashed like a kaleidoscope, such as leaders of political parties, public figures, diplomats, statesmen, military leaders, heads of numerous missions, and representatives of various intelligence services. The post-war Caucasus of 1918-1920 resembled a huge theatrical stage, on a hill, on which dramatic events unfolded, which played a fateful role in the history of the peoples of this region. Subsequently, the names of many of those who created this story entered the world encyclopaedias. Prominent figures of the British state, military establishment, who played a serious role in this series, stand out, building the policy of His Majesty's Government in the South Caucasus in 1918-1919.

Keywords: *Dunsterville, MacDonnell, Thomson, Teague-Jones, British troops, Azerbaijan Democratic Republic*

Introduction

Free access to various kinds of archival documents (dispatches, reports, government reports, telegrams, analytic references, etc.) makes it possible to recreate political portraits of prominent figures of that period. It is noteworthy that many of them left behind a good memoir literature, some of which was subsequently published as independent books [MacDonnell, Ranald. (1938); Dunsterville L. (1925); Peter Hopkirk, Reginald Teague-Jones (1990); Brian Pearce (1997); Brian Pearce, W.M. Thomson (1997)].

There is no doubt that all this huge layer of sources not only recreates the course of the historical realities of that time, but also allows us to talk about the role and significance of specific people, who create this story. The assessment of a particular person depends on political and national preferences. Therefore, an important factor in the construction of any document must be taken into account the identity of the author of the text, as well as the degree of its awareness of developments on the ground. The British military and political elite, leaving behind a lot of analytical references, biographical sketches, undoubtedly thereby enriched our knowledge of the truth of the history of Azerbaijan-British relations in 1918-1919. Such a layer of materials also allows, to some extent, to make a kind of portrait of the author himself through the prism of his activities. Since for the most part all memoir literature is written hot on the heels of events, they clearly contain the spirit of that time is captured, and at the same time, in almost all expositions, the presence of a certain imperial taste is felt. The existence of a body of archival documents and memoir literature allows us to consider now the role of a particular historical figure and his role and influence in the

events unfolding in the South Caucasus. To date, Azerbaijan historical science, keeping pace with the world, quite successfully uses the English memoir literature in its works. This article aims to dwell more closely on the characteristics of some of the well-known military commanders, as well as representatives of diplomatic missions located in the South Caucasus in 1918-1919, and who implemented their state policies. Those discussed in this article, following their respective instructions, were forced due to certain circumstances, to adjust the political policy of their governments on the ground. At times, dramatic struggles forced the British to adopt extraordinary decisions that did not always coincide with the general course of government in their South Caucasian politics. An important factor was also the pressure exerted on the British by the young states, in whose territories the occupying troops were stationed.

The British Commands and the South Caucasus

During the construction of their independent states by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia in 1918-1920, the most difficult for the British command was their involvement in territorial disputes between them. Very often, the fate of people living in these states depended on the specific decision of the representative of the Alliance, his personal attitude to a particular nation, under the influence of many factors. In this regard, an indicator in the solution of territorial issues often surfaced the Armenian question, which the British had in each case to resolve in favour of a particular state. Numerous archival documents that have been deposited in the funds of the British National Archives are literally filled with the Armenian correspondence: appeals to memorandums, letters addressed to world powers or to the British command on the ground – the pendulum of sympathy and support from the Alliance forces often outweighed the side. This undoubtedly happened due to the activities of specific personalities on whom the Armenians tried to exert pressure. In this regard, in modern historiography, describing the events in the South Caucasus of 1918-1920, one or another side often tries to impose personal labels, and calls them respectively Armenophobes or Muslimophobes, depending on the decisions taken by the British on the specific issues. Due to the fact that the main kitchen of the political decisions developed was brewed far beyond the Caucasus region itself and rested on the Versailles Gate, it was Western political and public figures, prominent diplomats, high-ranking government officials who played an important role in shaping these decisions. Undoubtedly, in a small article it is impossible to mention all the participants - representatives of the great powers, who by the will of history found themselves in the Caucasian foreground and are trying to dictate their rules to the "Small Peoples" in the occupied territories. Our task is to mention the most iconic figures of this group of representatives of this group of representatives, and by their example to show the role of individuals who have left a tangible mark in history. The very first, rather short-term period of stay of British troops in the South Caucasus has its own peculiarity: the British attempted to occupy one single oil city of Baku and establish complete control over the Caspian water area. At the time of the Russian revolution, which led to the collapse of the Eastern Front, the collapse of the Tsarist Empire, allowed the Bolsheviks to make an attempt at reconciliation. The Brest-Litovsk treaty left the Caucasus undefended. British India was open to invasion by Turkish-German troops, heading the east through the

Caspian Sea and the trans-Caspian railway towards Afghanistan. The British tried at all costs to prevent these actions, despite the fact that for this purpose, they had very few troops at their disposal. That is why it was considered necessary to establish an alliance with the local population to resist the Turkish-German troops. Therefore, British agents and military officers in Central Asia and the Transcaspian were hurriedly sent to Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, to explain the situation on the ground, and identify what forces were available to resist the Turkish-German forces [Дж. Гасанлы (2011): 245].

One of the officers selected for this purpose was Major J.M. Goldsmiths, who was tasked with ensuring the success of Major General Lionel Charles Dunsterville's proposed operation (later called Dunsterforce). He appeared in Baku on 13th February 1918, and shortly thereafter was relocated with his men to Tiflis, where he interacted with the Caucasian Military Committee existing there at that time, as well as with local political parties, including the Bolsheviks. Goldsmith also managed to establish contact with British troops in Persia. It is noteworthy that a later book by Dunsterville himself does not mention the existence of this Committee [Dunsterville L. (1925)]. The Turkish scholar Bulent Gökay writes about him in his work, referring to the 86-page report of Major Goldsmith, which was addressed to the director of the British Intelligence. According to Goldsmith, at the end of February 1918 Dunsterville was trying to establish relations with S. Shaumian, promising him 40 Ford cars, in exchange for the Baku gasoline he needs, and assistance in protecting the city [Bülent Gökay (1998): 30; Bülent Gökay (1996): 45]. This fact is also not mentioned in the memoirs of Dunsterville himself. According to all known sources, both archival and memoir, Dunsterville appears in Baku in August 1918 and the main preparatory work of his Baku deployment is prepared by Vice-Consul Aeneas Ranald MacDonnell (Lord MacDonell), who left behind an interesting book detailing the activities of his South Caucasian period [MacDonnell, Ranald. (1938); Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): 70]. MacDonnell's work is also well covered in documents deposited in the UK's National Archives, which has been widely used by us.

World War I was approaching its tragic end. It was during this period that the name of the former British Vice-Consul in Tehran, who by that time was already an employee of the British mission in Tiflis, and later in Baku, MacDonnell. This British intelligence officer, who played a different role in the historical events of 1918 in the Caucasus, left behind many memories that allow us to analyse Britain's policies in the region. All the actions of R. MacDonnell himself characterized him as a rather cunning politician, an intelligence officer, who managed to simultaneously establish contacts with almost all the main political figures - participants in the South Caucasian events of 1918. Being friends of the Bolsheviks, trying to constantly flirt with them, but in fact remaining indisputably their obvious opponent, he at the same time quite seriously assessed the pain of the Bolshevik potential, seeing in their presence a serious danger for the British. As the events of the early months of 1918 showed, it was MacDonnell who was one of those politicians who, in order to hold the front and successfully occupy the region, first lamented the formation of the volunteer army. Since the Armenians, burning with the desire for revenge against the Turks, remained on the front lines, they were the best option for this purpose. It is on them that the English intelligence officer chose. In them, he saw the local allies that Dunsterville needed in the fight against the Turkish army. Undoubtedly, it was the fact that the Armenian divisions continued to hold

positions on the front lines that encouraged the British to pay them. In order not to look in the eyes of another part of the population, especially Muslim, as patrons of Armenians, the British created the so-called Finance Committee, whose tasks included allocating all financial assistance to various military units, only through existing Russian personnel. It is quite logical that the Armenians, having received real money in their hands, and supported by assurances from the British, understood that the British mission was organized to help them [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): FO. 248-1196]. Subsequently, R. MacDonnell, having already experienced Armenian pressure, wrote about his awareness of the Armenian character, comparing them "with the Indians who dye and inflate their breasts to frighten the enemy with their importance, but in fact boast of the force behind them." [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): 68]. However, it was R. MacDonnell who had the main initiatives in finding "upper allies" for Dunsterville, whose knowledge of the region itself at the time of his arrival in Baku was very limited. To implement the British plans, R. MacDonnell made several tours in Baku, setting as his main goal the preparation for the landing of British troops here. As noted above, the British Vice-Consul tried to establish close relations with various political forces, flirting with both the Bolsheviks and the Social Democrats, and, of course, with the Dashnaks. He established a fairly close relationship between S. Shaumian and A. Djaparidze, and he was also acquainted with other commissars. He was more cautious in his dealings with Armenians, knowing that the Baku commissars did not fully trust the Armenian National Soviet. He visited them at night, disguised as a Russian soldier [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): 68-69]. The tragic events of March find R. MacDonnell in Baku. By the will of fate, he who in many ways contributed to the financing of Armenian weapons, had to witness how these weapons were used. Thus, albeit indirectly, the British found themselves implicated in brutal murders committed by armed gangs against the peaceful Muslim population. According to the report of the Extraordinary Investigative Commission, 12,000 people were killed by Bolshevik-Armenian forces. MacDonnell distanced himself entirely from these tragic events and confirmed that a brutal massacre was committed by the Armenians. "The Armenians joined with the Bolsheviks and turned everything into a massacre of their hereditary enemies, the Tatars, who suffered greatly and had no chance against the organized forces of the Armenians and the Red Guards with the support of the fleet." [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): FO. 248-1196]. MacDonnell was arrested by the Bolsheviks and was tried by a military tribunal on charges of attempting to organize a fleet for the arrival of British troops. For lack of evidence, he was released [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): FO. 248-1196]. Ultimately, we can conclude that the Baku mission of the British Vice Consul MacDonnell was unsuccessful. In fact, MacDonnell failed to solve any of the tasks set. The March events discredited the British in the eyes of the local Muslim population. He failed to persuade 600 idle Russian officers to join the Red Army, and thus have reliable soldiers among the Bolsheviks. He failed to prepare the fleet so that it would be available to follow instructions from General Bicherkhov or General Dunsterville at the right time. That is the reason why the Vice-consul soon left the city of Baku [H. Маквелл (2014): 94].

By this period, General Dunsterville occupied centre stage in the Caucasus. Operation Dunsterforce is well covered by him not only in memoir literature, but also in the documents of the British National Archives. It is from this package of documents,

"Stalky's Reminisces," that we can see a portrait of the general himself, or "Stalky," as he calls himself in his memoirs. The word stalky means clever, measured, cunning. Young Dunsterville's comrades said he had a good nature. It's interesting that the famous English writer Rudyard Kipling, his classmate at Westward Ho school where military cadres for colonial service were forged, later wrote the book "Stalky & Co", based on his memories of Dunsterville [Carrington, C.E. (1955): 22]. General Dunsterville himself was closely involved in the preparation of his expedition, was concerned about the situation developing in the South Caucasus. The general had difficulty getting allotted troops. The British military command had disagreements over the entire mission of Dunsterville's Baku operation. He reported to the War Department, with which Dunsterville had a strained relationship. The leadership did not approve of the enthusiasm of the general, who drew the basic information of their British intelligence. Without going into the details of the campaign itself, which is reflected in historiography, we note that the failure of Dunsterville's operation was predetermined by many factors. Fighting in a foreign land, chasing enemy forces of the legitimate Azerbaijani government, the mission of the British, even carried a rush to the personal characteristics of "Stalky" was doomed to defeat. The Armenians did not meet the hope of the general as loyal allies, after having invited the British, and also actively taken part in the events of August 1918, and tried to take a leading position in the fight against the advancing forces of the Caucasian Islamic Army. For the failure of the Baku operation, Dunsterville was relieved of his post. His troops were disbanded and replaced by regular units of the British 14th Division, whilst Dunsterville tried to regain his former reputation.

Amongst the main characters of the early period of the British presence in the region, it is impossible to avoid mentioning Soviet historiography's sensational view of the personality of the British intelligence officer, Captain Reginald Teague-Jones. Moscow accused British intelligence officials of being responsible for the deaths of Baku's commissars. According to the Soviet foreign minister, Britain was "thoroughly accused of murdering unprotected captives." Despite the denials of the British Government, the Soviet Government continued to press these charges, which were widely published in Soviet historical references. Even now, after so many years, after the end of the Soviet regime, the events that led to the murders are still shrouded in veils of mystery and ambiguity. The British government claimed that the commissars had been brutally executed by their own compatriots and enemies in Ashgabat. The fact that that particular anti-Bolshevik group naming themselves the Ashkabad Committee were supported by the British, does not mean that the British were responsible for the executions. Captain Reginald Teague-Jones was involved in a challenging and dangerous mission. He was fluent in Russian, having been brought up and educated in St. Petersburg. After serving in the Indian Police for several years, he was transferred to the elite Foreign and Political Department of the Indian Police. Finding himself in the spring of 1918 in the South Caucasus, he could not even have imagined the consequences of the trip that would haunt him for the rest of his life. At the age of 29, Teague-Jones was accused by none other than Leon Trotsky of being responsible for the death of 26 Baku commissars, and he was branded by Moscow as "a cursed representative of the blood of imperialism." Although official British sources proved that Teague-Jones was at that time in Ashgabat, at a distance of more than 200 miles from the place of execution, L. Trotsky described

him as ... "the immediate actual organizer". Because of fear of communist persecution, Teague-Jones went into hiding for the rest of his life. Before changing his name, he provided the Foreign Office with a brief account of the circumstances of the killings. He lived under the name of Ronald Sinclair for the rest of his life. He kept his identity secret from even his closest friends. It was only after his death, in the year of his centenary, that the truth about his disappearance appeared in an obituary published in *The Times*. However, it is worth mentioning that the early records of Teague-Jones, which he first attempted to publish in 1920 (these were his personal diaries, telegrams and memoirs), subsequently allowed the English historian Peter Hopkirk to publish a book: "The Adventure of the Bolsheviks, Turkmens and Tatars", which is a serious source for the study of the events of 1918 on the former southern outskirts of Russia [Peter Hopkirk, *Reginald Teague-Jones* (1990)]. Teague-Jones diary is undoubtedly not only an excellent source for reconstructing many details of the events of the 1918 period, it also allows us to judge the character of the author himself, and his direct role in the unfolding events. It can even be said that he to some extent supplements the information from the memoirs of MacDonnell and Dunsterville, revealing the true course of action of the British command on the ground. Teague-Jones mentions many names in his diary and gives them characteristics. A large place in the diary is given to the Transcaspian, and all the participants of the Ashgabat Committee. In general, he was twice in Baku before Dunsterforce appeared there, both times for a very short period. During the second visit to Baku, at a time when the fate of the city was already determined, and crowds of women tried to leave the city (Teague Jones dated this as 31st July 1918), he tried to dissolve into the crowd of escapees, taking with him an important and rare a map of the harbour, with an image of the city's coastal defences. "My idea was," Teague-Jones wrote in his diary, "that assuming the surrender of Baku to the Turks, we would still be able to prevent them by mining Baku Bay" [Peter Hopkirk, *Reginald Teague-Jones* (1990): 99]. Fortunately, as is known, the plan to mine the Bay of Baku was never implemented. Teague-Jones wrote in detail about the Baku events of the summer of 1918, but his narrative is more a memoir, without an admixture of political analysis of the events, unlike the books of MacDonnell and Dunsterville. During the Dunsterforce Expedition in Baku, Teague-Jones performed the duties of an intelligence officer, bearing personal responsibility for recruiting agents for the Dunsterforce headquarters. However, Teague Jones was soon recalled to the Transcaspian, against the wishes of Dunsterville, who considered him useful. According to Dunsterville's diary, "in spite of the Baku drama turning occasionally to comedy, an atmosphere of tragedy persisted. As unwitting players in this drama, at times we tended to laugh at the grotesque and fantastic scenes, even though we were constantly weighed down by the anticipation of impending disaster [[Peter Hopkirk, *Reginald Teague-Jones* (1990): 115].

Thus, despite the first, very short period of stay in the South Caucasus of the occupying forces, and the fact that their participants were quite professional military commanders, diplomats, intelligence officers (we can mention such names as Colonel Stokes, General Malleon), their attempts to implement their plans failed. The course of historical events brings here new Britons, already as representatives of the forces of the Alliance, which allowed them to establish themselves here as an occupying force. As we know, in the autumn of 1918, the German-Turkish bloc was defeated in the First World War. On October 30, Turkey signed the Treaty of Mudros, the terms of which proved

difficult not only for the Ottoman Empire itself, but implied serious changes in the life of the newly created South Caucasian states. As a result of the Mudros Armistice, the Allied forces invade the territory of the Southern Caucasus.

William Montgomerie Thomson and the Caucasian Republics

A new stage begins, when the young states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia had to combine the construction of new state institutions of power with the presence of British occupation troops here. This time, the gallery of names representing the participants from foggy Brittan is expanding. The period from November 1918 to August 1919, when the British occupation troops were stationed in strategically important places in the South Caucasus (Baku, Tiflis, Gori, Batumi, controlled the Caucasian Railway, seaports), the tasks of the British, the nature of their activities, the methods of their work here can be said to change dramatically. Now they had to deal with three newly formed states, trying, despite numerous difficulties, to build their independent national policy in accordance with the realities of that period. This time, among the representatives of His Majesty's Government, the most striking figure stands out in the name of Lieutenant General Sir William Montgomerie Thomson, who arrived in Baku on 17th November on the flagship cruiser "President Kruger", ironically, the same vessel that carried General Dunsterville.

Most of the British participants in the South Caucasus during this period had a tradition of keeping their own diaries, in addition to the mandatory daily report, monthly reports, final reports on the work done, or analytical reports, and other kinds of documents sent to the government. This was followed by Thomson, who declared himself Governor-General of Baku upon his arrival in the South Caucasus. For many years, his diary was considered lost. However, as it turned out, a typewritten copy of it was kept in the family archive of the Thomson family and was subsequently handed over to Mrs. D. Harper, one of the daughters of General Thomson to the "Leeds Russian Archive". Much later, the English historian Brian Pearce managed, with the permission of his family, to publish his diary in the journal "Revolutionary Russia" co-authored with Thomson. [Pearce, Brian and W.M. Thomson (1997)]. Since Thomson was one of the main actors in the South Caucasus, on whose actions and decisions the fate of many unfolding events often depended, it is understandable that the period of his stay here is widely covered in various sources, both archival and periodicals. However, Thomson's diary revealed many aspects of his character, details of his personal attitude, both in relation to individuals, and to the states themselves, on the territory, which he occupied. His official reports were written in a precise language, however there is much sarcasm in his diary. Many of his characterisations, both to the leadership of the South Caucasian states and to the state course itself, often have an imperial flavour. In short, in the pages of his diary, the general forgets about the art of diplomacy, but he strictly adheres to diplomacy in his government reports. Taking examples from his diary, "the Azerbaijan government, being a Turkish creation, was very careful not to irritate anyone and readily agreed to any British proposal. The Cabinet of Ministers took a very prudent moderate course between tyranny and confiscation of property, although in many respects harsh methods were used, which they learned from the Turks. Fraud was endemic among officials; bribes were taken even in the Cabinet of Ministers. It should be remembered,

however, that oil policy is always a dirty business and continues to remain so not only in Baku, but also in any other place. The Georgian Government presented itself as a problem of a different nature. President Jordania was a staunch and unyielding fanatic with no distinct personality. The Cabinet of Ministers was an unpleasant team of adventurers chaired by M. Gegechkori, a sneaky lawyer with whom it was very difficult to deal. The Armenian government, in fact, was the dictatorship of M. Khatisyan, a capable man and experienced, and one of the very few in the Caucasus with a sense of humour. In general, Armenians focused on hating Muslims, and founded parties of all shades, but as often happens in such cases, power was vested in a well-organized extremist minority, the Dashnaktsutyun Party". [Pearce, Brian and W.M. Thomson (1997): 88] Such diary entries differed from his official speech, delivered for the first time since his arrival in the South Caucasus, at the Baku Bay, in which he left no doubt about the purposes of his presence here. "We are coming to you," he addresses a group of those who meet him, "with the aim of restoring order by removing the German and Turkish centres of ferment that impede law and order." [Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика (1918-1920) (1998): 106]

As you know, the leaders wished for success in the process of establishing independent states, but unfortunately, it was accompanied by many misunderstandings, mutual claims against each other, often escalating into conflicts and local wars. The resolution of the complex territorial conflicts between Georgia and Armenia and Azerbaijan was kept in the bloody grip of these states, depriving them in many respects of the possibility of peaceful, creative construction. The British occupation forces attempted to separate the conflicting parties on different sides of the barricade. In fact, they acted as arbitrators, supporting the parties on a case-by-case basis, as required. Thomson had an undeniably significant role in this process. However, the fact that its decisions were also put at the forefront in resolving territorial disputes spoke of the conditions in which these states had to build independent foreign and domestic policies. As subsequent events have shown, one of the most difficult issues in the attempts to peacefully resolve the territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus throughout their stay here is the issue of resolving the status of Karabakh, a region known for its long and dramatic history. In this regard, the role of General Thomson himself made endless attempts to resolve the Karabakh problem, before the final decision on this issue was made at the Versailles Conference. This statement is by no means related to the fact that he took the position of the Azerbaijani government on this issue, and therefore his actions are welcomed in modern Azerbaijani historiography. The objectivity of his decisions follows from arguments made by the general himself, who motivates his decisions with concrete facts and thoughts. Characterising Thomson's role in the Karabakh conflict, we must mention his main achievement was the expulsion of Andronik's military forces, whose hands were stained with the blood of many thousands of human lives. Despite huge pressure from his compatriots at home, Thomson forced Andronik to retreat ingloriously from the South Caucasus in the spring of 1919. There are many documents signed by Thomson in the British Archives concerning territorial problems, however there are no references to Karabakh in his diaries. He mentions specific regions such as Kars, Nachichevan, and Zangezur. Several times he mentions Andonik. He regarded the territorial issues as the internal business of the states, until such time as the main decisions were made at the Versailles Conference. It should be

recognized that a far-sighted politician, an excellent strategist, General Thomson, was well aware that it was on the key issue (territorial) that it was necessary to show maximum diplomacy in order to keep the region calm, while managing to regulate economic problems. According to representatives of the Military Department, it was General Thomson who was able to show a remarkable example by his actions concerning how to resolve painful issues [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): FO 608-85]. I think we can agree that in the difficult conditions of the South Caucasian reality, Thomson managed to assemble a team of professionals (meaning both the English side and specialists from among the local population), around which the bulk of those who came here to serve the British government. Another question is to what extent they served the interests of the states of the South Caucasus. The general himself, in the final part of his diary, giving a fairly high assessment of his mission, asks himself: "If we had a mandate and a certain policy, would we be able to complete the task of establishing calm in the Caucasus and complete the work of the nascent republics? Does the example of the adoptive parent apply to the custom of throwing the infant away with soapy water, having previously helped him in the burning waters of self-determination? Have we done something similar to spanking and feeding the baby at the same time? Haven't we fed the baby sympathy far beyond his opportunities for assimilation, giving him a "de jure" confession, while at the same time giving leeway to Denikin's men in British uniforms and British machine guns. We can't shake off our guilt so easily." [Pearce, Brian and W.M. Thomson (1997): 90] As we can see from the concluding words of the general's diary, he was aware of the complexity, and the sharpness of the tasks ahead. The British could not guarantee the independence from the Bolshevik threat, which soon put an end to the young states of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.

In addition to General W. Thomson in the gallery of names of those present in 1918-1919 in the South Caucasus, you can cite the names of the commanders of the British troops' generals - Corey, Beach, Shuttleworth, officers Neil, Stewart, Walker, and many others.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, within the framework of an article, it is impossible to highlight these personalities in detail, indicating their role in the fate of the South Caucasian peoples. Undoubtedly, each of them, being the leader of the Allied forces, was consistent in the implementation of the effective directives assigned to them. However, it is also obvious that each of them carried his own human factors. And if in some particular situations it could seem that the British show visible sympathy for one of the nations, whether Armenians or Georgians or Azerbaijanis, then it was also indisputable that they were and remained British subjects, faithfully serving the interests of His Majesty, putting their interests at the forefront.

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**THE MAIN COURSE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ILKHANATE
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Abstract. The reign of Ghazan Khan (1295-1304) occupies an important place in the history of the Ilkhanid dynasty. The religious and other socio-economic reforms, he carried out, changed the nature of the state, which was reflected in foreign policy. Despite the fact that he was a Muslim and used the name of the Prophet Mahmud, his foreign policy continued the traditional path of the Ilkhans before him, which is clearly reflected in the sources. Thus, like his non-Muslim predecessors, he continued his wars with the Mamluks of Egypt and the Ulus of Jochi for economic interests and the mission of leading the Muslim world, and did not stop the traditional diplomatic correspondence with the Christian Western world. Although he refused titles and attributes, which were considered formal signs of submission to the Supreme Mongol Khan, he paid attention to maintaining relations with Beijing at the economic level, but serious conflicts with his other relatives, the Jaghatai, over Khorasan were inevitable. Based on the primary sources of the period and the modern researcher works, the article comprehensively re-examines the main directions of the foreign policy of the period of Mahmud Ghazan Khan, "Padishah-e Islam".

Keywords: *Mongol, Ghazan Khan, Foreign Policy, Mamluk, Jochi, Jaghatai, Byzantium*

INTRODUCTION

The complete establishment of Mongol power in the Middle East and the formation of a new state of the Ilkhan ulus was the result of the military campaign of Hulagu Khan (1260-1265), sent by order of the great kagan Mongke (1251-1259). If we focus on the history of the Ilkhan dynasty, which ruled the region for about a century, the reign of Ghazan Khan (1295-1304) is undoubtedly of great importance, who Islamized and transformed the state from a nomadic to a settled way of life. Historical works began to be written about Gazan Khan during his lifetime. Important measures taken by Ghazan Khan during his nine-year reign, especially his reforms in various directions are still the subject of scholarly study.

Although the reforms and all the measures of Ghazan Khan to strengthen the central power have become the object of extensive studies from different perspectives, his foreign policy remains a topic that has received less attention and in most cases has not been studied in detail. This paper aims to consider some aspects of the foreign policy of Mahmud Ghazan Khan on the basis of primary sources of that period and modern historiography. One of the objectives of the study is to find out the connection between the internal measures of Ghazan Khan and his foreign policy.

Ghazan Khan, who took the throne of the Ilkhanids in 1295, faced a critically complex set of socio-economic and political problems of the state. To bring the state out of this crisis, the Ilkhan began to carry out radical reforms, firstly converting to Islam in order to rise in the eyes of the majority Muslim subjects and to gain the support of the local aristocracy. It should be noted that in modern historiography there is also an opposite opinion that Ghazan Khan never accepted Islam. [Biran, Michal (2016): 79].

Without disputing any of the opinions for and against the fact that Ghazan Khan converted to Islam or not, it can be stated with certainty that he used Islam to spread and strengthen his power. Some historians claim that his religious policy is related to the foreign policy as well, besides above-mentioned reasons [Melville (1990): 159-177]. By accepting the name "*Padishah-e Islam*", he had a claim to lead the entire Muslim world.

Relations with the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt

Ghazan Khan wanted to take away the caliphate mission of the Egyptian Mamluk sultanate, his eternal enemy. It is known that Hulagu Khan's intention to invade Egypt when he entered the Middle East geography brought the Mongols into conflict with the Muslim Mamluk sultanate of Egypt. The conflict between the two states was always a priority in the foreign policy of the Ilkhans until Ghazan Khan, however most of their military operations against Egypt were not successful.

The fact that Ghazan Khan became a Muslim did not bring expected positive change in the policy of the Mongols against the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt, their main enemy in the region. On the contrary, Ghazan Khan who as mentioned before claimed to accept himself as the leader not only of the Mongols who became Muslims, but also of the entire Islamic world, began to conduct a more active policy against the Mamluks. Based on the Arab chronicles and diplomatic correspondence of the time, Denis Aigle point out that, by accepting the title of "*Padishah-e Islam*" Ghazan Khan intended to disguise his invasion plan with religious legitimacy during his march on the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt [Denise (2007): 92]. The author's opinion is confirmed by the information contained in *Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍlullāh*'s work *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh*. So, that, *Rashīd al-Dīn* states about the purpose of Ghazan Khan's military expedition to Syria in 1299. He describes that, as a just Islamic ruler, Ghazan Khan aimed to put an end to the actions of the Mamluk army, such as selling Muslim women as slaves during their marauding marches on Mardin, as well as the soldiers' immorality by drinking wine [Rashīd al-Dīn (1994): 1289-1290]. However, some of the scholars rightly consider the position of *Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍlullāh*, one of the viziers of the Ilkhanate, as an attempt to give religious legitimacy to the cause of Ghazan Khan's invasion [Erdem (2000): 25].

According to another essential Persian source of the period *Tārīkh-i Waṣṣāf*, H. Howards, derives that after his accession to the throne Ghazan Khan wrote a letter to the Sultan of Egypt. In his letter Ghazan Khan notifies that he had already accepted Islam and thus the religious conflict between the two parties had been resolved, but he claims that Mamluk dynasty has no legitimate right to rule and therefore advises them to submit to the Mongols who have world dominion. Henry Howorth notes that Ghazan Khan campaigned against Egypt based on the illegitimacy of the Mamluk dynasty [Howorth (1880): 435]. However, Robert Irvin, who approached the issue from a different perspective, thinks that one of the reasons for the hope of the Mongols to reoccupy Syria was the internal political unrest in the Mamluk Sultanate [Irwin (1986): 99].

Undoubtedly, we can also note, in addition to the mentioned reasons, that ilkhan's intention to invade Egypt was related to the factor of the realization the mission given to the previous ilkhans, which was the idea of world domination of the Mongols. In addition, after the fall of the Abbasids, the desire to achieve the main religious legitimate leadership of the Islamic world - the *ummah*, and the intention to turn the Muslims here into their subjects can also be counted among the goals of the Mongol invasion of these territories. However, the economic importance of the region at this time, especially the fact that it was the route of trade and caravan routes, cannot be ruled out.

Georgians and Armenians, which were traditional allies of the Mongols in this region, showed particular effort in the war of Ghazan Khan against the Mamluks of Egypt. According to the sources, in addition to the Anatolian Seljuk forces and Georgians, 10,000 Armenian troops under the leadership of the Cilicia Armenian king Hetum II participated in the 90,000-strong Mongol army [Galstyan (2005): 60-61, 173]. On December 22, 1299, in the battle of *Wadi al-Khaznadar* (in some sources, *Majma al-Muruj*) near Homs, the Mongols won a battle against the forces of the Egyptian Mamluk Sultanate for the first time [Irwin (1986): 100]. Although this victory gave the Mongol army hope to restore the image of invincibility and fighting spirit, which they had lost in the battle of *Ain Jalut* (1260), following events showed that it would not be possible to turn this into real political results. Most Armenian and Georgian chroniclers overdraw the victory of *Wadi al-Khaznadar* and exaggerate the role of Armenian-Georgian troops in the victory [Galstyan (2005): 153; Kartlis Tskhovreba (2014): 390]. However, major researchers explain the reason for the victory differently, for instance Denis Aigle point out that Ghazan Khan won the victory thanks to Seyfeddin Kipchak al-Mansuri, a Mamluk emir who escaped from the Mamluk sultanate and took refuge in the Ilkhanid state [Denise (2014): 256]. Also, recent studies suggest that Ghazan Khan achieved victory thanks to the reforms he implemented in the army, especially by using heavily armed infantry alongside with traditional light cavalry [Martinez (1986): 176-177, Sykes P.M (1921): 189, Uyar (2007): 3526]. Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍlullāh narrate that when the battle started, Ghazan Khan ordered the Mongol cavalymen to dismount and fight on foot. [Rashiduddin, (1998): 646]. In fact, a different method of fighting chosen by traditional light cavalry Mongols created confusion in the Mamluk army and this was the main reason for their defeat. This serious alteration in the army can be considered a clear sign that the Mongols have already mastered the traditional heavy infantry battle tactics of the Middle East.

After the battle, the Mongols besieged and conquered first the city of Homs, and then Damascus without any resistance. On January 8, 1300, a *Friday Khutbah* was delivered in the name of Ghazan Khan in the Damascus mosque [The Cambridge History of Iran (1968): 388]. On February 5, 1300, after appointing Gutlughshah Noyan and the fugitive Mamluk emir Seyfeddin Lachi as the governor to the conquered territories, Ghazan Khan returned to the city of Damascus. J.A. Boyle and D. Morgan explain his return with the beginning of attacks by the Qara'unas (or *Neguders*) forces in Southern Iran [The Cambridge History of Iran (1968): 388]. H. Howorth finds it unconvincing that *Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍlullāh* associated Ghazan Khan's retreat with hot weather, because it occurred in February. Based on Hayton, H. Howorth associates the withdrawal of the Mongols from Syria with the Chagatai raids that violated the eastern borders of the state [Howorth (1880): 446]. D. Morgan also connects Ghazan Khan's retreat with the Chagatai, but at

the same time he assumes that the Ilkhanid army retreated because of the lack of pastures for their horses in Syria [Morgan (1988): 74]. After the return of Ghazan Khan from Syria, the treacherous Mamluk emirs who previously turned to the Mongol side began to violate their promises and made peace with the Mamluk sultan again. The Ilkhanate emirs, who were appointed as governors to Damascus, were troubled by the news of the Mamluk attack and had to leave Syria.

Ghazan Khan's next campaign to Syria started from the city of Tabriz in the fall of 1300. According to the sources, despite the conquest of several areas in Syria, this military campaign failed due to heavy rains [İbn Tagriberdi (2013): 102-103; Rashiduddin (1998): 649; Irwin (1986): 101]. While Ghazan Khan was in Sinjar, he sent a diplomatic mission to the Sultan of Mamluk in order to regulate the relations. In his book, Ibn Tagriverdi gave the text of the letter presented by the envoys to the Sultan. In the letter, written in Mongolian on paper produced in Baghdad, Ghazan Khan relates the robbery and oppression of the Muslim community in Mardin as the main reason for his first campaign. He notifies that his army won the battle with the help of God. He also wrote that in order to improve welfare of the population again and restore the movement of merchants from both sides, both Muslim rulers must continue their relations in peaceful conditions [İbn Tagriberdi (2013): 105-106]. However, Denis Aigle, who conducted research on the Mongolian text of the letter and the Arabic translation text in the Mamluk sources, points out that Ghazan Khan attempted to show himself in a superior position over the Mamluk sultan using of critical and threatening manner [Denise (2014): 266-268]. Mamluk sultan al-Malik Nasir Muhammad (1299-1309), who well understood the Ilkhanate ruler's intention to present himself as the protector and leader of the Islamic Ummah, wrote a reply letter in almost the same essence and style and sent it to the Mongol court. However, both sides' inclination towards peace resulted in calming the tense political situation, albeit temporarily.

Nevertheless, the desire of the Mongols to possess lands as far as Egypt caused Ghazan Khan to make a final campaign in this direction. According to B. Shpuler, there emerged favorable political conditions for Ghazan Khan to go on his third military campaign to Egypt. Relations with the Chagatai in the east and the Ulus of Jochi (Golden Horde) in the north were already settled. As well as, taking advantage of the young age of the Mamluk sultan al-Malik Nasir Muhammad, the influential Turkmen emirs, named Baybars al-Jashngir and Sayf al-Din Salar, interfered in his actions, which caused political instability in the administration. Before starting the war with the Mamluks, Ghazan Khan sent a new delegation to Egypt in order to win some time. In the letter that the envoys delivered to Cairo on August 27, 1302, Ilkhan demanded the submission of the Mamluk sultan, the annual tribute, and minting of his name on coins, otherwise the Sultan was threatened to suffer the same fate as Sultan Muhammad, the ruler of Khwarazmshah [Bertold (2011): 114, Özgüdenli (2009): 212]. The ultimatum letter was answered in the same tone by the Mamluk sultan. On January 30, 1303, Ilkhanid army crossed the Euphrates River from Hilla and started the third Mamluk campaign. [Howorth (1880): 465]. The Mongol army under the leadership of Gutlughshah Noyan, Amir Choban and Mulay camped in Raqqa and then marched on Aleppo from here. The Mongols suffered a crushing defeat under the leadership of Gutlughshah Noyan in the battle that took place at a place called Shaqhab or Marj al-Saffar. The Mamluk side was successful as a result of the effective battle tactics under the command of Sultan al-Malik

Nasir Muhammad and his experienced generals Sayf al-Din Salar, Baybars al-Jashngir, Hussam al-Din Lajin, Baybars al-Mansoori and as well as Ibn Taymiyyah's religious-ideological propaganda in the army. As a result of the battle, the Mamluk Sultanate established its dominance in Syria. In addition, the Armenians, who were vassals of the Ilkhanate, accepted the Mamluk rule and began to pay the annual tribute [Bertold (2011): 115-116].

The consequences of the battle for the Ilkhanate, and especially the influence on Ghazan Khan, are overdrawn in most Arabic sources. According to the sources, the outcome of the battle had such a negative impact that it led to Ghazan Khan's death. It should be noted that in the sources of the period, Ghazan Khan's Mamluk policy was seen differently in the initial periods when he came to power, especially taking into account the effect of his conversion to Islam, but later events showed that he had distinct ambitions in this matter. Despite a positive relation towards the Mamluks in the initial negotiations, it is clear that he still was devoted to the ideology of world domination, left by his ancestor Genghis Khan. The Mamluk sultan's suspicion of Ghazan Khan's intentions is also confirmed in later events. As a result, it was not possible to fully realize the intention to conquer the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt during the reign of Ghazan Khan, as it was during the rule of the previous Ilkhans.

Relations with Ulus of Jochi (Golden Horde)

As we know Genghis Khan divided his empire, which is called "*Yeke Moğol Ulusu*" in the Chinese sources, into *ulus* (state, country) among his sons, and determined a share of land from the occupied territories within the certain borders for each of them. However, the fact that some territories were not completely occupied during the partition and fell under the Mongol rule after Genghis Khan's death, caused disputes between the states (*ulus*) in the later period. This territorial dispute occurred between the eldest (aka) and youngest (ini) sons of Genghis Khan, among the states (*ulus*) created by their successors, the Golden Horde (or *Jochi Ulus*), and the Ilkhanate. It is clear from the notes of the researchers, who tried to investigate the root and reasons of the dispute by using resources available in different languages of the time, that the cause of the dispute was mainly related to economic resources [Ализаде (2012): 323-356, Камалов (2007): 75-80]. The historical Azerbaijan, which located at the point where the east and the west meet, where the main trade and caravan routes pass, was a favorable strategic point desired by both Mongol states. Undoubtedly, the main reason of misunderstanding was Azerbaijan [Yakubovski (1976): 58]. Both states (*ulus*) well understood the importance of Azerbaijan's rich natural resources, fertile meadows and winter pastures, as well as its importance as a center for controlling the occupied territories, covering the territories from Darbend to Hamadan.

This long and hard conflict over Azerbaijan brought two Mongol empires against each other, and even caused wars over this claim for more than a century. Undoubtedly, both states have suffered socio-economically from these severe conflicts. The Arabic author Ibn Wasil writes that when Berke Khan of Golden Horde saw the terrible struggle that took place on the battlefield, he said "May God shame Hulagu, who killed the Mongol with the sword of the Mongol. If we were united, we could conquer the whole earth"[Tiesenhausen (1941): 153, Yakubovski (1976): 59]. It should be noted that the serious consequences of these bloody wars fell on the population of the region, especially

Derbend and Shirvan, and a large number of people were killed, and the cities and agriculture were damaged. The campaigns of the Jochi ulus to the region ended in defeat in most of the battles that took place before the accession of Ghazan Khan. However, Ilkhanate rulers have always focused on the forthcoming threat from the region and adjusted their foreign policy course to take it into account.

Ghazan Khan's accession to the throne and his conversion to Islam created hope for the Muslim Golden Horde khans to realize their traditional territorial claims. However, before moving on to the steps taken to realize these claims, it is necessary to pay attention to the events that took place within the Jochi ulus in order to better understand the processes at the time when Ghazan Khan came to power. After the death of Möngke Temür (1266-1280), there was a political instability in the Golden Horde ulus. Thus, during the reigns of Töde Möngke (1280-1287) and Töle Buqa (1287-1290), who replaced each other in a short period of time, the central administrative apparatus was weakened and influential nomadic Mongol noyans, especially Nogai, acted independently. As a result of the measures taken by the influential emir Nogai, who concentrated almost all the power in his hand, Töle Buqa was assassinated and replaced by Tokhta Khan (1290-1312). However, it should be noted that at the age of nine, Tokhta, who was declared the khan of Jochi ulus by Nogai Khan, was under his influence for some time. However, upon reaching a certain age, the deterioration of relations with Nogai led to the murder of the latter. The initial relations between the Ilkhanate and the Golden Horde during the time of Ghazan Khan, coincidence with the political instability that occurred in the Jochi ulus. According to the sources of the time, Nogai Khan had secret relations with the Ilkhanate regarding Tokta's attitude towards him. Even after Nogai's murder, his wife Chubei Khatun and his eldest son Torai took refuge in the state of Ilkhanate and asked for help from Ghazan Khan to take revenge on Tokta [Rashīd al-Dīn (1994): 748]. Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍlullāh states:

“Ghazan Khan said it is far from bravery not to keep one's word when relations are bad. Craft and deception are considered wrong in Sharia and Law. Although we have friendship with Nogai, we will not interfere between two people. Taking advantage in bad times is not a good feature for great kings.” [Rashiduddin (1998): 336].

After elimination of Nogai in 1301, Tokhta Khan, who gained full power in the Golden Horde ulus, stabilized the state's internal situation, and then began to become active in foreign policy. According to B. Shpuler's research, Tokhta initiated an invasion in 1301 through the Derbend pass, a key point between the two empires. This initiative, which was easily prevented, resulted in the submission of several Lezgi emirs to Ghazan Khan [Bertold (2011): 113]. In 1302, Tokhta Khan sent envoys to Ghazan Khan to demand their inherited territories. Information about the purpose and activities of the mission staff has been written by the Persian and Arabic authors. Tokhta Khan's envoys consisted of 350 people, according to “Tārīkh-i Waṣṣāf” and 300 people based on Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍlullāh's record [Ayati (1993): 240, Rashīd al-Dīn (1994): 1309]. Even Ghazan Khan, who was angry with the large number of envoys, said:

“If the envoys came to receive their inheritance, their number should have been more, if they came just as envoys, it would have been enough to have 5 people. Why should the expenses of these people from Darband to Hilla be a burden on my subject?”[Ayati (1993): 240].

The Arabic author al-Omari noted that the envoys sent to Ghazan Khan said: “These are the places, conquered by the sword of our ancestors. It is our inheritance from them and it is our right. Give us our rights”. In return, Mahmud Ghazan Khan responded: “*I did not get these lands by inheritance, but by the sword. Tabriz and Maragha are among the places that I took by the sword and joined to my country. In this matter, there is nothing between you and me but the sword*” [Tiesenhausen (1941): 385].

It is mentioned in the sources that the envoys of Tokhta Khan symbolically scattered a bag of millet on the ground to show the large number of the Golden Horde’s army. Ghazan Khan ordered some hens to be brought and after the hens ate the millet in a short time, he told the envoys: “It is known to Tokhta that a hen enjoys millet, a hunting bird enjoys a flock of pigeons, and a wolf is happy with a large flock of sheep” [Özgüdenli (2009): 163; Камалов (2007): 69].

Tokhta Khan intended to take advantage of Ghazan Khan’s unsuccessful campaign to Egypt and take back Azerbaijan peacefully. Tokhta Khan’s intention was severely answered by Ilkhan and remained without result. However, it is clear from the sources, that despite the harsh rejection to the envoys of the Golden Horde, Ghazan Khan did not allow the relations to deteriorate. According to “*Tārīkh-i Waṣṣāf*”, on December 31, 1302, during the celebration, organized on the occasion of the traditional Mongolian New Day (Novruz) holiday, precious stones were granted in return for 21 hunting birds brought by the envoys of Golden Horde [Ayati (1993): 242]. The sources suggests that the rulers of the Golden Horde, inspired by the crisis of power that arose during the Ghazan Khan’s rise to power and the fact that the new ilkhan was a Muslim, brought up the issue of traditional territory claim again, however their efforts were in vain. It should also be noted that despite being a Muslim, Ghazan Khan, who was distinguished by his loyalty to the laws and customs of his ancestors, managed to diplomatically prevent the territorial claims of the Golden Horde.

Relations with the Chagataids

As in the west, the Ilkhanate also had strategic interests in the east and rivals who trampled on those interests with marauding expeditions whenever possible. Thus, even during the division of the empire by Genghis Khan, the lands belonging to the eastern part of the Ilkhanate, especially Khorasan province, which had particularly favorable natural geographical conditions, caused conflicts with the Jagatais. During the time of the Ilkhans, who ruled before Ghazan Khan, the Jaghatai forces staged marauding raids in the area, but these raids were repulsed. A number of aggressive border violations launched by the ruler of Jagatais, Duva Khan (1277-1307) towards Khorasan during the reign of Ghazan Khan were recorded in the sources. Unlike the previous Chagatai rulers, Duva Khan, who pursued a more active policy, began to act more independently after the death of the Great Mongol Khan Kublai (1294), and even subdued the Ogedeis, whose he was subject once. Thus, as a result of his determined position, the Chagatai Khanate became more powerful and its influence increased in the territories of Afghanistan. Taking advantage of the internal struggle in the Ilkhanate state, Duva Khan started a raid in the direction of Khorasan and Mazandaran with the combined forces of Ogedeis’ crown prince Sarban and Juji Ghasar's successor Ebuge. According to M. Biran's researches, Duva Khan stayed in Mazandaran for eight months, and on his way back, he plundered a large number of cities in Khorasan and Mazandaran. He even tried to convince the

governor of Herat to take his side by promising him half of Khorasan, but the latter preferred to report this matter to Amir Nowruz [Biran (1997): 59].

According to the information given by Rashiduddin, Ghazan Khan, who heard about this attack, consulted with his emirs and sent an army to Khorasan under the command of Emir Nowruz and Prince Suka [Rashīd al-Dīn (1994): 1291-1292]. However, Prince Suka, who was in the army, and a number of his followers plotted against Emir Nowruz. As a result of their intention being revealed, a number of treacherous emirs, including Suka, were killed by Nowruz. B. Spuler mentions his patronage of Muslims and the desire of the emirs to remain faithful to their previous religious beliefs (Buddhism and Christianity) among the reasons for the hostility of the revolted emirs to Nowruz [Bertold (2011): 107]. As for the attack of Jagatai army, Duva Khan besieged and plundered the cities of Kusui and Fushank in the south of Herat, but he returned to Mawarunnahr after receiving the news of the Ilkhanid army's approach. Taking Ghazan Khan's campaign to Syria as an opportunity, Duva Khan appointed his son Gutluq Goja as the leader of the Karauna forces who were subordinates of the Jagatais and sent them on raids against Ilkhanid cities in the direction of Khorasan in 1298-1299. Jagatai forces plundered the cities of Balkh, Sistan and Marv, and in 1300 advanced to the Fars province and besieged the city of Shiraz. However, they were unable to take the city and advanced towards Kazuran, they did not succeed here as well and besieged the city of Hormuz. They returned to their country with the loot they captured, encountering serious resistance from the ruler of the city, Baha ad-Din Ayaz.

The next campaign of Jagatais to Khorasan took place in 1302. According to "Jāmi' al-tawārikh", the Mongol envoy, named Armeni Bala brought information to Ghazan Khan, who was on his next campaign to Syria, that the 3-4 thousand enemy forces crossed the border, but they were repulsed by Oljaytu Khan, governor of Khorasan [Özgüdenli (2009): 222]. M. Biran notes that, in 1302 Kaidu Khan sent an army under command of his son Sarban to help the Jagatais, but bad weather prevented the unification of the armies of the Jagatais and Ogedeis [Biran (1997): 60]. As mentioned, the Jagatai troops, having left alone, were repelled by Oljaytu Khan. The death of Ogedei's khan Kaiudu in March of 1303 created favorable conditions for the Ilkhanate. Inasmuch as, when the Jagatais were carrying out campaigns on Khorasan, the khans of the Ogedey house not only supported them, even encouraged them. However, it should be mentioned that Ghazan Khan, who was mainly involved in the struggle with the Egyptian Mamluks in the west of the country, and partly with the Jochi Ulus in the northern borders, managed to control the raids, carried out by the Jagatays in Khorasan, even if it's from a distance. Particularly, like the previous ilkhans his appointment of his brother and heir Oljaytu as a governor here, should be considered as an important step to ensure the security of the region.

Relations with the Grand Mongol Khanate

When Hulegu Khan was sent from Mongolia to the Middle East in 1253 by Münke Khan (1251-1260), he was ordered to subjugate the territory and return later. Nevertheless, subsequent events led to Hulegu Khan not only becoming the full ruler of the occupied territories, but also the emergence of a new independent Mongol state. Even so, according to the majority of researchers, Hulegu Khan did not actually become an independent ruler of the state until the death of his brother Münke Khan (1260), and that

relation of subordination, albeit formal, remained until the rule of Ghazan Khan. The Ilkhanid rulers up to Ghazan Khan paid special attention to relation of subordination with the Great Mongol Khanate, even if it was formal, and even the power of some Ilkhans depended on Khanbalik. The coming to power of Ghazan Khan and his conversion to Islam did not affect these relations. Thus, when the previous Ilkhans came to power, in order to confirm the legitimacy of their authority, a seal and yarlig (payza) had to come from the palace, which was previously situated in Karagorum, and at the time of Kublai Khan (1260-1294), was in Beijing, and the names of the great khans had to be minted before the names of Ilkhans on coins. However, with the ascension of Ghazan Khan to the throne, this rule disappeared. According to T. Allsen's research, in the coins related to the reign of Ghazan Khan started to be used Muslim titles and did not mention the names of the Grand Mongol Khan. However, it is interesting that in 1302, Ghazan Khan mentioned the name of the Grand Mongol Khan in his letter to Pope Boniface VIII and used the traditional title of Ilkhan [Allsen (2001): 32]. It seems that Ghazan Khan had a political purpose in mentioning the name of the Great Mongol Khan here, and tried to present himself as the successor of his grandfather Genghis Khan in order to create influence in the Western world.

In the sources, there are some facts that Ghazan Khan continued positive political, economic and cultural relations with Mönke Temür (1294-1307), the Great Mongol Khan. Referring to a source dedicated to the history of the Chinese dynasty, T. Allsen discovered information about sending a soldier named Baiju to the Ilkhanid palace in 1296. Thus, according to the source, Ghazan Khan, who was impressed by the skills of Baiju, gave him a military position. Baiju in his turn served well and gained the ruler's trust. Even after his return to the Yuan palace, he was rewarded by Mönke Timur for his services [Allsen (2001): 34]. During this period, there are records of the sending of an embassy from Ilkhanate to Beijing. In 1297-1298, a delegation, consisting of the governor of Fars province Malik Fakhreddin Ahmad and Nogai (Tokay) Elchi, was sent by sea to the Great Mongol palace by Ghazan Khan. According to T. Allsen, the reason the messengers went by water was that the land route was dangerous due to the conflict between the Jagatais and Ogedeis in Central Asia [Allsen, (2001): 34]. The delegation, together with the valuable gifts, they brought with them, went to meet Mönke Teymur Khagan, who was sick near Khanbaliq [Özgüdenli (2009): 216, 29, 284]. The Mongol delegation, which stayed in the Yuan palace for about four years, was sent to the Ilkhanid palace by Mönke Teymur, along with a ship loaded with silk in exchange for the goods, inherited by Hulegu Khan and an envoy of the great khan. According to "Tarikh-e Wassaf", on the way back, because of reasons unknown to us, the ship carrying Nogai and the Khagan's envoy sank. Malik Fakhreddin died in 1305 [Ayati (1993): 284]. However, in his work, T. Allsen determined that Nogai and the Khagan's messenger named Yang Su arrived in Hormuz in 1307 [Allsen (2001): 34].

In accordance with the information given in the sources of the period, it can be said that after the conversion to Islam by Ghazan Khan, although he limited formal relations with the Great Mongol palace and did not attach importance to submission to their will, he did not interfere with the development of economic and cultural relations between the parties. On the contrary, economic and cultural ties between Beijing and Tabriz continued during this period, as in the days of previous Ilkhans.

Relations with the Byzantine Empire, the Papacy and Western European states

The entry of the Mongols into the Middle East was an important event for the Christendom. In particular, as Hulegu Khan put an end to the Abbasid dynasty and his war with the Mamluks of Egypt created sympathy for the Mongols in the Christian West. In return, the Ilkhans tried to break the resistance of the Muslims in the region by establishing diplomatic relations with the Pope of Rome and other Western European states, especially with Byzantium. The elimination by the Mamluks of the crusader states such as Antakya, Tripoli, and Akka, created as a result of the crusades, as well as the actions of the Egyptian sultans, aimed to decrease the positions of the Mongols in the territories of the Anatolian Seljuk sultanate, were also factors that brought the Christian-Mongol alliance closer. Due to the mentioned reasons, since the time of Hulegu Khan, the Ilkhanate took the initiative to establish alliance with the Western world.

First of all, it should be noted that, as most researchers have rightly pointed out, the relations of the Ilkhanid state with the Christian-Western world were not widely reflected in the Muslim Eastern sources, and this factor did not allow for an in-depth study of the issue. The main reason of this was that in Muslim authors' opinion, Ilkhanid rulers, especially who accepted Islam, alliance with Christians (infidels) was not proper for a Muslim ruler [Boyle (1976): 27].

Among the Christian states, relations with the Byzantine Empire are the first to attract attention. Unfortunately, Byzantine-Ilkhanid relations, the subject of extensive research in the Western historiography, have not been sufficiently studied in Azerbaijani historiography. The analysis of a number of foreign studies suggests that the emergence and development of these relations are caused by various reasons. Thus, the Byzantine emperors, who carefully followed the events since the entry of the Mongols into the Middle East, implemented a policy of protecting themselves from Mongols and using this destructive force for their political interests. Especially during the time of Ghazan Khan, raids of the Turkmen tribes in Anatolia against Byzantium and their disobedience to the Ilkhanate government led to the unification of the two states in one front. Simultaneously, the riots that took place inside Byzantium and being attacked from various fronts caused them to look for an ally as the Ilkhanate.

There is no sufficient information about the relations with Byzantium during the reign of Ghazan Khan. Among the information that we have, the first to be noted is the request of Alaeddin Keygubad III, who was at that time in the Byzantine palace, to replace Masud II, who was removed from the throne of the Rum Seljuk Sultanate in 1296, by the Ilkhanate [Özgüdenli (2009): 223 - 225]. Thus, Alaeddin III, brought from Constantinople to Tabriz, was elevated to the throne of the Rum Seljuk Sultanate in 1298.

The second information about relations with Byzantium is the arrival of ambassadors from Constantinople to Ghazan Khan's palace, who was in Kermanshah at that time. In 1302, during the preparations for the Syrian campaign, it is known that the Byzantine emperor wanted to establish alliances and even send his own daughter to marry the ilkhan [Sykes (1921): 190]. Historians, who pay attention to the fact that such an initiative took place in 1302, explain it by the fact that Byzantium was attacked from various directions on that date, it was defeated by the Ottomans in Goyluhisar [Donald (1972): 127]. In addition, the victory of Ghazan Khan in Syria encouraged the Byzantine court to make an alliance with the Mongols against the Turks, but this wish was not fulfilled. Although

Ghazan Khan's response to the Byzantine envoys is not mentioned in the sources, his positive approach to the proposal is clear from subsequent information. John Boyle, referring to Pachymeres, a Byzantine historian, writes that apparently Ghazan Khan accepted this offer, but his death did not allow the alliance to continue until the end [Boyle (1976): 36].

It is clear from the information mentioned above that, like his predecessors, Ghazan Khan initiated the establishment of diplomatic relations beside Byzantium, with the Papacy and Western European states. Although we do not see this in the eastern sources of a chronicle nature, we can learn it in the works of Christian travelers and especially from the correspondence discovered in the archives at the beginning of the last century. From the letters, it is known that Ghazan Khan, like the previous ilkhans, took the initiative to create relations with the European states and make an alliance against the Egyptian Mamluks, and the attitude of the Western world towards this alliance was positive. Power of the Mamluks and the end of a number of Crusader states caused serious concern in the Christian world and caused them to attach importance to the alliance with the Ilkhanate.

In the following year, Ghazan Khan wrote a letter to the King of Cyprus, Henry II, in this context, and was disappointed that they could not march against the Mamluks together. According to P. Jackson, the king of Cyprus, Henry II, besieged Botru with two ships (galleys) in 1299 in order to cooperate with the Mongols, and rebuilt the fortress of Nef here. Amauri, the brother of the king of Cyprus, responded more seriously to the call of Ghazan Khan. In 1300, under his command, Cypriots and Knights Templar besieged Ruad, a small island in the coast of Tortosa, but the Mongols, led by Gutlughshah, did not come [Jackson (2005): 171]. Thus, joint action did not take place. Henry Howorth determined that the main reason for Gutlughshah's return was that he received the news of Ghazan Khan's illness [Howorth (1880): 456].

Ghazan Khan's victory over the Mamluks in the battle of Wadi al-Khazandar in 1299 was greeted with joy in the Western world and created a desire to establish an alliance with the Ilkhanate. King James II of Aragon (1291-1327) congratulated Ilkhan on his victory [Özgüdenli (2009): 229]. With that, the influence of the Ilkhans in the region and the short-term superiority over the Mamluks tempted the Venetians, who were lords of sea trade, to make an alliance with the Mongols. According to M.P. Pedani's research [Maria Pia Pedani (1987-1988)], there were correspondences between the two parties. It is known from the author's research that in 1300, Ghazan Khan announced the victory over the Mamluks to the Doge of Venice and expressed his desire for alliance. In March of 1300, the Venetian senate, which was in the same position with the Mongols against the Mamluks, sent its representative to the Tartars (Mongols) with valuable gifts to congratulate Ghazan Khan on his victory. Marino Sanuto Torsello's report on situation in the Holy Land also confirms the existence of economic relations between the two sides this time. Marino Sanuto the Elder claims that it is possible to boycott Egypt by conducting trade with India through Persia (the territory of the Ilkhanate). In this case, it would be possible to gain an advantage for the Venetian merchants along the Euphrates towards the Syrian coast, weakening the infidels (Muslims-NN) and defeating the Genoese on the spice route [Maria Pia Pedani (1987-1988): 608-109].

Despite being a Muslim, Ghazan Khan continued the policy of his predecessors and even before the first Mamluk campaign, in 1298 he sent a letter to the French king Philip

IV the Fair (1285-1314) with the idea of acting together against the Mamluks. Although the text of the letter has not survived, we assume that he, like his predecessors, encouraged the French king to send forces to liberate the Holy Land. Moreover, Buscarello de Ghizolfi, a Venetian merchant, who was sent to Europe in 1289 during the reign of Arghun Khan (1282-1291) with the aim of establishing diplomatic relations between the European kings and the Ilkhanate, was again appointed by Ghazan Khan for this purpose. In addition to conveying the information and congratulations from the west to the Ilkhan, in this diplomatic mission, beside Rome and Paris, he also went to meet the English king Edward I (1272-1307) in London and presented the letter of Ghazan Khan to the king. Unlike the letter sent by Ghazan Khan, the reply letter of Edward I has reached us. It is clear from the text of the letter that the English king expressed that the riots in Europe had ended and that the alliance with the Mongols against the Mamluks would be realized. However, this idea of Edward I was not accomplished due to the rebellion of Robert Bruce who revolted against him in Scotland [Özgüdenli (2009): 323].

Ghazan Khan also established relations with the Pope of Rome, leader of the Catholic Church. However, as mentioned, most of the eastern Muslim authors are silent about this in their works and do not share any information with us. The main reason for this was that the creation of an alliance against the Muslim states by a ruler, who had actually accepted Islam, was against religious and moral rules. Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303) was among those who congratulated Ghazan Khan on his victory over the Mamluks, but the text of his letter has not reached us. However, the letter sent by Ghazan Khan to Boniface VIII from Azerbaijan, more precisely, from a place called Kushgapu (Kushkapisı -NN) by the Mongols near the present city of Shabran, on April 12, 1302, was discovered in the Vatican archives in 1921 and was studied by John Andrew Boyle [Boyle (1976): 38]. From what was written in the letter, the original text of which was analyzed by Mostart and Clevis, it is known that Ghazan Khan explained the invasion plan of Syria in detail to the Pope and European rulers and asked them to prepare their forces to start a war with their common enemy, the Mamluks of Egypt [Mostaert and Cleaves (1952): 469-471]. However, as with other European kings, relations with the Pope did not bring real political results. This can be explained mostly by the internal political instability in Europe during this period and the disagreements of some of the European rulers with Pope Boniface VIII [Özgüdenli (2009): 231].

CONCLUSION

Thus, based on the traditional historiography of that period and modern historiography, it can be concluded that with the coming to power of Ghazan Khan, the diplomatic policy of his predecessors was continued, not taking into account some new points in the foreign policy of the Ilkhanate. The conversion of Ghazan Khan to Islam did not give the expected results in foreign policy, especially against the Mamluks of Egypt and the Ulus of Juchi.

His campaigns against the Mamluk sultanate confirmed the attitude of the Mamluk sultans, who doubted his sincerity in converting to Islam. On the other hand, although relations with the Juchids improved, this could not change the fact that there was still no complete confidence in diplomatic activity between the parties. At the same time, despite the fact that Ghazan Khan strengthened and used Islam in every possible way, he intensified relations with the Christian world and Western Europe. In particular, it is

known that attempts by Ghazan Khan to incite a number of Western European rulers to go on a crusade against the Mamluks of Egypt with the support by the Pope of Rome did not yield serious results.

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AL-BIRUNI'S CONCEPT OF HISTORY

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Abstract. This article is devoted to the role of Abu Rayhan Biruni, a great figure of medieval science, culture, philosophy, economics, politics and history. It considers him as a founder of the modern scientific thinking and research methods, quantitative approaches in scientific research, experimental and observational methods and tools in science. His works, "Al-Asar-ul-Baqiya", "India", "Geodesy" and others prove that he was a devotee of the ideas of national and universal human values, reason and law, reasonable harmony of human duties and obligations, rights and freedoms, development and civilization, both in politics and social development. Research on his books "Mineralogy" and "Al-Qanun al-Masudi" confirm that his philosophy of history had a formative influence on the development of Eastern historiography and sociology of the Middle and Late Middle Ages, on the historical and social political views of Utbi, Bayhaqi, Yaqut, Ibn al-Athir, Ibn Abi Usaybiya, Abul Fido Qifti, Rashidaddin, Ibn Khaldun, and Maqrizi. And according to the concept of history, it is concluded that the aspect of historical research is not substantial, but relational, i.e. changing, updating and rising to a higher level.

Keywords: *Biruni, Al-Asar-ul-Baqiya, Al-Qanun al-Masudi, Concept of History, Scientific Thinking, Research Methods*

Abu Reykhan Biruni, a great figure in Central Asia, Turkestan and world science, culture, philosophy, economics, politics and history in the Middle Ages, was the founder of the rules of modern scientific thinking and research methods, quantitative approaches in scientific research, experimental and observational methods in science, but also in politics, and in social development. He was an adherent of national and universal values, reason and law, reasonable harmony of human duties, rights and freedoms, development and civilization.

In the rich scientific heritage of Biruni, there are many works dedicated to the problems of historical science, methods, the uniqueness and essence of historical thinking, the formation and manifestation of the principles of modern historical research. This is especially true about Biruni's major works, such as "Al-Asar-ul-Baqiya" ("The Chronology of Ancient Nations"), "India", "Geodesy", "Minerology", "Al-Qanun al-Masudi" ("The Cannon of Masudi"), "Kitab-us-Saydana" ("The book of Pharmacology") and others. However most of his works have not reached us or manuscript copies have not yet been found, and among them are "Tanqih-ut-tawarikh", "Ad-dastur", "At-tarikh va-l-hay'ya", as well as his philosophical debate with Shaykh ur-Rais, as we can see in the preface, written to his teacher Abu Bakr al-Razi, where the list of latter's works and his own works were given [Беруний билан Ибн Синонинг савол жавоблари (1950); Beruni (1976): 234-271].

Biruni's philosophy of history had a formative influence on the development of Eastern historiography and sociology of the Middle and Late Middle Ages, on the historical and social political views of Utbi, Bayhaqi, Yaqut, Ibn al-Asir, Ibn Abi Usaybiya, Abul Fido Qifti, Rashidaddin, Ibn Khaldun, and Maqrizi. In this sense, Biruni is one of the mature forerunners of the science of history.

The entire humanity presented in Biruni's works, such as "Al-Asar-ul-Baqiya", "Tahqiqu molil-Hind", "Kitab ul-jamahir", "Kitab ul-Saydana", "Tahdid nihayat al-amakin", "Mashahiri Khwarazm". They illuminate the unity of history, the orientation from past to future, from lower development to higher and advanced development, the objective existence of historical processes and eras, cultures, developments, interrelationship, communication, and relationship [M. Khairullaev (1973)]. To prove that history and its laws have a high, noble essence and meaning, these theoretical and methodological problems of the philosophy of history and methodology were founded by Biruni. The most important thing is that the research and knowledge of historical processes is fundamentally different from other knowledge, especially social and natural sciences. Biruni expressed the following in "Al-Asar-ul-Baqiya" that it has its own uniqueness, its method and principles specific to the science of history.

Biruni strongly emphasizes the uniqueness of the science of history, the closeness of historical knowledge to other social sciences, especially religious traditions, creeds, hadiths, specific sciences that are sharply different from knowledge, as well as the silence in the methods of history writing and research of his predecessors and contemporaries. While indirectly criticizing prejudices and preconception, he openly writes that he wanted to "put it among the exact sciences" in order to write history scientifically and impartially [Biruniy (1968): 40].

Knowledge of history through the scientific and exact sciences of astronomy, mathematics, geodesy, cartography, calendaring, methods was especially applied and demonstrated by Biruni in the works "Geodesy", "Minerology", "Al-Qanun al-Masudi" (The Cannon of Masudi), and "Kitab-us-Saydana" ("The book of Pharmacology"). On the other hand, Biruni admits that according to the conditions and possibilities of his era, especially according to the methods and traditions of learning, researching and writing history, this is a "difficult work and the source is far away (difficult to reach)" [Biruni (1968) 40]. In addition, he writes that scientific research methods, used in the natural and exact sciences, are more traditional under the influence of Greek figures; however historians, philosophers use only rational knowledge, logical rules, observation, and experimental methods, which are not enough, the historical truth cannot be known without research on the historical process: "Mentally it impossible to know those messages without providing evidence, comparing them with observed (things)" [Biruniy (1968): 40].

The following definition of the methods of historical knowledge, its uniqueness, given by Biruni, in our opinion, differs from the definitions given by specialists in the philosophy of history and historical knowledge [Filosofiya istorii (1999): 338-374] in its deep-rooted, comprehensive and complete, closeness to historical processes. It is distinguished by a number of advantages. Biruni writes that history "is the knowledge of the narratives of ancient nations, the news of past generations, because most of them consist of the generations of those nations and their rules of art and style, which only "people of the book" (in general, these are the Judaism and Christianity, with the true

prophets - S.Z.) and following different religious figures, people of various professions and beliefs who follow these beliefs, is known by always basing their concepts. Then it is known by comparing the words and beliefs that they bring for proof after purifying themselves from the bad morals that degrade the nature of most people and the factors that do not allow them to see the truth. What I have mentioned is the best way to the true goal and the most powerful help to wash away the doubts that stain it. Even if we try hard and suffer great hardships, we cannot achieve the goal in any other way" [Biruni (1968): 40-41]. It is possible that these ideas are still superior to the definitions of researchers of the philosophy and methodology of history!

The peculiarity of historical knowledge, discovered and emphasized by Biruni, is that a certain historical fact, a proven fact, as in other, especially natural, exact sciences, is often suddenly "discovered" by one person for a short time, stating it as a certain "completed truth". In opposed to this, it is a problem of acquisition, proof and becoming the truth of history as a result of the successive cooperation of several historians. The reason for is that, according to Biruni, the historical concept, the setting of problems in the middle are abstract concepts, very high and fundamentally variable, which are fundamentally different from natural sciences, which are based on purely quantitative, concrete indicators, and can be strongly influenced by different spiritual, ideological, and social aspects. Historical understanding of the existence of problems in the form of messages, narratives, traditions, values, which differ from scientific or often historical evidence, and the existence of each person's free, personal opinion about them. Due to the fact that this historical message, narration is often passed from mouth to mouth without being recorded, they contain various empirical evidences, life experiences, personal, spiritual experiences, emotions, even lies, erroneous information, and exaggerations. One human life is not enough for this. "A human life is not enough to find out (all relevant) messages about a person. How can it be enough to know the messages (about) all nations? This is impossible" [Biruni (1968): 41], - writes Biruni.

On top of that, historical events and processes are often observed or recorded in the form of fragments in an objective way, and are often passed down from generation to generation in the form of word of mouth, oral tradition. However, in any science, it is not only impossible to express a scientific, specific, complete opinion and judgment, based on a single piece of information, but also it is extremely dangerous from social and scientific aspects. One must be able to see that they really are such in a long period of time and therefore it is necessary to investigate historical events and processes accordingly and draw conclusions consistently and naturally. In this way, a successor creative cooperation, working towards one goal, i.e. division of labor, which cannot be recorded in any official documents, takes place between modern historians and historians of the future. "When the work goes this way, we should take the closest and most famous narrations to our time, and then the closest and more famous ones (one after the other). We accept (some) of them from their own people and correct what can be corrected, and we leave others as they are. Then the narrations that we have given will help the seeker of truth and sense of wisdom to work on other narrations and guide him to achieve things that are not possible for us" [Biruni (1968): 41]. Therefore, according to Biruni's concept of history, the aspect of historical research is not substantial, but relational [B. Torae (1992)], that is, changing, renewing and rising to a higher level.

First, historical truth cannot be ascertained until a wide range of data covering periods as large and long as a changing field of inquiry is established.

Secondly, the collection and research of this large-scale historical empirical information is not the work of one historian, but "true" knowledge and conclusions can be obtained only as a result of research conducted in different historical periods.

And thirdly, historical processes and events are not frozen and unchanging, but real, full-blooded, alive, changing, developing, enriching, and rising. This process also requires a truthful approach to the above-mentioned objective process of change, not according to the subjective will and desire of the historical researcher, because the content of the historical process - the objective basis that ensures the coherence of the changing reality, which reflects the historical reality, is not only based on historical events and processes. The underlying natural causal chain, and most importantly, the internal driving force of the historical process, which sets in motion an important historical process, encourages improvement and growth - these are based on hereditary relations. [M. Khairullaev, D. Shorakhmedov (1972)]. Hereditary connection, necessity, successional repetition, that is, historical legitimacy, manifests itself in the essence of eras, centuries, and year calculations.

Fourthly, although the historical researcher does not have the right to interpret objective historical events and processes according to his own knowledge, at the same time, his worldview, imagination, approach and methods of interpretation depend primarily on his inner tones, spiritual experience, dreams and goals. Moreover, Biruni specifically emphasizes that, no matter how objective, impartial, and determined the historian is, the historical research aspect depends on the uniqueness of the ways of knowing:

1. The influence of sacred religious tradition;
2. Influence of authorities;
3. Influence of some socio-political forces;
4. It cannot remain free from the impressions of changing political and historical events and cannot take them into account [Biruniy (1966): 218-219].

This, according to Biruni, makes it difficult for the historian to be objective and ultimately consistent. The intrusion of subjectivity into the historian's research can open the way for distortions, falsifications of narratives, messages, and stories. Nevertheless, every historian, knowing about objective historical events and processes, trying to determine the most accurate ones, especially those that can be verified by measurements, calendars, including works of other researchers, compares knowledge, information, ideas of different periods in order to draw an impartial conclusion. Historian must be able to distinguish what he is capable with his own strength, intellectual potential, and correct and create a source and research base for restoring the truth of history in creative collaboration with others, especially historians after him, conveying to the next the truth of history without destroying it, as it is. This basis is the continuity of relations between various historical events, processes, and also historians, their ability to be objectively impartial - for the continuity of the direction, allowing you to get the perfect historical truth about historical changes.

This historical phenomenon, the historical change, rise and perfection of the processes, in the eyes of Biruni, show that the whole history has a common, necessary, legal, noble meaning, essence and purpose that unites great historical periods, and that

history guides it in a rational and noble direction. "All this is not accidental, nor in vain, but due to the Original, Wise Owner, Composer and Creator [Biruni (1966): 20, 42, 103, 104]."

Of course, Biruni's conclusions can be interpreted as a sidestepping of the sacred beliefs of the ruling religious ideology of his time, that is, as a method of theological history, which assumes that the historical process, the development of events, is the goal set by God and the emergence of truth.

However, even though Biruni emphasizes that this holy belief, that is, the noble meaning, essence and direction of the historical process, and moreover, there is a guide, but to determine the truth of this history, first of all, by scientific and logical methods, an objective process, a historical event, the objective of the times taking into account the adequate adaptation to the process of change, he set the goal of determining the scientific truth about historical processes steadily and consistently, without allowing subjective distortions and interpretations, and directed his successors to this goal. Historians of the future generation recognized Biruni's methods of historical research as the most perfect method for scientific objectivity and consistency. This recognition was expressed not only by his contemporaries, for example, Bayhaqi and others, not only by Muslim historians, but also by the most powerful historical thinkers who flourished in the West. In the 19th-20th centuries, in a completely new environment, such thinkers as Eduard Sachau, Arnold J Toynbee, I. Y. Krachkovsky, S.P. Tolstov and others mentioned him in their works.

Although Biruni's works such as "Al-Qanun al-Masudi", "Minerology", "Geodesy" are devoted to the problems of special sciences, astronomy, mineralogy, geodesy, the new understanding of historical studies, historical thinking and impartial interpretation, are promoted by Biruni. It also serves as an appendix to historical research methods, empirical and quantitative analysis. For example, the book "Al-Qanun al-Masudi" summarizes the progress of almost a thousand years after Ptolemy (Batlymus) and Aristarchus in the sciences of astronomy and natural sciences, in addition to promoting a number of new solutions and interpretations [Biruni (1973-1976)], in different nations comparative study of popular calendar systems - Greeks, Romans, Copts, Jews, Byzantines, Persians, Syrians, Arabs, Indians, Turks, Khorezmians, Bactrians and other peoples, and various dynasties that allow to show their peculiarities and principles and benefits. A number of tables are given which determine the periods of reigns (beginning and end), the dates of the declaration and outbreak of wars, the places and years of rebellions, extensive agricultural works, and especially the periods for the payment of taxes and other obligations, which can be correctly read, understood, and interpreted impartially. According to the contemporary historian Mustaqil (on the basis of Biruni's tables can solve many research problems on a high scientific basis, with mathematical and astronomical precision and on the basis of the primary, most reliable source - Biruni's calculations and conclusions, and draws new conclusions.

Such astronomical, mathematical, natural-scientific, historical research Algorithms of Biruni's tables are numerous presented in both books of "Al-Qanun al-Masudi", especially in the second book.

Based on the above-mentioned tables in Biruni's work "Al-Qanuni al-Masudi", the famous historian and scientist Professor A.Z.V. Toghhan wrote in 1928-1939 and was published in Egypt in the old Arabic Uzbek alphabet "Today's Turkestan and the recent

history". And later in his work "All Turkish People of Turkestan and Recent History", he proved that it was five thousand years since the foundation of the Uzbek-Turkish statehood in the 1930s. Toghan wrote: "According to the Old Khorezm tradition narrated by Al-Biruni, they believe that they came at the invitation of a Turkish king and settled in the land from which they got their name in 982 before the Seleucid calendar, i.e. 1292 BC, and they consider this date as the beginning of their calendar, they know that. In the chapter of this story narrated by the author of the 10th century, Muqaddasi, it is reported that the Khorezm people came to the "King of the East" as 400 soldiers, that the king thought of the 400 Turkish girls he gave, and in this way, a nation (people) with mixed Iranian and Turkish blood was born [Toğan (1981): 92].

P.G. Bulgakov, who learned from A.Z.V. Toghan to calculate the historical date or solve the problem by calculating from the "Al-Qanuni al-Masudi" tables, also said that the date of the revolt of the ancient Egyptians against the rule of Darius II has not been determined until Biruni, who was able to solve it. Biruni in his "Al-Qanuni al-Masudi" shows that this event took place in the 14th year of the reign of Darius, that is, in 410 AD [Bulgakov (1972): 38-39]. But in the first book of the Uzbek edition of "Al-Qanuni al-Masudi" this date is indicated as follows: "Darius II, in the 15th year of his reign in 5085, the Egyptians rebelled and freed themselves from the Iranians" [Biruni (1973): 137] (table). This date is 5 years more accurate than the date of this uprising, which is now conditionally accepted [Vsemirnaya istoriya (1956): 199-822].

Another aspect of the fact that the philosophy of history, developed by Biruni in "Al-Asar-ul-Baqiya", "Al-Qanun al-Masudi" and "Geodesy" has different scientific and historical research methods on the classical period and middle ages. According to P.G. Bulgakov's apt conclusion, based on the collection of rare, mostly lost, ethnographic data on the ethnography of the peoples, Biruni "emerges as the founder of comparative ethnography in the Middle Ages in the East: he describes Indian rituals, traditions, family-marriage and other relations before Islam and compares with the same relations of Arabs, Persians and other peoples" [Bulgakov (1972): 41].

The most interesting aspect of the concept of history and the method of historical research of Biruni, which surprised modern Western scholars, is his impartial and frank study of the history of various religious beliefs, philosophical and moral teachings and sectarian movements of the peoples of the world. His purely objective approach to the research question, which is very consonant with our time, lies in the fact that "comparative ethnography" and "comparative theology", even the holy books of world religions, such as the Torah, the Bible, the Holy Koran and other monuments, were turned into front of "scientific-comparative criticism" as clearly cultural monuments.

Important directions and problems of Biruni's historical research method specially researched and illuminated by A.B. Kholidov, B.G. Erman [A.B. Kholidov, B.G. Erman (1963): 34-47], M.A. Usmanov [M.A. Usmanov (1973): 39-52], A. Zokhidov [A. Zakhidov (1979)].

It is known that in the medieval Arab Muslim literature, the study of religious and philosophical teachings, beliefs, and sectarian sects created a separate "Ilm ul-firaq", and a special field of history that studies sects, teachings, and heretics, that is, heresiography. This was first formed among the Shiites, Kharijites and Mu'tazilites, and the need to fight against them was created by the Sunni heresiographic literature and its following major representatives - heresiographic historians and their religious sects, folk beliefs, scientific

and philosophical teachings, which world science today recognizes as classical monuments. Its emergence led to the creation of the main works on the essence and genealogies of the sect's teachings:

1. Al-Ash'ari (died - 935) "Kitab maqalat al-Islamiyyin wa ikhtilaf al-musallin" (Sayings of Muslims and Differences between Those Who Pray) [Al-Ash'ari (1963)].
2. Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi (died in 1037) "Al-Farq bayn al-Firaq" (The difference between the sects and the statement of the sect that survived them) [Al-Baghdadi (1910)].
3. Ibn Hazm (died in 1064) "Kitab ul-Faisal-fi-l-milal wa-l-ahwa' wa-n-nihal" (The Book of Judgement regarding the confessions, inclinations and sects). [Ibn Hazm (1899)]
4. Muhammad ibn Abd -al-Karim Ash-Shahrastani (died in 1153) "Kitab al-milal wa-nihal" (Book about religious and philosophical beliefs) [Аш-Шахрастани (1984)].
5. Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Fakhri (died in 1430s) "Kitab Talhis al-bayan fi dhikr firak ahl al-adyan (A brief explanation of the list of followers of different faiths " [Ал-Фахри (1988)].

Of course, Biruni at least had a good approach of the above-mentioned religious, scientific-philosophical sects, as well as the listed authors, in general, the apocryphal Torah, the Bible, the Holy Qur'an, and the beliefs and teachings of other religious sects. Biruni himself, as mentioned in "Al-Asar-ul-Baqiya", even wrote a special heresiographical book such as "Akhbar ul-Mubayida wal-l-Qaramita" which has been lost or not yet found. Moreover, "India", left us such rare, rich and diverse information about religious and philosophical beliefs, doctrines, sects, communities that Western scholars, such as T. Haarbrucker, Steiner, Steinschneider, H. Ritter, O. Fisher, S. Prozorov and others only in the 19th-20th centuries conducted similar studies.

A.B. Kholidov wrote in the preface to V.G. Erman's work on Biruni's "India", that when he studied scientific-philosophical, religious-sectarian, moral teachings, according to a certain trend, sect, introduced the primary sources of religious-philosophical teachings into scientific use and noted that he very carefully and painstakingly translated philosophical written monuments, at least when it was impossible to give the text directly, he managed to clearly explain the meaning of the original text [A.B. Kholidov, Erman V.G. (1963): 26]. It is especially true in the spirit of Vedanta that the concept of "God" is given in the concept of "Brahma", in sources such as "Patanjala" and "Bhagavad Gita" the function of "cause" is "Ishvara", and the concept of God in the other world with the concept of achievement Nirvana, is the path of liberation - the path of knowing God.

An important aspect of Biruni's concept of history, historical thinking and research method is that he was the first to use archaeological, epigraphic, and paleontological methods in the historical research. Especially in his "Al-Asar-ul-Baqiya", "Geodesy", "India", "Al-Qanuni al-Masudi", "Kitab-us-Saydana" and other works, this method was widely used. It is in these mentioned works, especially in the work "Geodesy", that Biruni used the process of observation, vision, and experiments in studying important problems related to the geology, geodesy, cartography, paleontology, zoology, and works of his spiritual teacher Abul Abbas Iranshahri, Razi, Khojandi, or others. Using the reports given by scientists, travelers, and diplomats, he drew conclusions about "The land replaced the sea and the sea replaced the land" [Biruni (1966): 94] and this was confirmed by the examples of the Arabian sands and the Karakum desert, where were found the remains of fish bones, traces of water waves and by other paleontological evidence. At the same time, Biruni was not limited to these archaeological,

paleontological, zoological, geographical, ethnographic, etc. evidences, but based on their comparison with ancient Greek, Arabic, Persian or Turkish written sources, historical events, he came to firm scientific conclusions. The famous Uzbek geologist O.M. Akramkhojaev rightly writes about this: "He describes the shells or remains of ancient animals that came out from under the earth so accurately that any modern paleontology or zoologist would envy" [O.M. Akramkhojaev (1973): 33].

Finally, we come to the conclusion that the philosophy of history of Biruni, the method of historical research he proposed, especially his fundamental scientific and practical rules, can be used correctly and adequately, leaving the class approach and ideology characteristic of the Soviet era, and raising the question of the authenticity of the history of peoples and states, making possible to effectively and consistently solve a number of unresolved problems of historical research.

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**THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION IN AZERBAIJAN IN CONDITIONS
OF THE CONFLICT OF THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE NATIONAL FORCES
(April-July 1918)**

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Abstract: The military-political situation in Azerbaijan in April-July 1918 in the context of the struggle of the Baku Soviet of People's Commissars against the Republic of Azerbaijan is analyzed in the article. Since at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Baku gubernia was under the authority of the Baku Soviet of People's Commissars, there was actually dual power in the country. But soon the Baku SPC started a war with the national government, due to which the Bolsheviks suffered heavy results. The article elucidates the relationship between the forces on the political scene in Baku. In the summer of 1918, the factors that determined the anti-Bolshevik activity of the forces represented in the Baku Soviet are revealed, and the reasons for the isolation and subsequent overthrow of the Bolsheviks are determined. The causes of disagreements between the Bolsheviks and the Dashnaks are analyzed in detail. Altogether, the influence of the Armenian factor on the events of the period is being studied.

It also clarifies to which extent the military assistance of Soviet Russia played a role in the struggle of the Baku SPC against the Republic of Azerbaijan. The main source base of the paper is the press materials of the mentioned period and the memories of participants in the event of different political orientations.

Keywords: *Azerbaijan Republic, Baku Soviet of People's Commissars, Transcaucasian Seim, the Ottoman State, Caucasus Islamic Army, Bolsheviks, Armenian National Soviet, S.Shaumyan*

Introduction

Although the first period of Bolshevik rule in Azerbaijan in April-July 1918, which covered only the Baku gubernia, was a short period, it has become the object of historical investigations for many years. This period was studied in Soviet historiography in the context of the struggle of the Bolsheviks for power in Azerbaijan, and in the Azerbaijani one - in the context of the struggle of the Republic of Azerbaijan to establish its power in the country and the anti-Azerbaijani activities of the Bolshevik-Dashnak regime. The change of approach in the analysis of events from one pole to another (Soviet and modern Azerbaijan) did not allow us to fully determine the essence of a number of issues. Therefore, there is a need to dwell on the relations between the political forces in Baku, especially between the Bolsheviks and the Dashnaks, between the Armenian political forces in the tense situation that arose during the confrontation of the Bolsheviks with the Azerbaijani national forces, the role of the British factor in leaving of the Bolsheviks the power and other questions. For instance, if the Bolshevik-Dashnak alliance is mainly mentioned in Azerbaijani historiography, then the essence of the subsequent

contradictions between them remains unclear. Relations between the head of the Baku Commune S.Shaumyan and the Armenian national forces before the summer of 1918 differ from the relations then. It would also be appropriate to pay attention to the interference of Soviet Russia in the events taken place in Baku in the summer of 1918.

As we know, in March 1918, after the massacre of the Muslim population in Baku, the Bolsheviks established their first government - the Baku Soviet of People's Commissars (Baku SPC), which existed from April 25 to July 31 under the leadership of S.Shaumyan. The Baku SPC was the local authority of Soviet Russia here. Despite the fact that the official power was in the hands of the Bolsheviks and the left-wing socialist-revolutionaries (S.R.- member of Socialist Revolutionary Party), in fact, the Bolshevik-Dashnak regime was established in the city. The Bolshevik-Dashnak regime ensured the same position regarding the national political forces of Azerbaijan, the participation of the Dashnaktsutyun party in the Baku Soviet and the inclusion of the Armenian armed forces in the newly formed Baku Army of the SPC. Since the detachments sent by the Baku SPC to establish Soviet power in the regions were mainly Armenian military units, the "struggle for Soviet power" in these regions was carried out through serial massacres of the Muslim population in April-May. However, the Bolsheviks, who had managed to consolidate power in Baku gubernia, faced a difficult struggle.

The impact of relations within the Transcaucasian Seim on the military-political situation in Azerbaijan in April-May of 1918

The aggravation of the national-political struggle in the region had a serious impact on what was happening in Azerbaijan. In April 1918, the Baku gubernia was under the jurisdiction of the Baku SPC, and all other territories of Azerbaijan were formally and legally under the authority of the Transcaucasian Seim. The power of the Seim depended on the mutual relations of the Georgian, Armenian and Muslim factions within it, which in turn affected the struggle with the Bolsheviks.

Since its foundation, the general policy of the Transcaucasian Seim, which implemented the will of the Georgian and Armenian factions, led to an 8-day war with the Ottoman state and, as a result, the Seim, which was defeated on April 22. announced the establishment of an independent Transcaucasian Federative Republic and further estranged itself from Bolshevik Russia. But, after the fightings between the Ottoman state and the troops of the Seim, who were trying to fulfill the conditions of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, on May 11, a conference between the parties began in the city of Batum. The fate of the South Caucasus was already being decided here.

At the time, the Muslim faction of the Transcaucasian Seim discussed the situation in Azerbaijan, and it appeared that as a result of the "advance" of the Baku Bolsheviks into the population, Bolshevik sentiments in the population began to increase [Minutes of the meetings...1918 (2006): 64]. Certainly, at that time we could not talk about the growth of sympathy of the Muslim population for Bolshevism, but only about the strengthening of Bolshevik power in places. The national forces of Azerbaijan had urgently to reveal their positions. Thus, in this situation, the most important task facing the Azerbaijani national forces was the liberation of Baku, which was possible only with the help of the Ottoman state. So, the Muslim faction sent its representatives M.H.Hajinsky and M.A.Rasulzadeh to the afore-said conference. The issue was so important for the

Azerbaijanis that even a large number of influential people from uyezds took the initiative to go to Batum for asking help from the Turks. [Minutes of the meetings... 1918 (2006): 66]. Since the active intervention of the Entente and Soviet Russia in the region was impossible, it increased the chances of victory for the Ottoman state.

In this case, the representatives of the Dashnaktsutyun party in the Seim, seeing the danger of getting Baku out of control, tried to discuss the future fate of Baku with members of the Azerbaijani faction and achieve a favorable result for themselves. Taking on the obligation to rectify the situation, they put forward the condition that power in Baku should belong not only to Muslims, but be international, and the Armenian military units should remain in Baku. However, representatives of the Azerbaijani faction rejected any concessions to the Dashnaks, contrary to the expectations of the Armenians, taking the position of “all or nothing” in this matter [Minutes of the meetings...1918 (2006): 66]. By this time, the Ottoman troops had already seized Alexandropol, creating disconnection along the common front line where the Armenians were fighting, and creating an unfavorable situation for the Armenian troops on the Kars and Iravan sides.

The harsh position of the Azerbaijani faction prompted the Dashnaks to take retaliatory measures. So, in mid-May, the Dashnaks, who form the basis of the armed forces of the Baku SPC, requested the approval of the head of the Baku SPC, S.Shaumyan, for an attack on Ganja. But S.Shaumyan was against hastiness. He considered first to ensure the delivery of a sufficient amount of food from the North Caucasus to Baku, and then take an offensive against Ganja [Meeting of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Sailors' Deputie... (1918, June 12)]. Such a step had to confirm to the policy of Soviet Russia, that is, the Center, and backed up with help from there. Baku SPC tried to get support from the Center in a short time. This is evident from Shaumyan's letter to the Soviet of People's Commissars of Russia dated May 24 and from the report of the commander of the Caucasian Red Army (or the army of Baku SPC) G.Korganov attached to this letter. G.Korganov provided detailed information about the state of preparation and the needs of the army. There was information in Shaumyan's letter received by him from the Dashnaks: “The Dashnaks received information from Tiflis that they promised autonomy to the Georgians in Batum under the protectorate of Wilhelm, and the rest of the South Caucasus should be autonomous Azerbaijan”[Bolsheviks in the struggle... (1957): 424].

It appears from the letter that Shaumyan, who made haste to capture Ganja, was planning to start an Armenian rebellion there and further. In his opinion, this step would mobilize the Georgian peasants and result in the dismissal of the Seim ”[Bolsheviks in the struggle...(1957): 425]. On the eve of the attack on Ganja, the Caucasian Red Army consisted of 19 battalions with 18.000 men. As for the supply of weapons and ammunition, it consisted of 60 machine guns, more than a thousand shells, 9 million rifle bullets, 12 cannons, 7 mortars, 3 armored trains, and some hydroplanes. Korganov's report stated that there is a great need to send a high command staff from the Center to the army [March 1918 genocide... (2009): 97].

The influence of the establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the political course of the Baku SPC

The further development of the events faced the Baku SPC with new facts. Thus, after the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Seim on May 26 and Georgia's decision on

independence, the Muslim faction of the Seim, seeing that the South Caucasus cannot be an alliance, created the Azerbaijan National Soviet on May 27 and the next day, on May 28 announced the creation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. This also meant that dual power had already emerged in the territory of Azerbaijan, with the National Government of Azerbaijan and the local government of Bolshevik Russia controlling only the Baku gubernia. A sharp military-political conflict between these two forces standing in an irreconcilable position was inevitable.

The government of the Republic of Azerbaijan did not have the military power to establish its authority in the entire territory of the country. Therefore, on June 4, the representatives of Azerbaijan and the Ottoman state signed an agreement “On Peace and Friendship” in the city of Batum, and according to the 4th clause of the agreement, the Ottoman state undertook to provide military assistance to the Republic of Azerbaijan. In order not to provoke the protest of its ally Germany, which has its own interests in the region, the Ottoman state decided to create an “Islamic Army” consisting of its own army and Azerbaijani volunteers, and to conduct military operations through it.

Since the Baku SPC was primarily a local authority of Soviet Russia, the head of the Russian SPC Lenin tried to direct its activities in the region. Worrying about the increasing Ottoman threat, in his telegram sent to Shaumyan on May 24, as a way out of the current situation, Lenin advised to enter into an alliance with the Georgian Mensheviks [ЛЕНИН (1970): 82]. Although the Georgian Mensheviks and Bolsheviks had long since parted ways, in the current situation, Shaumyan appealed to Jordania on June 6, following Lenin’s recommendation. Despite the fact that the letter sent to Jordania through the Tiflis Bolsheviks was delivered to Jordania only on the 25th of the month, he promised, even though it was late, that under any circumstances Turkish echelons would not be allowed to enter the North Caucasus from its territory [Bolsheviks and N.N. Jordania (1918, August 7); Bolsheviks at N.N. Jordania (1918, August 9)]

At that time, also Stalin, being in the defence of the Saritsyn city, was worried about the current situation of the Baku SPC. His sending a new mandate to Shaumyan on behalf of the Central government and advising him to act as he knows in certain situations [Bolsheviks in the struggle...(1957): 426] gave Shaumyan even more authority. On June 5, without waiting for further instructions from the Center the Baku SPC, began the war with the Republic of Azerbaijan.

It should be noted that during this period, since the civil war in Russia was gaining momentum, the necessary assistance that will be provided to the Bolsheviks in Baku became a difficult matter. Despite this, the leadership of the Baku SPC hoped that assistance would reach Baku from the Center in any case. S.Ter-Gabrielyan, whom Shaumyan trusted greatly, was negotiating. He was told that 100 million rubles will be given to Baku. In the end, Ter-Gabrielyan was able to receive only 50 million rubles of the promised amount, but Lenin instructed that the money given to Baku should be spent just on oil production [ЛЕНИН, В.И. (1970): 516].

On June 10, the deployment of the 5th Caucasian division sent by the Ottoman state to Ganja was ended. Its military staff consisted of 257 officers and 5.575 soldiers [Qafarov, V. (2020): 64], and it was planned to merge the division with the Azerbaijani military forces. From June 14, Nuru Pasha took direct control of the operations of the Caucasus Islamic Army. By starting a counterattack he intended to go behind the troops of the Baku SPC and isolate Baku from the southern grain regions and block the road to

Iran. On June 16, a battle took place between the troops of the Baku SPC and the Caucasus Islamic Army near Kurdamir, and the army of Baku SPC was able to gain an advantage for the time being.

Finally, on June 23, aid consisting of 4 armored vehicles, 13 airplanes, and other weapons was delivered to Baku through Ter-Gabrielyan. At that time, most of the weapons and ammunition at the disposal of the Caucasian Red Army were the weapons that the Bolsheviks bought from the corps of the Russian army commander N.Baratov in Iran. As early as the beginning of 1918, the Baku Soviet sent a group of guardsmen to Iran to obtain these weapons.

It should be noted that although Lenin advised Shaumyan through Ter-Gabrielyan to take a waiting position in the current situation for the difficulty in the international situation [Bolsheviks in the struggle ... (1957): 519], but he considered going forward as the only way out.

The invitation of the English to Baku and the strengthening of disagreement within The Baku Soviet

The serious resistance of the Caucasus Islamic Army created an opportunity for the emergence of an opposition group against the Bolsheviks within the Baku Soviet. The right wing of the Soviet - socialist revolutionaries, social-democrats (Mensheviks) and Dashnaks began to look for alternative ways in the current situation and persistently offered to call the British forces stationed in Iran for help against the German-Turkish bloc. The Armenian National Soviet in Baku was also in this position and was particularly active in order to achieve this. The idea of calling the English to Baku among the aforementioned forces appeared already in the spring of 1918. L. Dunsterville, the head of the British mission in Iran, shows in his memoirs that in the second half of April, when he was in Hamadan, the Baku Armenian National Soviet sent a representative to him and asked for help from the British [Денстервилл (1925): 100]. To the point, on the other hand, the Armenian National Soviet in Tiflis sent a delegation consisting of Melik-Karagezov (Armenian People's Party) and A.Jamalyan (Dashnak), and then A.Zurabyan (social-democrat) and A.Ohanyan (Dashnak) to achieve German influence in Turkey [Киракосян (1989): 137].

Another active group that tried to establish contact with Dunsterville was the Baku SRs, which had strong positions in the navy. It should be noted that Armenians (Ter-Ohanyan, Dr. Zakharyan) were active among them [Verbatim report...p.73]. The idea of inviting the British was fueled by the critic situation within the country, the acute dissatisfaction caused by the shortage of necessary foodstuffs, especially bread. The idea that the British would solve this problem quickly was spreading among the workers.

It appears from Dunsterville's writings that at this time the British were able to create a whole intelligence and courier system in the entire area from Hamadan to the Caucasus [Денстервилл (1925): 56]. R.Mcdonell, the former British vice-consul living in Baku, was widely active in this direction. It appears from Mcdonell's memoirs that he was able to establish close relations with Shaumyan and Japaridze in Baku [Макдонелл (1938): 207]. Calling Shaumyan "his friend", Mcdonell tried to convince him that the British could play an important role in the course of events.

However, there was a difference of opinion within the Baku SPC on the calling the British. If Japaridze was in favor of accepting this help, (At one time, during the discussions in the Baku committee regarding the Brest-Litovsk Peace, Japaridze spoke against this peace. In other words, in some cases, he considered it possible to abandon the general policy of the Bolsheviks.) Shaumyan was hesitant, and at first opposed. On June 5, after receiving instructions from Moscow, Shaumyan informed the British consul that the Soviet government would not allow the British to enter Baku [Suny R.G. (1990): 281]. No matter how much it was in the interests of the Armenians, as the head of the Bolshevik government in Baku, Shaumyan could not appreciate such cooperation with the British.

For this reason, the British agency in Baku tried to use the manpower of the Caspian Navy against the Bolsheviks. In a short time, a fairly positive result had been achieved in this issue, and the number of those agitating for the acceptance of help from the British in the navy was constantly increasing. At that time, the idea of inviting the British seemed so attractive that its rejection even led to an open attempt against the existing government. So, on June 12, 1918, an attempt was made against Shaumyan under the leadership of the right-wing socialist revolutionary P.Ivanov and S.Kirichenko, the mechanic of the “Ardahan” ship. The purpose of the attempt was to seize power in the Baku SPC and to dissolve the Baku Soviet by arresting Shaumyan [Şaumyan (1978): 357]. But accidentally, the attempt ended in failure.

On the whole, the ideas about inviting the British brought into question the “reliability” of the Baku Bolsheviks in the eyes of the Russian Bolshevik authorities. For this reason, on June 21, Shaumyan and Japaridze had to send a radiogram to the Soviets of the North Caucasus and Volga and to Lenin himself to refute the ideas spread about it [Deputies of Soviets: Petrovsk (1918, June 23)].

But, Shaumyan being in the difficult situation, instead of the help of the British, decided to use the help offered by L.Bicherakhov, head of the Russian-Cossack partisan group located in Iran. Representatives of the Anzali Military Revolutionary Committee, especially Dashnak Nerses Jigityan, played an important role in the formation of a positive opinion about Bicherakhov [Безугольный (2011): 72].

After the negotiations for some time, Bicherakhov first came to Anzali and then to Baku and met with Shaumyan. According to the initial agreement between the parties, Bicherakhov, who included his military force in the Red Army, had to be the commander of one of its units. Bicherakhov assumed the task of holding the right flank along the Shamakhy-Goychay road. Then, Bicherakhov intended to advance towards Tiflis with this flank, and on the way to raise up the North Caucasus highlanders, especially the Ossetians [Bolsheviks in the struggle (1957): 519]. There were approximately 1,500 soldiers in his detachment, 880 of whom were Cossacks. However, it should be noted that after Bicherakhov announced “voluntary mobilization” in Baku, a considerable force joined the detachment. One of the factors that led to this was the fact that his soldiers were paid more.

On July 1, after the Caucasus Islamic Army inflicted a heavy defeat on the forces of the Baku SPC near Goychay, Bicherakhov’s detachment went to the front. Bicherakhov, who started commanding the Red Army on July 6, took a position on the right flank of the front, while G.Korganov took a position on the left one. Despite the help of the new force, the Caucasus Islamic Army gained the upper hand in the battles near Kurdamir on

July 10 and Karrar station on July 14, and after that the military initiative passed into the hands of the Caucasus Islamic Army.

In the telegram sent on July 13 by Shaumyan, he still hoping for Soviet Russia, asked for immediate strong help [Bolsheviks in the struggle (1957): 557]. Along with several other representatives, he even had to send his son Suren to Moscow. As mentioned, the beginning of the civil war on the territory of Russia certainly did not allow the sending of necessary military aid to the Baku SPC. The leadership of Soviet Russia first solved issues that it considered important and that could be solved more quickly.

However, on July 19, help - a detachment headed by G.Petrov came to Baku from the Center. However, Petrov, who had to give most of his soldiers for the defense of Saritsyn, was able to bring only 780 men to Baku. On July 24, a cavalry battery of 170 men, armed with 4 cannons, joined them [Bolsheviks in the struggle (1957): 583].

It should be noted that the position of Extraordinary Military Commissar for Caucasian Affairs was given to Petrov by the Russian Foreign Ministry. According to Suren Shaumyan's writings who tells about Petrov's activities in Baku, considered himself equal to Shaumyan, if not higher than him [Meeting of the Azerbaijan Assistance ...:12].

The position of Armenian political forces

At the time, the fate of the newly declared Republic of Armenia was being decided as well, and this issue worried the Armenian political forces. The defeat of the Armenians in the struggle against the Turks on the Caucasus front created a serious disagreement among the Armenian political forces, which were faced with the dilemma of war or peace. In fact, disagreement between Armenian political forces existed from the very beginning. After it became clear that Turkey insisted on implementing the terms of Brest-Litovsk, the Armenian National Soviet in Baku considered admissible not to follow the Baku Soviet, but to send a peace delegation to Tiflis [Ceremonial meeting of the Soviet. (1918, June 4)].

The Armenian National Soviet in Baku and the Dashnaks here hoped for the British in the current situation. Not recognizing the new Armenian government and the old Armenian National Council in Tbilisi, they wanted to amend the Batumi Treaty and save the Armenians with the help of the British [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): 117]. Therefore, they parted ways with the Soviets, which implemented the Bolshevik policy. One of the Dashnak leaders, O.Kachaznuni, expressed the interests of the part of the Baku Dashnaks who wanted to distance themselves from the Soviet. Afterwards, Kachaznuni clarified their goals and stated that they had their own political line and believed that by consolidating in Baku, they could attract Turkish-Tatar (that is, Azerbaijani – A.A.) forces here and protect the rest of Armenia from Turkish attacks [Качазнуни (1990): 22]. However, as the situation escalated, the Dashnaks had already begun to accuse Shaumyan, and this became clear at the meeting of the Baku Soviet on June 9 [Orders of the Provisional Dictatorship ...(1918, August 8)]. Unlike them, Dashnaks of Tiflis considered relations with England very problematic and tended to talk with Turks. They also undertook to influence the Dashnaks in Baku to surrender the city [Radiotelegrams (1918, July 30)]. Thus, according to the 11th article of the Batum Treaty, the Armenian National Soviet had to succeed in removing the Armenian units from Baku by separating from the Bolsheviks. Therefore, on June 10-12, the Armenian

National Soviet in Tiflis sent its representatives M.Arzumanov and M.Arutunyants to Baku accompanied by the Ottoman representative Husameddin Bey [Pogroms of Armenians in Baku (2003): 61]. But, not reaching the goal the representation returned from Kurdamir [Pogroms of Armenians in Baku (2003): 127].

Shaumyan, who had to implement the political course of Bolshevik Russia, insisted on continuing the war with Turkey and tried to use another force interested in it – Andranik Ozanian, who made a name for himself with his brutality in his attitude towards Muslims in Azerbaijan. Rather, the parties mutually hoped to receive help from each other, and the initiative came from Andranik. So, on July 14, Andranik himself sent a telegram to Shaumyan and stated that he unconditionally obeyed the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, that he declared the Nakhchivan uyezd, which he had captured at that time, an integral part of the Russian Republic, and that he, together with his detachment, was at the disposal of the Central Russian government. Shaumyan, who called Andranik a “people’s hero”, immediately sent him a reply telegram [*Radiotelegrams: Julfa. Folk hero Andranik (1918, July 20)*]. But at the time, the tactical steps of the command of the Caucasus Islamic Army did not allow Andranik’s units to join the commune army.

The fall of the Baku Soviet of People’s Commissars

In the last decade of July, Shaumyan, feeling helpless in the face of the successful operations of the Caucasus Islamic Army, sent representatives to Russia several times.

After the defeat of Kurdamir by the army of Baku SPC, contradictions within the Baku Soviet intensified and calls for inviting the British began to increase [The Last Days of the Commissars of the Baku Commune (1928):18]. The misperception of non-Muslim population about the real power of the British in the region led the political forces to open action against the Bolshevik government. This option was proposed as the only way to get rid of hunger and the threat of defeat in workers’ and sailors’ meetings. Until the mid of July, there was uncertainty between the British Ministry of Defense and the “Government of India” about the possibility of conducting military operations on Russian territory [Эллис (1963): 23], but finally, after learning about the Soviet-German secret talks in London, the British agreed to send a mission to Baku. [Эллис (1963): 26]. However, the position of the Central Bolshevik government on this matter was clear, and Stalin in his telegram demanded from Shaumyan a decisive struggle with the supporters of inviting the British and “agents of foreign capital” within the Soviet [Bolsheviks in the struggle...(1957): 574]. It was evident that in such a situation, a certain personal initiative of Shaumyan could not be the subject of discussion. Moreover, Shaumyan, who had more correct information about the British military forces in Iran, was sure that they would not go beyond Baku by strengthening themselves in the Caspian basin. For this reason, he did not believe that they would help against the Turks [Extraordinary meeting of the Soviet ...(1918, July 21)]. Therefore, in any case Shaumyan did not support the separate negotiations of the Armenian political forces.

At the July 17 meeting of the Baku SPC, Shaumyan informed that the members of the Armenian National Soviet in Tiflis, together with the representatives of Azerbaijan and Georgia, wanted to come to Baku with a delegation of 5 people for negotiations with the Armenian National Soviet here, and that a letter had been sent to Hamazasp, the head of the Armenian military unit. In the letter, Hamazasp, who was in the battle line, was asked to help the afore-mentioned representatives to go to Baku. At that time, it was

decided at the meeting not to allow the delegation to Baku [Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee...p.61]. However, the matter was also that in the current situation, the Armenian National Soviet and the Dashnaks did not accept any decision of the Baku SPC against them. Already Dashnaks and Shaumyan were definitely parting ways in Baku. This was also manifested in the attitude of Dashnak military forces to military operations. So, at the end of July, Hamazasp and Tatevos Amirov withdrew their cavalry units from the front line. [Bolsheviks in the struggle...(1957): 588].

At the initiative of Shaumyan, a large meeting of the Baku Soviet was called to discuss the situation. By the decision of the meeting, the Bolsheviks once again appealed to the Center for instructions. The Center, first through Stalin, and then through the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Sverdlov (in his telegram dated July 25 – A.A.), categorically demanded from the Baku Bolsheviks to obey the decision of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets (July 4-10, 1918). and to give up British military assistance [Bolsheviks in the struggle...(1957):593]. On July 25, an extraordinary meeting of the Baku Soviet was called with the participation of 459 men. The Dashnaks and others who wanted to invite the British believed that the Soviet power in Baku was a federative power and that Shaumyan, as the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, could make the necessary decisions about foreign policy [Extraordinary meeting of the Soviet together ...July 25 (1918, August 3)]. Disagreeing with this position, Shaumyan stated that a large amount of military ammunition from Russia - 80 cannons, 10 thousand rifles, 20 thousand cartridges, 150 machine guns - had already arrived in Baku and tried to dissuade the S.Rs, Mensheviks and Dashnaks from inviting the British to Baku [Bolsheviks in the struggle (1957):594]. But they did not agree to it. When it was proposed to form a coalition government consisting of all the parties included in the Soviet as a way out of the situation, the Bolsheviks protested and announced that they would resign. As a result, two resolutions were put to be voted, one proposed by the Left S.Rs, Bolsheviks and Left Dashnaks, and the other by the Right S.R.s. After the first resolution submitted by Shaumyan was rejected by 236 votes against 259 votes, it was reported that the Baku SPC resigned as the Bolshevik government [Extraordinary meeting of the Soviet together...July 25] (1918, August 5)]. However, the Bolsheviks remained part of the Baku Soviet, the only authority in the city. It should be noted that the demand of the forces gathered in the Baku Soviet was not the resignation of the Baku SPC. This was Shaumyan's position as the chairman of the Baku SPC and was intended to show that the Bolsheviks had no intention of making any deals.

But that night, the Baku committee of the Bolshevik organization held an extraordinary meeting and stated that the decision to resign was not the right step [Микоян (1971): 164], and then the next day, on the 26th of the month, a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Baku Soviet was convened under the chairmanship of Japaridze, and Commissars were asked to remain in place and not to follow provocations until the issue of the organization of the new government was resolved. [Bolsheviks in the struggle...(1957): 611].

In the current situation, the power of the Bolsheviks could be saved only by a large military force sent from the Center. But, in the next telegram sent to Shaumyan on July 29, by Lenin, who warned that any activities of the Dashnaks against the decision of the Fifth Congress of Soviets would be treated as treason and rebellion, still did not promise to send troops to Baku [Ленин (1987): 71].

The advancement of the Caucasus Islamic Army led to the active support of the Muslim population in the uyezds of Azerbaijan, especially in Baku gubernia, and the rapid increase in the number of volunteers who wanted to join the army. The merciless actions of the Armenian military against the Muslim population in the areas through which the army of Baku SPC passed accelerated this even more. This situation strengthened the demoralization of the Caucasian Red Army as well. Seeing that the situation was hopeless, on July 20, Bicherakhov gave the command to Avetisov, citing the demoralization of the army units and the fact that no measures were taken against it.⁹ And on the morning of July 29, Avetisov offered to surrender. The Armenian National Soviet was already intending to reach an agreement with the Turks, and negotiations had even begun with the mediation of the Swedish consul [Мижоян (1971): 171].

After being isolated in the direction of Shamakhy during the attack of the Caucasus Islamic Army, Bicherakhov separated his detachment from the front and left for Derbent on July 30. After that, the Armenian political forces, thinking that they had no other choice in the face of inevitable defeat, took action, and on the night of July 30, Dashnaksutyun party called a debate; at its headquarters and after discussing the situation with the Armenian bourgeoisie decided to surrender.

Unwilling to accept the option of surrender, the leadership of the Baku SPC made a last attempt to save the situation and demanded from the commanders of the Dashnak military units to send the detachments under their command to battle. Although the Dashnaks promised to send up to 3000 armed forces, it turned out that only 320 soldiers arrived the next morning, but they also refused to fight. After that, the members of the Armenian National Soviet came to Shaumyan and demanded that the Baku SPC leave power and hand over the city. Following this, the leadership of the Baku SPC, which also took into account the information about the situation on the front line, was forced to completely abandon from its authorities. Thus, the first Bolshevik government in Baku fell. Along with the Bolsheviks, the activity of the second convocation Baku Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (December 1917-July 1918), which implemented an anti-Azerbaijani policy, ended.

In his telegram sent to the Center, Shaumyan clarified the issue of the resignation of the Bolsheviks and stated that the votes of the Dashnaks actually played a decisive role [Bolsheviks in the struggle...(1957): 610.]. *It was clear that the Dashnaks wanted to get the British to be invited by blackmailing the Baku SPC in refusing to fight.*

Conclusion

In April 1918, after the establishment of the Baku SPC, the local government of Bolshevik Russia was formed in a part of Azerbaijan - in Baku gubernia. The establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan on May 28 created a situation of dual power in the country. Azerbaijan became the arena of confrontation between Bolsheviks and national forces.

The fact that the national government of Azerbaijan used the only opportunity - the military assistance of the Ottoman state - to establish its rule in the entire country decided

⁹ Телеграмма Сталина в Баку т. Шаумяну, в Москву, Совнарком т. Ленину по поводу приглашения англичанов в Баку // Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidenti İşlər İdarəsinin İctimai-Siyasi Sənədlər Arxivi, Fond №456, siyahı №14, iş №79-83, vərəq – 38-79.

the fate of the Bolshevik government here. First, the continuation of the massacres against the Muslim population in the uyezds, and then the war against the Republic of Azerbaijan, led the authorities of Baku SPC to collapse. The tense military-political confrontation strengthened opposition against the Bolsheviks within the Baku Soviet. In particular, the position of the Armenian political forces influenced the course of events. National interests drew the Dashnaks, the main political force of the Armenians, to resort to various means. In April, with the help of the Dashnaks, the Bolsheviks, who gained power in Baku by defeating their main rival - the Azerbaijani national forces, only three months later had to hand over this power due to the “betrayal” of the Dashnaks. This also meant that the course of events was determined by the interests and changing activities of the Armenian political forces.

Out of interest, the Dashnaks turned against the Bolsheviks, whom they once supported. Despite the fact that the leadership of the Baku Bolsheviks by an Armenian Bolshevik ensured the trust of Dashnaks in the Bolsheviks in a certain sense, Shaumyan, as the representative of Bolshevik Russia here, was deprived to take steps independently contrary to its political course. This, in turn, caused the Dashnaks to turn away from Shaumyan.

So, the analysis of the military and political situation in Azerbaijan in April-May 1918 showed that the “failure” of the first experience of power in Azerbaijan by the Bolsheviks, who came to power as the result of support of Dashnak, was inevitable, but not due to the acceptance of Bolshevism by the local people – Azerbaijanis.

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SOVIET ORIENTALISM AND CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST

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Abstract: This study aims to compare the Orientalism of Edward Said and the understanding of Orient in Tsarist Russia and, most importantly, in Soviet Russia. Based on this, the Bolsheviks began to develop Oriental studies in early Soviet Russia, setting themselves the task of approaching the East, and expecting a world revolution from the East.

Between 1917 and 1920 Soviet Russia experienced period of civil war, foreign intervention and expectations of revolution in Germany. When the Soviets realized that the revolution in the west could not be realized in a short time, they began to turn their attention to the east. On account of to break the influence of England in the east, they started a strict propaganda activity here. In a short time, they created institutions to learn the East and educate Marxist orientalists. The Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East in 1920, served to create the perception that the Soviets were friends of the Eastern peoples and to propagate against the British rule there. The executive organ of the Congress translated and delivered resolutions and propaganda materials to the countries of the East. Although the dream of the Soviets to start a revolution in the East lost its effect soon after the agreement with Great Britain.

Keywords: *The Baku Congress, Peoples of the East, Orientalism, Soviet Orientalism, Soviet Russia, World Revolution, Oriental Studies*

INTRODUCTION

Until the late 1970s the phrase “Orientalism” had two specific definitions. “Orientalism” was an academic discipline, implied knowledge of complex languages. At the same time, for art historians "Orientalism" served as a name of the artistic directions of the 19th century, representatives of which were Ferdinand Delacroix, Eugene Fromentin and Jean-Louis Gerome. [Ван Дер Ойе (2002): 253] Orientalism was an academic tradition defined by travelers, commercial enterprises, military expeditions, natural historians and pilgrims to whom the Orient is a specific kind of knowledge about specific places, peoples, and civilizations. [Said (1979): 203]

The concept of “Orientalism” phenomenon changed after the publication of Edward Said’s book “Orientalism” in 1978. Now Orientalism did not refer to the refined occupations of the academics or artistic preference for the eastern exotics, but was understood definition of the Western imperialism, as an intellectual tool for ensuring the domination of the West over the East. [Ван Дер Ойе (2002): 253] Orientalism, described by Edward Said, is a broad discursive formation that underlies the European imagination, understanding and domination of the East. Orientalism wants to represent the East, not just to “the West”, but also to the East itself. [Khalid (2000): 693]

Russia: East or West?

When it comes to Russia, the paradigm of Orientalism quickly raises questions. As can be clearly seen, the difficult division of borders around E. Said's analysis between East and West turns into the strange three words in the Russian context: Western, Russian, and Eastern. In the 16th and 17th centuries, Russia was mainly described as an oriental despotism in the Western literature. [Knight (2000): 77]

Russian Orientalism is a particularly interesting exception to Said's conception. In contrast to the marine colonial powers, the conquered imperial periphery of Russia bordered on its neighborhood. Unlike Britain and France, separated by the seas from "their" East, Russia's Eurasian geography has not created such barriers to the separation of the metropolis from the East. Thus, for the Russians, the line between them and East was not so clear. [Ван Дер Ойе (2002): 254] "A paradox of simultaneously inclusion and exclusion, Europe but not Europe" was a Russian image. The Russian territory was still associated with what was alternatively termed *l'Europe orientale and l'Orient européen*. [Soboleva (2017): 20] In Fyodor Dostoevsky's words, "In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, but in Asia we are masters. In Europe we were Tatars, but in Asia we too are Europeans". [Khalid (2000): 697]

Wilhelm Barthold noted that the nature of the "conquest" of Siberia, which was part of the "East" and control of Siberia, provided a different type of permanent presence for Russia in the East. He believed that "In Russia the Orient did not oppose the Occident, but it had been made an organic part of Russian history, so closely associated that it often determined its course". [Evans (1999): 41-42]

According to Karl Marx, the Russian Empire was an "Eastern despotism" and "semi-Asiatic" [Ван Дер Ойе (2002): 252]. Apparently, this is due to the fact that the military intervention of the Russian Empire played a major role in the suppression of the liberal-nationalist revolutions in Europe that took place in 1848-1849.

Red Orientalism: Early Soviet Oriental Studies

On November 24, 1917, shortly after the October coup, when the Bolshevik party seized the power, the Soviet government issued a statement, addressing Muslims in Russia and the East. In the declaration, it was stated that Soviet Russia completely abandoned the colonial policy of the Tsarist Russia. The declaration also proclaimed that the tsar's secret agreements regarding the capture of Istanbul were invalid and that Istanbul should remain in the hands of the Turks. [Торговые отношения СССР со странами Востока (1938): 10] A similar note sent to the Iranian envoy in Petrograd on January 14, 1918, by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, proclaiming that the Council of People's Commissars had terminated the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. All Russian troops in Iran were withdrawn from the country between December 1917 and January 1918. [Кирилин (1986): 95]

Soviet Russia was in its powerless period between 1917-1920, facing strong capitalist states. This was also a period of the civil war and dreams about impending world revolution in the industrialized countries, especially in Germany. The Soviet Russia was struggling with internal and external problems. Although Lenin could not effectively support the short-lived Communist regimes (in Hungary, Bavaria, the Baltic states and Finland), he did not give up on his dream of world revolution. [Kulski (1959): 138]

Between 1918 and 1919, the eastern policy of Bolsheviks covered Baku, Tbilisi and Tashkent, rather than Ankara, Delhi or Beijing. Only after the decline of the revolutionary wave in Europe in 1920, a more active interest in Asia aroused. [Laqueur (1959): 8] Having given up hope of a socialist revolution in the West, the Bolsheviks tied their hopes to the spread of Bolshevism in the Eastern countries since the 1920s. Hoping that the “national-revolutionary” movement would turn into a socialist revolution, particularly in Turkey and Iran. [Гасанлы (2008): 19]

Throughout the 1920s, the Bolsheviks paid serious attention to the East for exporting the Bolshevik Revolution. [Bustanov (2015): 2] In the 1920s, the Bolsheviks created the new institutions and organizations intended to produce devotee Marxist scholars of Oriental studies. Moscow Institute for Oriental Studies (Московский институт востоковедения, МИВ) was the most important institute amongst others. This Institute created mainly for the requirements of the Soviet diplomatic services. Communist University of the Toilers of the Orient (Коммунистический университет трудящихся Востока, КУТВ) was founded in 1921 for educating the party members from Central Asia and Caucasus, as well as for training communists from abroad. [Kemper (2009): 4-5] These institutions were dedicated to work for the revolutionary transformation of the East, and all intellectual work has been subject to this reason. One of their significant figures was Mikhail Pavlovich, head of the Moscow Institute and founder of the journal *Новый Восток* (The New Orient) [Cronin (2015): 653]. The slogan “To Moscow, not to Mecca” calling the Muslims to unite with the Soviet Russia against the colonialism, also belongs to him. [Kemper, (2010): 436]

The new regime in Russia did not eliminate the Asiatic Museum (Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences after 1930), and it did not purge the famous Academics of the elder generation, like Wilhelm Barthold, Sergey F. Oldenburg or Ignaty Y. Krachkovskii. [Kemper (2009): 4] After the October Revolution, W. Barthold played an important role in the establishment of new institutions for Oriental studies. He assisted to develop a Latinized alphabet for the Turkic languages of Central Asia. [Evans (1999): 32]

In 1920s Soviet government tried to create image of the Soviet authorities as “anti-imperial”. Academics as Sergey Oldenburg and Nikolai Marr criticized the Western Oriental Studies and began to claim that the Soviet scholars were in the process of creating morally superior type of scholarship. [Tolz (2008): 80-81] But the East was an object of propaganda and political agitation for Communists. “Red Orientalism” was built upon European imagination about the East. With their Eurocentric understanding of history and society, Mikhail Pavlovich and his colleagues tried to create a new Marxist model of Orientalism. The Soviet Orientalism seemed to be a “civilizing mission” rather than the Western Orientalism. But while the Bolsheviks did establish a discourse on how to overcome the traditional “orientalism”, they used the same methods consciously as the “bourgeois” Orientalism. [Kemper (2010): 476]

Soviet Propaganda in the East: Congress of the Peoples of the East

The basic principles of Soviet foreign policy were laid down in Vladimir Lenin’s “Peace Decree”. These were the policy of “proletarian internationalism” and “peaceful coexistence”. On the one hand, this decree expressed support for the working class struggling to overthrow the bourgeoisie and establish communist regimes, and on the

other hand, it aimed to live in peace with the capitalist states and to establish good relations with them. It was believed that both policies could be carried out simultaneously. [Zickel (1991): 401-402]

The failed revolutions in Germany and Hungary, the war against Poland and White Armies with their Western supporters put the young Soviet state in a difficult situation. In August 1919, War Commissar Leon Trotsky suggested that, with their limited power they would not success in Europe, they had to look to the East. For this purpose they organized a special Congress of the Peoples of the East, to take place in Baku after the Communist International (Comintern) Congress in Petrograd. [Kemper (2010): 445-446]

The Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East was opened on August 31, 1920, by Grigory Zinoviev, chairman of the Comintern. Co-organizers, Karl Radek, as Congress secretary, and Mikhail Pavlovich, as the Comintern's expert on the East, were together with him. [Kemper (2010): 448]

The congress was attended by 1,891 delegates from the following countries: Turkey, Persia, Egypt, India, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Kashgar, China, Japan, Korea, Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Bukhara, Khiva, Dagestan, Northern Caucasia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkestan, Fergana, the Kalmuck Autonomous Region, the Tatar Republic, and the Far Eastern District. [Congress of the Peoples of the East Baku (1977): 163]

The main idea was that the Communists are fighting for the liberation of the East, and they had to join Russia to start the revolutionary movement against the Western colonial powers. Russia and the East were in need of each other. Victory of Communists against the Western interventions in Russia would support and inspire the Eastern revolutions. Withdrawal from the East would weaken the capitalist system in the West, and support the Soviet Russia [Kemper (2010): 447]. Lenin affirmed and successfully convinced his comrades-in-arms that the revolutionary movement of the Eastern peoples can now develop effectively, and achieve success only in direct connection with the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic against international imperialism. [Lenin (1954): 5]. Now it was the turn to convince the peoples of the East with the aim of realizing Lenin's plans for the world revolution on new soil.

The Bolsheviks assumed that they could help liberate the Muslims of India and the Middle East from "the tyranny of the British" by starting revolution in Central Asia. In this regard V.I. Lenin wrote the following in his letter to the Congress:

"The period of awakening of the East in the contemporary revolution is being succeeded by a period in which all the Eastern peoples will participate in deciding the destiny of the whole world, so as not to be simply an object of enrichment of others. The peoples of the East are becoming alive to the need for practical action, for every nation to take part in shaping the destiny of all mankind. [Lenin (1954): 22, 24]

Also continuing such rhetoric, he expresses the readiness and duty of the Soviet Republic to unite around itself all the awakening peoples of the East and together with them to combat against the international imperialism.

As can be seen from the quotation, Lenin's letter to the congress participants is exclusively in the nature of propaganda, with the aim of rousing them to dynamic revolutionary activity. The text is very openly visible on what fronts he tried to divide the world. A similar sentiment reveals itself in the manifesto, accepted by the Congress, declaring "holy war" against imperialism. Most likely, the term "holy war" is a tool to

attract the attention of the religious communities of the East, for whom this term had a special meaning. The Congress Manifesto demonstrates the same rhetoric, used by Lenin in his letter, that this "holy war" is a struggle for the liberation of the Peoples of the East, ending the division of mankind into oppressor peoples and oppressed peoples, and the achievement of universal human values, such as the complete equality of all peoples and races, whatever language they speak, whatever color of their skin and whatever religion they professed. The manifesto tries to convince everyone that this is a call to a holy war in order to put an end to the partition of countries into advanced and backward, dependent and independent, metropolitan and colonial. Emphasizing the class character of the holy war, the document states that it is for the liberation of all mankind from the yoke of capitalist and imperialist slavery, for the cessation of all forms of oppression of one people by another and all forms of exploitation of man by man. [Congress of the Peoples of the East (1977): 172]

The Manifesto of the Congress was calling all peoples of the east actually to the "holy war" against the British imperialism, without mentioning other leading countries of the world. It cannot be stated that the Bolsheviks were more amicable to other leading countries of the world, however to a great degree they were stimulated by the fact that many countries of the East were British colonies. It is for this reason that the text of the Manifesto is directed against Great Britain, which is notably emphasized in the following lines:

"Into the holy war against the last citadel of capitalism and imperialism in Europe, against the nest of pirates and bandits by sea and land, against the age-old oppressor of all the peoples of the East, against imperialist Britain! Into the holy war for freedom, independence and happiness for all the peoples of the East, all the East's millions of peasants and workers enslaved by Britain!" [Congress of the Peoples of the East (1977): 172]

Executive organ of the Congress was "Council for Propaganda and Action". The Council was organizing translation of the Congress resolutions and other propaganda materials into Turkish, Farsi and Arabic and delivering them to the Eastern countries. The Council was directed by the Comintern representatives A.E. Skachko and Mikhail Pavlovich. It's journal, *Народы Востока* (The Peoples of the East), was published in Russian and Turkish. [Kemper (2010): 453]

Yelena Stasova and Mikhail Pavlovich were acting as representatives of the Comintern in the Council of Action and Propaganda of the Peoples of the East and were appointed there on the recommendation of Grigory Zinoviev. [Lazitch and Drachkovitch (1972): 408]

According to the project prepared by Anatoly Skachko in 1921 on organizing the Communication Office of the Eastern Peoples Action and Propaganda Council, the Communication Office was publishing the periodic news bulletins with compilations from the local and foreign press in Baku. Based on the information obtained, the office was preparing summaries of events and changes in the Eastern countries in the form of reports. Possible printed and cartographic materials of the East were collected and classified. [РГАСПИ, Фонд 85, Опись 19, Дело 29, (1921): 2-3]

Short courses on the Oriental Studies were organized to prepare the staff of the Communication Office. In these courses, geographical, ethnographic and cultural studies of the Eastern countries were carried out, as well as lectures on the economic, social and

current political situation of the East. In addition, the employees of the Communications office were taking lessons on telegraph, bulletin, news summary and report preparation, as well as press techniques. The weight, coins, land and all other units of measurement of Eastern countries, were taught. [РГАСПИ, Фонд 85, Опись 19, Дело 29, (1921): 5]

The propaganda was not only against British imperialism, but also against the ruling class of the East. In his speech at the Congress, Bela Kun noticed that the revolution of the Peoples of the East will not end even after the rule of the foreign imperialists come to an end. It will not end with a system under the false slogan of democracy, seeks to continue the power of the sultans, shahs, emirs, pashas and beys. [Congress of the Peoples of the East Baku (1977): 128-129]

One of the results of the Baku Congress was that the Communists realized the lack of knowledge about the Orient. In October of 1921 the Central Committee decided to use the professors of Oriental Studies working in the pre-revolutionary Russia for the production of literature on the liberation movements in the East. [Kemper (2010): 455]

In December of 1921, M. Pavlovich was appointed the head of the All-Russian Scientific Society of Oriental Studies (Всероссийская научная ассоциация востоковедения, ВНАВ), subordinated to the Commissariat for Nationalities (Наркомнац). All-Russian Scientific Association of Oriental Studies was not a propaganda tool for foreign policy purposes, but became the major scientific organ of Oriental Studies in Russia. [Kemper (2010): 455, 456]

The Communists did not understand the East and they thought that the problems were simply “the peasant and territorial issues”. After the shift of international situation, the Communists changed their approach to the East. In 1921, after signing treaties of non-aggression with Turkey and Iran and a trade agreement with Great Britain, the Soviets stopped their massive anti-British propaganda in the East. The Council for Propaganda and Action was abolished, its journal was closed. The Oriental Revolution was just a function with regard to the West, revolutionizing the Orient was not a purpose in itself. [Kemper (2010): 454-455]

Despite G. Zinovev’s statement that a similar congress would be held every year, the second Congress of the Peoples of the East was never convened. [Lazitch and Drachkovitch (1972): 407]

After signing the Trade Agreement with Britain on March 1921, Nariman Narimanov, who was the director of the Near East Bureau of the RSFSR Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, was of the opinion that Georgy Chicherin’s views on the Eastern policy were completely wrong. N. Narimanov thought that the Bolsheviki, deceived by the British, were strangling the revolution in Iran with their own hands. As a matter of fact, according to him, similar wrong decisions were taken for Turkey as well. [АРПІІ SSA, F. 609 siy 1 sax.vah 91: 115]

Nariman Narimanov claimed that the revolutionary process that started in Iran was suppressed because Lloyd George wanted it, and accused G. Chicherin of destroying the Iranian revolution. G. Chicherin had to answer these accusations, since N. Narimanov gave wide coverage to these accusations in the “Eastern Question” section of his letter to the Central Committee. [Həsənli (2012): 125]

G. Chicherin, in his letter to the Secretary of the Central Control Commission, Yemelyan Yaroslavski, stated that he did not go beyond the line determined by the Central Committee in his Eastern policy. According to G. Chicherin, N. Narimanov’s

ideas on the Eastern policy were so different from the policy of the Central Committee that the Politburo had to remind him to follow the line of the Center. [Həsənli (2012): 126]

G. Chicherin said: “If we had the military power to seize Turkey, Iran and all of Afghanistan, we could enforce communism there by force. However, this is not possible. We must act very carefully, so, as not to turn the movement of the peoples of the East against us”. [Həsənli (2012): 126]

The reason for the change in the eastern policy after 1921 was the Soviets’ movement to a period of defense policy that avoided military conflict. The Soviet Russia needed time to increase its economic potential. The Soviet government was hopeful that during these years a war would break out between the “imperialist” powers and that it would provide an opportunity. [Kulski (1959): 139]

CONCLUSION

Although the Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in Baku in September 1920, was connected by the failed policy of the Bolsheviks to initiate the world revolution with the interaction of Muslim peoples, it occupies a special place in the history of the communist movement.

This unsuccessful attempt to raise the peoples of the east against Britain and its elites was due to the fact that the Bolsheviks did not have a definite strategy regarding the Eastern policy after the revolution. A communist revolution would hardly have been possible in the eastern countries where there was no industrial proletariat.

Agreeing with the basic principles of Marxism, L. Trotsky argued that Russia’s survival depended on “permanent revolution” abroad. In his opinion, there had to be socialist revolutions in other countries for Russia to become an economically independent state. The region, where the Bolsheviks concentrated more, was the west. However when Bolsheviks, realized that they could not succeed in the west, they turned to the east. After the establishment of the soviet regimes in the Caucasus and Central Asia, they get close access to the eastern countries. They thought that their policies in the Caucasus and Central Asia would create a good perception in the east.

The Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East was organized in order to raise Soviets’ reputation among the eastern nations and also to provoke the revolutionary movement in the east through propaganda and agitation. This attempt to collect the exploited and oppressed peoples in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, around revolutionary Russia was over with disillusion.

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CUSTOMS AND TARIFF POLICY OF TSARISM IN NORTHERN AZERBAIJAN DURING THE MODERATE PATRONAGE TARIFF POLICY IN RUSSIA (1850-1877)

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Abstract: In the middle of the 19th century, reforms in the field of customs and tariffs were necessary for the development of capitalist relations and industry in the Russian Empire. In particular, the idea of gradually abandoning the protectionist policy appeared by making changes in the customs-tariff policy. Important customs and tariff reforms were implemented in Russia in the context of political and economic interests in 1850-1877. After the military conquest of the South Caucasus by the Russian Empire the economic conquest of the territory commenced by the tsarist government. From the middle of the 19th century, the Russian Empire began to implement new customs-tariff policy and structural reforms in Azerbaijan.

The article states the process of gradually abandoning the strict protectionism policy in the South Caucasus, starting from the end of the 1840s. The moderate protectionist tariff was applied to the Azerbaijani customs offices either late or with certain restrictions. Moreover, the implementation of the Russian moderate tariff policy in Transcaucasia, including Azerbaijan is studied.

Keywords: *Customs, Northern Azerbaijan, Tariff Policy, Duty, Regulation, Quarantine, Goods*

Introduction

The Russian Empire practiced developing capitalist relations and industrial growth rate in the middle of the 19th century. This situation prompted the state to carry out new revolutionary reforms in the field of agriculture, trade and customs, to abolish the serf system, a remnant of the Middle Ages, gradually abandon the protectionist policy by making changes in the customs-tariff policy. In general, the period 1850-1877 is considered as a crucial period for customs-tariff reforms in the history of customs policy in Russia. After the military conquest by the Russian Empire, the economic conquest of Azerbaijan by the tsarist government began. From the first years of the occupation, the implementation of the new customs-tariff policy, trade-tariff issues, as well as the study and research of the structural reforms carried out in the customs are important in the economic policy implemented here by the empire.

The main source science database and a large part of the materials for the studied problem are the documents of the Baku Customs Department of 1809-1917 [ARMDTA: (fond 376)], the Acts of the Caucasian Archeographic Commission (Акты собранные Кавказскою Археографическою Коммиссиею) (АКАК)), as well as the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire (ПСЗРИ) [ПСЗРИ]. It should be noted that codified acts called Customs Regulations took the leading place in the system of sources of customs legislation in the 19th century. Some of these acts were included in the First

Compendium of the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. The second collection (Collective) is comprised of numerous acts providing for additions and changes to these statutes. Most of these norms were later systematized in a consolidated act, the Customs Regulations of 1857, included in Volume VI of the Compendium of Laws of the Russian Empire. Acts related to the organization and management of the customs system, both in the entire state and in individual regions, are dedicated to changes in the customs infrastructure – to the creation of customs and customs posts, changing their status, and customs tariffs [Балковая (2018): 95-97].

There has been no special research on the above-mentioned topic and it has hardly been touched upon in historiography. Information on separate problems of the subject can be found only in a number of generalized works and published articles on the customs history of Azerbaijan. For instance, the articles, concerning the history of customs from ancient times to the present, were published in the book "Azerbaijani Customs: Historical Traditions and Modernity" in 2007 under editorship of Professor Y.M. Mahmudov. This collection includes H.N. Hasanov's article "The history of the customs policy of Tsarist Russia in Northern Azerbaijan and its impact on economic life in the early 19th-20th centuries" [Həsənov (2007): 106-111] and Y.M. Mahmudov, A.A. Pashayev, and K.K. Shukurov's co-authored article "Regarding the resettlement of Armenians to the South Caucasus (from the quarantine-customs documents of Tsarist Russia)" [Mahudov (2007): 113-130] contains brief information on this topic. In the book "Azerbaijan customs history" published under the editorship of F.S. Asadov and A.Ş. Shekaraliyev, also R.A. Guliyev's monograph "Customs work in the history of Azerbaijan statehood (Azerbaijan People's Republic (1918-1920)) and M. Musayev's monograph "Trade of the city of Baku in the 19th century (1800-1883 years)" [Musayev M. (1966)] briefly touched on customs and tariff issues in the second half of the 19th century.

The overview of the customs and tariff policy of tsarism in Northern Azerbaijan towards the middle of the 19th century

In the late 1830s and early 1840s, the internal and external trade of the South Caucasus decreased significantly. In 1843, Y.A. Gagameyster, an official of the Ministry of Finance, was sent to the South Caucasus in order to clarify the reasons for the decline of trade in the South Caucasus, to develop a "plan for changes in the customs regulations and customs points". It should be noted that a special organization of territorial customs' points was created on the basis of geographical, economic and political (administrative) factors in the first half of the 19th century in Russia. The location of customs authorities was primarily based on geographical factors. Public demand for customs services was expressed by economic factors in terms of the role of various territories in the prospects of the Russian economy and the interests of neighboring countries. At the same time, the priority criterion of placing customs authorities along the state border was preserved. As a result, a specific border space is formed and created a number of potential advantages for the regions: the development of border trade, increased employment and competition in the field of trade. So, central authorities turned their attention to the problems of border regions. Thus, when creating customs bodies (stations), the Russian authorities took into consideration not only the need for a checkpoint, but also other criteria [Савосина (2014): 54]. In July 1844, Y.A. Gagameister, together with the deputy head of the South Caucasus customs district D.A. Ducroix, got acquainted with the work of trade and

customs administrations in the South Caucasus, as well as in Azerbaijan and submitted their notes to the head of the Caucasus, A.I. Neygar [Süleymanov (2002): 135]. Y.A. Gagameister and D.A. Ducroix's proposals were mainly approved. Consequently, a new stage began in the work of upgrading the customs system in South Caucasus, including in Azerbaijan.

With the resignation of Finance Minister Kankrin, changes were made for the first time in the last ten years regarding the customs points of the South Caucasus. The Ordubad customs post, which was closed in 1844, started operating again in 1846. In the same year, the Gulistan customs post was again moved to Nakhchivan. The Javad customs post, which has no importance for trade and customs and is located quite far from the border, was abolished on May 1, 1846. In 1847, Sharur customs station was established instead of Norashen customs station. In 1849, the Salyan customs post was moved to Bilasuvar, which is relatively close to the Mughan road-border [Süleymanov (2002): 136]. In order to strengthen control over goods imported from Europe, a decision was made to establish an additional customs point in Astara in 1847. At the end of 1847, the Agoghlan customs office was transferred to Jabrayil.

The district (territorial) system was the basis for Russian customs administration in the 19th century. Moreover, the strengthening of border and internal customs' status can also be noted in this matter. The latter carried out the inspection and clearance of the goods controlled outside the border, as well as transit cargo, which indicates a comprehensive assessment of the activities of the customs authorities, taking into account their location and operational characteristics. Towards the middle of the 19th century, special attention was paid to the development of customs authorities in remote regions. In 1847, the Regulation on the structure, operation and management of quarantine-customs units in the Caucasus and beyond the borders of the Caucasus was approved. The regulation was closely related to the issues of quarantine measures and customs affairs, which arose as a result of the real threat of epidemiological diseases entering the territory of Russia. In this regard, the quarantine institutions on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus were merged with the customs institutions and received the name "quarantine-customs". All the quarantine and customs facilities on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus were part of the Transcaucasia (South Caucasus) and Sukhum-Kali quarantine-customs district [Савосина (2014): 54-55]. Thus, by the regulations of the General Administration Council of May 4, 1847, quarantine and customs parts were combined and quarantine-customs districts were created, which also were divided into distances headed by I and II quarantine and customs departments. As a result, unlike other parts of the Russian Empire, a single quarantine-customs district was organized in the South Caucasus [Mahmudov (2007): 115]. In 1847, the South Caucasus quarantine-customs district was divided into 4 districts: Baku, Nakhchivan, Alexandropol and Redoubt (Redut)-Kali.

Protectionism was considered the most appropriate customs tariff policy in Russia in the 1820s-50s. Protectionism was carried out by imposing high customs duties on imported goods, currency restrictions and import limits. The main goal here was to reduce imports, and instead to help the development of local industry. It is no coincidence that Tsar Nicholas I, approved the "Regulation on the Organization of Trade and Customs Affairs in Transcaucasia" taking into account numerous appeals to prevent the introduction of quality European goods to the Caucasus and promote the sale of Russian

industrial products here, on June 3, 1831. According to this new Regulation, it was forbidden to bring goods from Europe to the South Caucasus from January 1, 1832 [Əliyev (2004): 38-39]. By the decision of the Senate, starting from June 3, 1831, the prohibition tariff began to be implemented in customs offices in Azerbaijan as well. On June 3, 1831, due to the new trade tariff, the markets of the South Caucasus were declared virtually closed to European industrial goods, primarily to British textile products. According to this tariff, very large customs duties were imposed on European products. The aim here was to expand the sale of Russian goods in the Transcaucasian provinces and Iran and to prevent the free movement of European goods in the Transcaucasia. As a result, the Russian textile industry was saved from international competition [Süleymanov (2001): 89]. Customs duties on European traders were so elevated that it made trade in the region practically pointless. As a result, Kulevi-Tbilisi-Baku trade route has lost its former importance. Moreover, trade between European countries and Iran moved to new trade routes by passing Trabzon-Erzurum through the Ottoman Empire. In addition, England established a commercial company in Trabzon and controlled all trade with Asia Minor and Iran with its assistance [Мурадалиева (2017): 9]. Under the governor M.S. Vorontsov, taxes on foreign goods, imported to the South Caucasus, in 1844 were reduced again. Furthermore, customs-free transport trade was allowed to Turkey, Iran and other countries through the South Caucasus. These concessions led to the fact that the total value of foreign goods brought to the South Caucasus was five times higher than the total value of goods exported from here [Osmanov (1996): 48-49]. Despite flourishing trade relations between South Caucasus and foreign countries, the commerce relations with the neighboring governorates of Russia remained very weak until the Crimean War. However, since the late fifties of the 19th century, trade relations between Russia and the South Caucasus were revived as a result of the several activities such as establishment of Russian shipping and trading societies, the strengthening of traffic on the Volga and the Caspian Sea, the completion of the military Georgian road construction, road and new highway constructions, the opening of the Transcaucasian railway and the prohibition of preferential trade. [Osmanov (1996): 49]. In the late 1840s and early 1850s, public opinion shifted to free trade. Consequently, protective customs measures gradually weakened and the period of free trade began. However, this had a negative impact on the country's economy. Later, the customs offices operated on the basis of the general trade tariffs of 1846 and 1851. Although the terms of the tariff of 1831 were slightly softened by the December 14, 1846 "Charter", it did not have a positive effect on trade in the Caucasus [Süleymanov (2001): 89].

Until the period of moderate patronage tariff policy in Tsarist Russia began (in 1850), the customs and tariff policy of Tsarism in North Azerbaijan was apparently of a colonial nature and adapted to the Russian customs regulations with minor exceptions. The protectionist tariff policy applied in Russia since 1822 has been implemented in the South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan since 1831, in a stricter manner and in the form of a prohibitive tariff, in accordance with the economic interests of the empire. Also, after the resignation of Finance Minister Kankrin, in the 1840s, significant changes were made in the customs and tariff work of tsarism in the South Caucasus. For the first time in the last ten years, a single quarantine-customs system was established, and as in Russia itself, the

tariff policy was softened from 1846 on. Thus, the protectionist tariff in Russia and the prohibitive tariff in Azerbaijan were gradually abandoned.

Moderate patronage in the customs tariff policy of the Russian Empire

During his tenure as Minister of Finance, Count E.F. Kankrin's (1823-1844) tariff policy was based on the criticism of cosmopolitanism. It justified the protection of the national industry with the assistance of the customs tariff, which he applied in practice. In 1844, Kankrin retired, handing over his post to by F.P. Vronchenko. From that moment, the customs tariff liberalization movement began to gain momentum [Еропов (2010): 11]. Thus, after the retirement of Kankrin, a gradual transition from a strict protection system to a moderate protectionism in the Russian tariff policy began [Лодыженский (1886): 226]. This was expressed in the project "On Measures to Expand Russia's Foreign Trade", prepared by the trade advisor Popov. In this document, difficulties in selling Russian goods, high customs duties on export goods and prohibitive tariffs on import goods were explained [Кисловский (2004): 199]. In 1848, the customs tariff was revised. On October 13, 1850, a new customs tariff was approved, which broke the restrictive system of foreign trade established by the 1822 tariff and marked the beginning of customs liberalization. With the customs tariff adopted on October 13, 1850, the prohibitive tendencies were considerably softened. While the old tariff contained 336 taxable items, 11 of which were prohibited and 56 of which were duty-free, the new tariff consisted of 118 items (109 of which were subject to duties, 6 of which were duty-free, and 3 of which were prohibited to import). Also, the duties on main imported goods (cotton fabrics, dyes, equipment) fell sharply [Кисловский (2004): 199]. Famous economist Ludwig Valerianovich Tengoborski played a leading role in the adoption of this tariff, as well as in the preparation of the 1857 tariff [Лодыженский (1886): 239]. His views on Russia's economic policy were reflected in the essence of these two tariffs and formed the quintessence of the national economic views of most educated people of that period [Еропов (2010): 12]. The tariff of 1850 marked the beginning of the liberalization of customs, which was especially intensified in the tariffs of 1857 and 1868. In 1850, duties were reduced on 299 articles of the tariff, import bans were lifted on 12. In particular, the import of unprocessed raw materials and semi-finished products was facilitated. As a result, the flow of goods to Russia began in the period from 1850 to the mid-70s [Кисловский (2004): 199]. Under these conditions, a significant part of the country's factories and plants, created in the 1820s and 1840s, could not withstand foreign competition: products from abroad which were produced by using new technologies were of better quality and cheaper.

Nevertheless, the introduction of the tariff of 1850 resulted in the development of some industries. The relatively prosperous development of the country was interrupted in 1853 due to the beginning of the Crimean War. The Russian Empire was neither financially nor industrially equipped for such a war. The war caused the collapse of the state's financial system and clearly demonstrated to the Russian elite the advantages of the development of bourgeois industry compared to Russia's system of feudal serfdom [Еропов (2010): 15-18]. The best moment came for the supporters of liberal reforms after the accession to the throne of Emperor Alexander II (1855). The young emperor was open to proposals for reform, and his rule would ensure and witness the implementation of complementary reforms - in the abolition of serfdom, the judiciary, land and urban

administration - influenced by the lessons learned from the Crimean War and liberal ideas. All this would lead to innovations in trade and industry and the development of new customs regulations.

In 1856, the Crimean War ended, the consequences of which led to a decrease in trade and, as a result, in severe monetary inflation. Although customs revenues increased during this period due to the increase in the import of goods, the Russian economy was in a state of crisis, and urgent measures were required to stabilize the finances. Under these conditions, public opinion began to support protectionist measures, but it remained only as a wish [Кисловский (2004): 199]. In the 1850s and 1860s, the tendencies that penetrated the tariff movement in Russia were usually in the liberal and even "free trade" direction. However, on closer inspection, these tendencies can be seen to be more moderate protectionist ideas than overly liberal trade ideas. The desire to open the widest avenues for foreign trade through a liberal customs system was secondary for Russian economic thought. Importing cheap raw materials and semi-finished products from abroad could, according to majority of people, be useful and sometimes vital for the establishment of national industry [Еропов (2010): 12]. Because from that period (from 1850-1860s), fundamental structural changes were taking place in the development of productive forces in the economy of advanced European countries.

The steam transport and machine technology, which became the main condition for the production process in the national economy, played a powerful role in stimulating the rapid growth of both relatively independent and major industries in European countries [Гаркавенко (2017): 34-35]. In this respect, Russia was far behind European countries. On April 25, 1857, Emperor Alexander II approved a new Customs Charter for European and Asian trade, which outlined the main directions of the empire's customs policy and customs legislation. In accordance with the charter, the structure of customs administration was defined: the independence of customs authorities was emphasized for the first time in the new charter, and special requirements for customs employees were also defined.

While preparing the tariff of 1857, the government was guided by two objectives: fiscal and defensive. First of all, replenishing the treasury depleted during the Crimean War was a crucial factor. As a result of the significant increase in imports and the expansion of the tax base, the government could hope for at least a partial solution to the public debt problem. The most important outcome of the implementation of the tariff of 1857 was the sustainable industrial growth of Russia. Production enterprises were supplied with relatively cheap foreign raw materials. Among the monopolists who criticized the reduction of the interest rate, got acquainted with foreign competition and were forced to reduce the costs of their production, thereby increasing the efficiency of the Russian economy as a whole [Еропов (2010): 17-18].

The tariffs of 1857 and 1868 were passed to demand the liberation of foreign trade from previous restrictions and allow free competition between foreign and domestic industry. However, the former demands of the protectionist group were not entirely ignored, as the previous high protective (conservative) duty (customs) was only gradually reduced (in a certain sequence), the tariff of 1868 was drawn up in a generally moderate protectionist spirit and retained some traces of the earlier system: in some of its articles a high duty was set for the import of goods [Лодыженский (1886): 229].

With the tariff adopted in 1868, the duty on 16 items was canceled, the tariff rates on 152 items were lowered, and the tariff was increased on 35 items [Соломеин (2011): 143], which ultimately affected the increase in customs revenues of the treasury. The new tariff reform envisaged the simplification of tariff classification, the equalization of the amount of duties on sea and land imports, taking into account the railway connection of the Russian Empire with Europe, and the maximum possible reduction of duties on raw materials without harming the fiscal. Of all the points mentioned above, only the last one had a certain value in patronizing the development of industry. Thus, the tariff measure of 1868 was fiscally and moderately protective. The direct result of the tariff of 1868 was a significant grow in the amount of customs revenues [Еропов (2010): 18].

In the 1868 tariff, duties on imported raw materials and semi-finished products were considerably reduced. Dominant free trade trends opened wide opportunities for importing goods from abroad [Кисловский (2004): 199].

The reduction of duties in this tariff allowed some contemporaries and even later researchers to call it the "freest trade". Thus, despite a significant reduction in the duty rate, the tariffs of the 1850s and 1870s had a more vital impact on industrial growth than the high tariffs of the 1820s and 1850s. In practice, a low tariff was more protective than a high tariff and together with other socio-economic changes of the period, enabled the Russian Empire to make a qualitative leap towards industrial development [Еропов (2010): 18-19]. In other words, the liberal customs tariff of 1850-1870s was more profitable for the Russian industry than the protectionist policy applied for the purpose of industrial development in Russia in 1820-1850s. The impending war with Turkey, as well as the government's dissatisfaction with the state of the country's trade balance, resulted in the adoption of a new customs tariff. On November 10, 1876, the regulation "On the purchase of customs duties with gold currency" was adopted. Until the adoption of this document, the fee was paid in credit rubles, which at that time had a notable exchange rate difference with the gold ruble. This was the beginning of the next stage in the history of Russian tariff regulation. Thus, from January 1, 1877, the payment of customs duties in gold was introduced in the empire, which led to a general increase in customs taxes due to the devaluation of the credit ruble.

Thus, in 1877, the gold ruble was worth 1.48 credit rubles. So, with the help of the measure mentioned above, the government raised all customs tariff rates by 48% indiscriminately. The new charter was instantly adopted as part of a program to prepare for an imminent war with the Ottoman Empire. With his help, additional funds were found for the treasury. The trade balance has also changed towards a decrease in imports. The measure of 1876 to solve short-term economic and financial problems was fully justified. With the introduction of this tariff, the era of free trade in the Russian customs-tariff policy ended. However, public opinion on the imposition of a customs tariff was divided, as it was in the middle of the century. The years of 1850-70s were the period when liberal ideas prevailed, while after 1877 protectionist ideas began to dominate in the Russian Empire.

Customs and tariff policy of Tsarist Russia in Northern Azerbaijan (1850-1877)

The customs and tariff policy implemented in the Russian Empire in the middle of the 19th century was soon reflected in the South Caucasus. The implementation of the

Russian customs tariff policy in the South Caucasus was carried out through changes in the customs system and various tariff adjustments. Vorontsov, the viceroy of the Caucasus, using the great authority given to him by the emperor, altered the customs system of the Caucasus in 1850. He issued an order on the new management under the name of "Customs Quarantines and Customs Affairs". Thus, in addition to Baku, Dagestan, Tbilisi, customs offices were established in Kuban and Kutaisi. In order to provide closer assistance to the customs work in Northern Azerbaijan, he considered it important to have distances (*дистанция* in Russian). There were given different degrees to those distances. For instance, Nakhchivan, Julfa and Sharur were preserved as first-class customs points, while Ordubad customhouse was remained in the second class as before. Irevan was maintained as a customs post. [Əsədov (2001): 55-56]

A new stage in the expansion of the customs system of the South Caucasus began from the second half of the 19th century. According to the "Regulation on the reconstruction of the customs-quarantine section in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia" approved by the Viceroy of the Caucasus on March 31, 1861, the South Caucasus customs territory was divided into quarantine-customs districts. Baku quarantine-customs circle was divided into Baku and Jabrayil districts.

Baku district includes areas along the Caspian Sea, starting from the Terek River and reaching the Astara station; Jabrayil District included the Elisabethpol (Ganja) governorate, starting from Astara along the border with Iran, the Alexandropol district up to the border of Yerevan, Nakhchivan and Etchmiadzin. The Baku customs house was placed under the control of the quarantine-customs office located in Baku under the name of the customs-quarantine office. As the "Charter" was of a temporary nature, it was supposed to be implemented until 1863 [ARMDTA (f. 376, l.1.w.10): 33-34].

According to the "Regulation on the reorganization and management of the Quarantine- Customs Department in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia" approved by the Viceroy of the Caucasus, General Knyaz Baryatinsky on March 31, 1861, the Baku Quarantine-Customs management (*управление* in Russian) was transformed into the Baku Quarantine-Customs office (*контора* in Russian) and it has been subordinated to the newly established Baku Quarantine-Customs District. Moreover, three staffs (Head of the District, task officer and secretary) were allocated for the management of the district.

The Baku Quarantine-Customs office was considered to be the 1st level, with allocated 18 employees (chief, quarantine director-physician, secretary-treasurer, two tax collectors, supervisor, translator, ship watcher and 10 customs house inspectors).

On January 1, 1863, taking into account the large length of borders (i.e. the large number of customs points) under the control of the Baku customs department, the viceroy divided the Northern Azerbaijan customs into two regions. Thus, the customs authorities started their activities with Jabrayil and Baku regions.

According to the directive of the governor of the Caucasus dated December 31, 1867, a new Regulation on the quarantine and customs system in the South Caucasus was adopted. According to this document, Baku Quarantine and Customs District was divided into three distances:

- 1) Baku quarantine-customs distance (from the place where the Terek River flows into the Caspian Sea to the place where the Astara River flows into the Caspian Sea);
- 2) Jabrayil quarantine-customs distance (from the settlement of Astara to the borders of Elisabethpol governorate along the border with Iran and Iravan district);

3) Nakhchivan quarantine-customs distance (from the borders of Yerevan district to the settlement of Gyumri along the border with Iran) [Гулиев (2014): 77].

Starting from 1874, Mozdok, Proladinsk, Kizlyar, Serebrakovski stations located in the North Caucasus were also included in the scope of Baku quarantine-customs. Moreover, the Jabrayil quarantine-customs outpost, established in 1847, was given the status of a quarantine-customs office in 1861. Until 1861, the Jabrayil quarantine-customs outpost was subordinate to the Nakhchivan quarantine-customs administration, and in 1861-1897 it was included to the Baku quarantine-customs district.

In the middle of the 19th century, important changes took place in the tariff policy in Russia. Thus, after Kankrin's resignation as Minister of Finance, the tendency to soften protectionism prevailed in the customs policy. This was reflected in the project "On measures related to the expansion of Russia's foreign trade" formulated by trade adviser Popov. In this document, challenges in the sale of Russian goods were elucidated by high customs duties on exported goods and prohibitive tariffs on imported goods. The preparation of a new tariff was started at once. The customs tariff adopted on October 13, 1850 greatly softened the prohibition tendencies [Кисловский (2004): 199]. It initiated the first attempts at liberalization in customs, and the line of such liberalization was strengthened particularly in the tariffs of 1857 and 1868. The softening of the tariff policy carried out by Tsarism in the South Caucasus drew attention with its own characteristics.

So, as early as June 26, 1847, with the Supreme Decree of the Senate, Shamakhi enterprise (industry) owners permitted to send silk products to Russia by mail without a customs certificate [ПСЗРИ (1848): 551]. It should be noted that during the period when the moderate trade tariff was applied, three issues related to customs tariff regulations got attention: firstly, the application of the moderate (moderate) protectionist tariff policy applied in the Empire to the South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan (in the customs offices here), and secondly, the South Caucasus, especially the release or passage of transit goods from customs institutions located in Azerbaijan, and finally, the third issue is the application of tariffs to industrial products produced in Russia and Azerbaijan. On June 18, 1849, the Supremely approved Regulation was approved on the "authorization of various things and supplies, depending on quantity and quality, brought to Transcaucasia from foreign countries without duty". The Supreme Senate made a decision in accordance with the discretion of Adjutant General Knyaz Vorontsov to allow the import of foreign goods to Transcaucasia duty free. For each foreign merchant, skipper and honorary passenger who arriving in Transcaucasia from Iran and Turkey along the land border and to the Caspian ports, it was allowed to bring without customs (duty): five pounds (*girvka*) of sugar, half a *girvka* of tea, two *girvka* of coffee, cinnamon, cloves, nutmeg, ginger, pepper and other spices in such a quantity that generally not exceeding two *girwankas* for each person; all kinds of fruits and Asian sweets, usually ten *gireng*; henna dye three *gilts*, dye grade one pound, and boot tobacco five *gilts* [ПСЗРИ (1850):350].

The Supremely Approved Regulation of the Caucasian Committee dated June 18, 1849 permitted to bring some European and colonial goods to the Baku customs house. Thus, the validity of the permission to bring European and colonial goods from Iran and Turkey to the Transcaucasian region by land border through the quarantine-customs office of Alexandropol and Nakhchivan by paying a fee at the tariff of December 14, 1846, it was allowed to be applied to the Baku customs office according to the list

announced in the decree of the Supreme Senate published on January 29, 1848. With this Regulation, it was also envisaged to levy a duty on European and colonial goods delivered directly to Baku from the foreign countries via Caspian Sea due to the rate of December 14, 1846.

However, when the mentioned goods were brought from Baku to Astarkhana, despite the fact that there was a certificate from the Baku customs house on the clearance of the goods an additional fee was charged in the latter port on Article 2273 of the Customs Code, on contrary to the Transcaucasian tariff [ИЦЗПИ (1850): 351].

On October 13 (25), 1850, a common tariff was adopted for the customs house of the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Poland for European trade. The tariff was aimed to encourage the development of trade and industry and to further facilitate foreign trade relations. The general tariff on European trade was implemented both for the empire and the tsarist from January 1/13, 1851. With this tariff, the internal customs line between the Empire and Tsarist Poland was also eliminated, and the Russian customs administration (administrative mechanism) was introduced in the latter. A new reduced tariff duty had to be paid for some goods from January 1/13, 1851. The scope of this tariff was applied to goods which imported from abroad to the Black Sea and delivered to Tbilisi from Redoubt Kali and Sukhum Kali, also this tariff was applied all European ports, customs offices and outposts of the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Poland, and the quarantine-customs offices of the Transcaucasian region on the eastern shores of the Black Sea, as well as the Tbilisi customs office. All customs houses and outposts for European trade in the Empire and the Kingdom of Poland were with some exceptions, divided into three classes. The tariff was applied to the following Transcaucasian regional quarantine-customs places on the eastern coast of the Black Sea: a) Quarantine-customs Department: Redoubt Kali, Sukhum Kali (one year cleaning) and Novorossiysk (5 months cleaning) and b) Nikolaevsk, Ochemchirsk, Gelenchik (Gelinchik) and Anap quarantine customs posts. In addition, the same tariff was also put into practice to the quarantine-customs offices of Alexandropol, Nakhchivan and Baku, located in the territory of Azerbaijan: but this only applied to European and colonial goods listed in Article 2256 of the Customs Regulations (Collection of Laws, Volume 6). A three-month clearing period was determined for those European and colonial goods. There was also defined a period of one month for customs clearance of goods in quarantine customs posts. Prohibited European colonial and Asian goods from all locations were admitted to the Tiflis warehouse customs house and could be sent to the warehouse either for duty clearance or for transit to foreign countries via Nakhchivan or via Sukhum Fort and Redoubt Fort. An annual period for customs clearance or transit of goods was set for the Tbilisi customs office. European goods transported to Iran (in the remote areas of Transcaucasia, from Redoubt Kali and Sukhum Kali to Tiflis and Nakhchivan) were released duty-free based on a special law passed for this transit. [ИЦЗПИ (1851): 543-544]. The content of the Charter published by the decree of the Senate on January 28, 1853 was as follows: The Supreme Senate, considering the proposal of the Ministry of Justice on the presentation of the Caucasian Viceroy, on December 17, 1852, allowed to confirm a new Charter on the movement of Asian goods from Iran to Europe and European goods to Iran through the Transcaucasian region. The new Regulation was issued instead of the law applied in Article 2343 of Volume VI of the Compendium of

Customs Regulations. According to the general rules of the above mentioned supremely approved Charter:

1. European and colonial goods could be sent duty-free through Transcaucasia from Redoubt Kali to Iran, from Sukhum Kali and Tiflis to the border of Iran through Nakhchivan.
2. Asian goods could be transmitted to Europe either from all quarantine-customs offices and outposts on the land border with Iran, or from the Transcaucasian ports of the Caspian Sea: Baku and Astara, Tiflis in Redoubt-Kali and Sukhum Kali [ПЦЗРП (1853): 770].

However, by the decision of the Senate, dated November 15, 1853, from January 1, 1854 to January 1, 1860, it was forbidden to bring grain from abroad to Transcaucasia. On December 6, 1859, with the presentation of the Viceroy of the Caucasus, the effect of Article 181 of the Customs Tariff of 1857 (31881) for the Black Sea ports of the Transcaucasian region was restored from January 1, 1860, by the Supremely approved Regulation of the Caucasus Committee. Thus, it was allowed to import foreign grain with a fee of ten silver cents per *pood*.

On September 13, 1854, in addition to Article 2272 of the Compendium of Customs Regulations, Volume VI, according to the general tariff of 1850, it was forbidden to import into Transcaucasia by land and via the Caspian Sea all goods prohibited for import into the Transcaucasian Black Sea ports [ПЦЗРП (1855): 756].

During the Crimean War of 1853-1856, there was a significant change in the supply of goods to the Transcaucasian region. Thus, on September 20, 1855, by the Supreme Decree of the Senate, until the end of the war, it was allowed to deliver European and colonial goods to the Black Sea ports of the Transcaucasian region under the 1850 tariff. However this privilege was limited. For this reason, the privilege (concessions) was given only to the two most important customs offices on the aforementioned borders, the Nakhchivan and Alexandropol quarantine customs offices. Nevertheless they were allowed to store, use and send goods to the warehouse of the Tbilisi customs office on general grounds [ПЦЗРП (1856): 595].

On July 7, 1857, a new general tariff for the European trade was issued for the customs offices of the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Poland. The tariff was applied to all customs offices of the Empire except Odessa, which was *porto franco* [ПЦЗРП (1857): 411]. The Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Poland were allowed to levy various goods on the Black Sea coast in the Transcaucasian region under the common tariff for European trade; in addition, 20 kopecks per *pood* and goods, that were prohibited to be imported, were also determined by the tariff [ПЦЗРП (1858): 110]. According to the general rules established for the operation of the tariff, the operation (force, effect) of the tariff applies to all European ports and land border outposts and customs offices of the Russian Empire and Tsarist Poland, and to the quarantine customs places organized on the Black Sea Eastern coast of the Transcaucasia region, as well as those brought from the Black Sea coast and Redoubt-Kali and spread to the Tbilisi customs office in connection with the goods delivered from Sukhum Kali to Tbilisi [ПЦЗРП (1858):164]. The Transcaucasia quarantine-customs places on the Eastern coast of the Black Sea, where the tariff was distributed, were as follows:

- a) Quarantine-customs office- Redoubt-Kali, Sukhum Kali and Novorossiysk
- b) Nikolaevsky, Ochmirsk, Gelencik and Anap quarantine-customs outposts

The tariff of 1857 was applied with exceptions to the customs offices located in the territories of Azerbaijan. Thus, the activity of that tariff is extended to the quarantine-customs offices of Alexandropol, Nakhchivan and Baku and Jabrayil and Jigisman quarantine-customs posts only in relation to those European and colonial goods whose names are listed in the table in the appendix to Article 2256 of the Customs Charter (Compendium of Laws, Volume VI) has been noted. The period for clearance of European and colonial goods allowed (released) at the quarantine customs offices of Alexandropol, Nakhchivan and Baku was set at three months. A period of one month was set for customs clearance of goods at quarantine customs posts. According to Article 1539 of the Customs Regulations, Russian customs offices charge a transit fee of 35 silver kopecks per pound of gross weight of goods in transit. European goods sent in transit from Redoubt-Kali and Sukhum Kali to Iran, through Tiflis and Nakhchivan in the Transcaucasia region were released duty-free based on the special rule (law) decided for that transit [ПЦЗРП (1858): 110, 162-168].

According to Article 2230 of the Compendium of Laws, Volume VI of the Customs Regulations (1857 edition), the importation of European and colonial goods from the Caspian Sea and the land border from Iran and Turkey to Transcaucasia, in the additional list mentioned in that article, the quarantine customs offices of Alexandropol, Nakhchivan and Baku and Jagisman It was allowed through Gabriel outposts. By the decision of May 12, 1862, in addition to the above-mentioned offices and outposts, it was allowed to import European and colonial goods through the Astara, Sossuvar, Igdir (Orgov), Redoubt-Kali, and Nikolaevsk quarantine-customs outposts by paying duties at the European tariff.

In addition, His Imperial Majesty passed the following decision in order to prevent the introduction of cotton cloth, called cloth, in a more properly defined form into Transcaucasia and the smuggling of such goods:

- 1) According to the current general tariff for bringing European cloth to the Transcaucasia, the duty should be reduced from 20 kopecks to 10 kopecks, and at the same time, this cloth should be allowed to be released through the customs offices of the Transcaucasian region and the northeastern coast of the Black Sea without exception.
- 2) The Viceroy of the Caucasus should be entrusted with determining the rules for correctly determining the origin of the cloth brought to the Transcaucasian region under his immediate order [ПЦЗРП (1865): 429].

According to the Supreme approved regulation of the Caucasian Committee dated September 25, 1862, cloth made in Europe, and dyed (colored) and embroidered in Iran, then brought to Transcaucasia under the name of Iranian product is obliged to pay a fee of 10 kopecks per girvanka, determined by the above-mentioned Supreme decree for European cloth; the said cloth was allowed to be released through all customs offices of the Transcaucasian region and the northeastern coast of the Black Sea [ПЦЗРП (1865): 129]. On January 29, 1865, a Supreme approved Regulation was adopted regarding the transit of European goods to Iran and Asian goods from Iran to Europe through the Transcaucasia region [ПЦЗРП (1867): 124-125]. On April 5, 1865 (published on June 21), the Supreme Approved Resolution of the Council of State amending some articles of the General Customs Tariff of 1857 on European trade was adopted. By amendment of May 27, 1857 (31881) to simplify the General Customs tariff on European trade,

approved by the Supreme, a duty was levied on the importation of some goods, and an excise was fixed on others. It was forbidden to import military copper and steel tools (cannons) and bullets (shells) [ИЦЗПИ (1867): 394].

Until the early 1860s, the Iranian-European transit trade was carried out via the Poti-Tiflis-Nakhchivan route. Baku was completely excluded from this transit trade. It was written in the code of customs laws, published in 1857: the goods of European and colonial countries can be transported from Transcaucasia to Iran without paying customs, only from Redoubt-Kali, Sukhum-Kali and Tiflis to Nakhchivan, and from there to Iran. In order to expand the role of Transcaucasia in the Iranian-European transit trade, in the middle of 1863 transit trade was allowed to be carried out from Baku as well [Musayev (1966): 129]. Merchants from different parts of the world brought their goods to the outposts and crossings under the Baku customs district. For one year (1864), 217,822 manats of duties were collected from merchants coming from Europe and Asia alone. Customs duty was 130,680 manats 85 kopecks from Baku customs, 598,236 manats 15 kopecks from Jabrayil, and 244,101 manat 50 kopecks from Astara. By the special decree of the Viceroy of the Caucasus, when collecting customs duty from goods imported from other countries, the quality of the goods, where they were produced, should be checked, and duties should be applied according to the quality of the goods. If the merchant could not pay the fee in cash while passing through the customs point, he had to pay the fee after selling his goods under a special contract [Əsədov F. S., Şəkərəliyev A. Ş. (2001): 65]. Traders from almost all over the world came to the customs points, outposts and crossings of Northern Azerbaijan. There were also differences in the payment of duties by merchants from one or another country. In many cases, merchants hid their European and American goods from customs. The reason was that the goods were overcharged. Viceroy had a special instruction about this. As a rule, the customs officials, based on that instruction, thoroughly inspected the goods brought by the merchants and received customs duties in return.

It is also noteworthy that the customs clearance of goods in transit to Iran in the South Caucasus was based on the rules, released in 1870. In 1876, trade in the South Caucasus, including in Azerbaijan, was carried out under preferential conditions, and was not subject to the legislation operating within the empire on trade fees [Osmanov (1996): 49-50].

Conclusion

From all the above, we come to the conclusion that customs and tariff policy of tsarism in North Azerbaijan during the period of moderate patronage tariff policy in Tsarist Russia (1850-1877) served the interests of the Russian Empire and the customs and tariff policy implemented in the South Caucasus in general aimed at ensuring the economic interests of the empire, especially the interests of the industrial owners, it played a role in increasing the budget revenues, bearing a fiscal character in a certain sense. In 1847, along with the establishment of a unified quarantine-customs system in the South Caucasus, certain relaxations were observed in the prohibitive tariff policy that existed since 1831. In the 1860s, new changes were made in the customs structure of Northern Azerbaijan, and since 1874, the scope of Baku customs has been further expanded.

In the 1850s and 1860s, a moderate conservative tariff policy prevailed in Russia, which was reflected in the General Tariffs adopted in 1850, 1857, and 1868. So, if these

accepted tariffs were applied to all the customs offices of the empire as well as to the customs points of the Black Sea coast of the South Caucasus, these tariffs were applied to the customs offices located in Northern Azerbaijan either, but later or with certain restrictions. In 1850-1877, taking into account the economic and commercial interests of the tsarism in the South Caucasus, the changes in the customs tariff policy implemented by the tsarism in Northern Azerbaijan were carried out in accordance with the customs policy applied in Russia with some minor exceptions. This policy of tsarism results in the strengthening of the Russian customs system in Northern Azerbaijan and the customs tariff that meets the interests of the empire. Also, taking into account the general state of capitalist relations and industry in the South Caucasus, the tariffs imposed on oil, tobacco and sugar were changed according to the economic and political influences of the time.

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PATTERNS AND INTERPRETATION: BEYLAGAN'S LUSTERWARE SAMPLES**Mirjavid Elshad Aghalarov**ANAS Institute of Archaeology, Ethnography, and Anthropology
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Abstract: The medieval city of Beylagan is one of the best-studied urban areas of Azerbaijan. As a result of this long-term research work, done by A. Alakbarov, A. Gasharli, I. Meschaninov, and others during the 1930s-1960s, rich samples of material culture were discovered from this city. This paper is devoted to a comparative analysis of the lusterware findings from Beylagan. Back in the last century, B.A. Shelkovnikov conducted research and published an article about samples of Beylagan lusterwares, but this article mostly focused on the problem of their origin. The aim of this research is to explain the main pattern motifs of Beylagan's lusterware in detail. In addition, these pattern motifs were compared with the pattern motifs of Iranian cities, and the common aspects were brought to the fore. The material basis of the research includes artefacts from the Hermitage Museum of Russia and National History Museum of Azerbaijan.

Keywords: *lusterware, Beylagan, Kashan, Rey, pattern motif, floral*

The medieval city of Beylagan is one of the best-studied cities from the archaeological point of view among the medieval cities of Azerbaijan. The archaeological site of Orangala, which is the ruin of medieval Beylagan city, was not inhabited, so the cultural layer suffered little damage. In 1926, Alasgar Alakbarov, one of the first archaeologists of Azerbaijan, together with A. Gasharli, organized an archaeological visit to the Mil plain, including Orangala and the historical site, called the Prophet's cemetery near it. In 1933, I. Meshchaninov provided small-scale archaeological excavation works for the first time. These works were only preliminary and did not produce serious results. After a break for a while, the excavations were continued in 1951 by Ishaq Jafarzade, and then followed by Alexander Jessen in 1953-1958 [Иессен (1959): 34], and Gara Ahmadov in 1959-1968 [Əhmədov (1997): 26], who conducted large-scale excavations in the Orangala archaeological site.

As a result of archaeological excavations that began in the 1930s, rich examples of material culture were discovered in the city of Beylagan. Among these examples of material culture, lusterware vessels are of special interest. B.A. Shelkovnikov wrote the first and most comprehensive article about lusterware samples of Beylagan [Шелковников (1959)]. He generally described Beylagan's lusterware products, described their forms [Шелковников (1959): 303] and tried to solve the problem of their origin [Шелковников (1959): 322]. Referring to Arthur Upham Pope's work [Pope (1939): 167], B. Shelkovnikov, based on the artistic design features of Beylagan's lusterware samples, finally came to the conclusion that, with a few exceptions,

Beylagan's lusterware samples were mostly produced in Ray, as a result of commercial relations brought to this city.

Among the stonepaste samples found in archaeological excavations in Azerbaijan, samples with defective results were also found. Such examples were found in Shamkir [Dostiyev (2017): 105], Ganja [Джафарзаде (1949): 74-75]. Although there are examples of lusterware from Beylagan with a manufacturing defect, they have not been described so far. In general, the samples of lusterware found in the medieval cities of Azerbaijan are connected with the cities of Ray and Kashan in Iran and are considered mainly as examples of commercial relations.

The issue of where and from what period lusterware -type dishes were produced is one of the important issues. Lustre was used in the artistic design of glassware in Egypt and Syria from the eighth century. According to some experts, this was the method used to imitate precious metals [Lane (1958): 14]. The use of lustre in the artistic design of clay products took place in the ninth century in the cities of Baghdad and Samara under the rule of the Abbasid dynasty [Caiger-Smith (1985): 25]. Some researchers attribute the production of lusterware in Egypt to the tenth century [Jenkins (1968): 119].

There are differences between examples of lusterware produced in Iran and Egypt. These differences are evident in both chemical, petrographic, and pattern motifs [Mason (1997a): 204]. Robert B. Mason conducted a pictographic analysis of the samples of lusterware found in Iran. He took the cities of Ray and Kashan as a base point of comparison and came to the conclusion that the pictographic tablea of most of the vases found in different areas of Iran is close to that of the city of Kashan [Mason (1997b): 103]. In addition, as a result of these petrographic analyses, he determined the specific pattern motifs of the samples of lusterware produced in the city of Kashan.

The lusterwares of Beylagan are generally the examples of Seljuk art. Both, the city of Beylagan itself, as well as the cities of Ray and Kashan, which may have been the homelands of the lusterwares brought here, were Seljuk craft centres, therefore, it would be most correct to characterize all these artefacts as the examples of Seljuk art.

Glazing styles of lusterware samples found in Beylagan are very diverse. Two types of glaze were used in glazing these samples: blue-cobalt glaze and milky-white glaze. The use of these glazes was also in different forms. In the first group, both surfaces were glazed with white milk-coloured glaze, in the second group, one surface was glazed with blue-cobalt glaze, the other surface was glazed with white milk-coloured glaze, and in the third group, both surfaces were glazed with blue cobalt glaze. Although samples of stonepaste glazed with turquoise glaze were found en masse from Beylagan, lustre painted samples are not found among these samples, whereas such samples exist in Syria.

The artistic designs of Beylagan lusterware are also attracting interest. They are mainly decorated with anthropomorphic, zoomorphic, botanic and epigraphic patterns. It is also common to use these patterns at the same time. The most widespread among these patterns are floral and epigraphic patterns. These are the division of patterns according to the line of composition; besides, they divide the samples of lusterware into three styles according to their artistic design: "Monumental", "Miniature" and "Kashan type" [Dostiyev (2018): 122]. "Monumental" style is characterized by the large images. In most of the cases, the area of the pattern was decorated with lustre, and the image remained white. In the "miniature" style, on the contrary, the images are small in size, and the decorative elements are free and superficial [Dostiyev (2018): 122-123]. Oliver Watson

links early Iranian lusterwares with the Fatimid lusterwares and notes that the Monumental style is based on the Fatimid lusterware traditions. Following this, he notes that the Miniature style is a continuation of classical Iranian ceramic traditions. For him, the biggest innovation in the lusterware production of Iran is the creation of Kashan style [Watson (1985): 88].

Archaeologist Farhad Ibrahimov, who conducted the archaeological excavations of Orangala in 1959-1969, in his article, dedicated to the Beylagan lusterwares, divided these samples into 3 groups. Calling the first group pink clay samples, he indicates that they were of Ray origin. Then calling the second group white clay, he suggested that they were from Kashan. Analysing the last group in terms of artistic design and clay, he notes that they are locally produced [Ibrahimov F. Ə. (1965): 212]. Whether the stonepastes, especially the lusterwares, can be locally produced is a controversial topic and requires comprehensive analysis, therefore, this issue will not be considered in this research work.

Images of horsemen are often found on the envelopes found in Beylagan (Fig. 1.; Fig. 2; Fig. 3). There is an interesting regularity in these equestrian depictions, as all examples also feature tree depictions (inv. 2159). The specific feature of these trees is that they are bush-shaped and the interior is arranged in the shape of a chessboard. Robert Mason gives this motif among the special patterns of Kashan [Mason (1997b): 110]. In another fragmentary example, the image of a horseman is clearly visible, and next to it, there is a representation of a plant (inv.25042). This floral image is a branch image decorated with dots, and R. Mason attributed this motif to the city of Kashan [Mason (1997b): 110]. All these equestrian images are made in "Miniature" style.

Another pattern motif is the fox motif depicted in a belt-shaped pattern (Fig. 2). Although we do not find this motif among R. Mason's Kashan motifs, A. Pope considers this pattern traditional for the city of Kashan. One of the above-mentioned horse-drawn envelopes also has such a fox image (inv.2012). Images of a fox running along the belt from the mouth to the body are given, and below this belt, the images of cavalry are drawn with lustre. The point that attracts attention is that only one of the three equestrian examples we described earlier has a belt with a fox image.

Another example of a zoomorphic image found in Beylagan attracts attention. On the seat of this material, which differs from other samples, an elephant is depicted with dark brown dice (Fig. 4). With the fury in the elephant's eyes and the saddle-like thing depicted on it, it can be assumed that it is a war elephant. There are Arabic inscriptions on the elephant's saddle that cannot be read. Along with the image of an elephant, spirals were also widely used in the artistic design of this example.

Among the lusterware products of Beylagan, three small archaeological whole bowls are particularly interesting (Fig. 5-8). The materials were found very close to each other in the same area in 1953 (inv. 23663, inv. 23664, inv. 23662). Both the inner and outer surfaces of all three examples are decorated with lustre over a milk-coloured glaze. The artistic decoration of all three has the same style, so that the outer surfaces are decorated with the same pattern motif (Fig. 6; Fig. 8), and the inner surfaces have the same compositional subject (Fig. 5; Fig. 7): 0.7-1 cm from the mouth part on the outer surfaces. there is a thick lustre pattern, and 1.4-1.6 cm below it, there is a wavy lustre pattern. Let's also note that this pattern is the same on the outer surface of all three samples. As for the inner surface, there are small differences. Firstly, 2.2-2.4 cm from the mouth of the inner surface of all three samples. There is a thick lustre patterned belt.

There are Arabic inscriptions inside this belt. Secondly, the image in the centre is different in all three materials. The similarity of all three artefacts to this extent suggests that they are the product of the same workshop. Although the inscriptions on these examples are not yet legible, their artistic design belongs to the Kashan style, which suggests that they were produced in the city of Kashan in the early 13th century.

Figures decorated with lustre are one of the characteristic features of Seljuk art. Such figures were found throughout the Islamic geography during this period. Although stonepaste figures were found in Beylagan, they were not decorated with lustre. This is of a particular interest. Although these figures are structurally similar to the figures produced in Iran, they differ in terms of artistic design, as all the examples found in Beylagan are glazed with turquoise glaze [Ibrahimov (1967): 120], which is absent in Iran. From here, it can be suggested that they are products of local workshop, and with that, another feature comes to the fore. It can be said that the reason why the figures are not decorated with lustre can be explained by the fact that the method of decorating with lustre does not exist in the city of Beylagan.

As for floral patterns, they were used both in combination with zoomorphic and anthropomorphic images (inv. 4330) and as independent pattern motifs (s\q 96). One of the examples where the floral pattern is used independently is attracting interest. In this example, a complex floral pattern with a lustre pattern is depicted on the seat. This pattern is complexly drawn with lustre and spiral-shaped ornamentation. The floral style was used in Monumental, Miniature and Kashan styles. Although it is rarely found in the monumental style, floral images become a part of the main composition in the miniature style. Floral patterns were an indispensable part of Kashan style. In this style, floral patterns were the main subject line of artistic design.

Epigraphic patterns were generally not used independently in the decoration of vases; they were given separately around or inside the floral, zoomorphic and anthropomorphic patterns. Epigraphic patterns were often engraved in a belt on the inner or outer rim of the vessel. Cobalt stains were sometimes present on epigraphic patterns. The mouth fragment of the vase with such a motif comes into notice. The upper part of the mouth is outlined with blue, cobalt, and below it, an epigraphic inscription is written with a *naskh* line with a lustre pattern (s\q 254). The characteristic feature of epigraphic examples is that their artistic arrangement creates an artistic composition in the form of a unity and is in harmony. The use of calligraphic images, often floral, and sometimes geometric patterns is a visual indicator of this [Достигов (2020): 234].

In one of the samples found from Beylagan, the epigraphic pattern was used in an independent form (A3-1340). Unlike other examples, in this material, radial pattern technique was used instead of concentric. In the belts going towards the centre, alternate epigraphic patterns are engraved with reserve and brush work.

The technique of processing the patterns on the lusterware samples is also one of the points that catches eye. Two important techniques will be considered here: *reserve* and *sgraffito*. The sgraffito method is the engraving of a pattern with a fine scratch. Although the use of this method is not very widespread, it is found in examples of patterned tiles. Basically, in the bowls, a die was drawn over the sweet in the form of a belt, and the die was slowly scratched up to the glaze. In the Beylagan samples, this method was used only for drawing epigraphic patterns (Fig. 6; Fig. 7). As for the reserve method, it was

intended to use the lustre as a background in the artistic arrangement of the earthenware vessel (Fig. 4).

As for the chronological determination of the samples of lusterware found in Beylagan, it would be more correct to attribute them to the second half of the 12th century and the beginning of the 13th century. B. Shelkovnikov also connected their period belonging to those centuries. In addition, they can be attributed to the mentioned date by matching the pattern motif of the materials described above [Mason (1997b): 110]. Interestingly, most of the vases found in the city of Samosdel, located on the bank of Volga River, in a far distance and north of Beylagan, belong to this period [Болдырева (2014): 90].

If we summarize the ideas about the decorations of the medieval Beylagan, we can conclude that this rich collection includes unique examples as well as classic examples. In order to clarify the origin of some samples, the information provided by the studies so far has been widely used. So, contrary to what B. Shelkovnikov wrote in the 1950s, it would be more correct to say that most of the samples of lusterware found in Beylagan were produced in the city of Kashan, Iran, as the chart of pattern motifs drawn up by Robert Mason is taken as the basis here. However the pattern motifs on a separate group of lusterware samples do not coincide with the pattern motifs of Kashan. It would not yet be entirely correct to attribute specimens of this type to local manufacture, as it would be rash to give a definite opinion as to their origin until their chemical and petrographic analysis has been carried out.

All these ornaments depicted on the vessels are not only the imagination of the masters who made them, but also the basic indicator of the artistic and aesthetic worldview of their buyers. This illustrated envelope was mainly an item that could be used by the upper classes living in the city. The existence of images of animals, prohibited in Islam, on lusterwares is an indicator of the freedom of the aesthetic tastes of Beylagan nobles from religion.

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Figures



Figure 1. Lusterware vessel with horseman pattern.
Photo by Musa Nasirov



Figure 2. Lusterware vessel with horseman pattern. Photo by Musa Nasirov



Figure 3. Lusterware vessel with horseman pattern
Photo by Musa Nasirov



Figure 4. Lusterware vessel fragment with elephant image.
Photo by Mirjavid Aghalarov



Figure 5. Lustreware bowl (inside)
Photo by Mirjavid Aghalarov



Figure 6. Lustreware bowl (profile)
Photo by Mirjavid Aghalarov



Figure 7. Lustreware bowl (inside)
Photo by Mirjavid Aghalarov



Figure 8. Lustreware bowl (profile)
Photo by Mirjavid Aghalarov

NEW ECONOMIC ORDER -BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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Abstract: An agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom led to the founding of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in July 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.

The Bretton Woods institutions were created and put into place thanks in large part to American economic leadership, which reflected the country's dominant position in the world's diplomacy and economy in the years following World War II.

A pattern of institutionalized multilateral cooperation that has come to be one of the defining characteristics of the post-World War II international political economy was undoubtedly influenced by the climate of international cooperation that emerged at Bretton Woods and persisted for decades afterward.

Keywords: *Bretton Woods, dollar, WB, IMF, WTO*

INTRODUCTION

The Bretton Woods agreements were the first successful attempt consciously undertaken by a large group of nations to shape and control their economic relations. The Bretton Woods (BW) agreement of 1944 aided Western Europe, Japan, and the United States in their post-World War II recovery. Its design reflected the post-World War II architecture well the market-oriented states were dominated by the US, at a time when the US was committed to facilitating a recovery without repeating the costly mistakes of the post-World War I period.

Understanding the Bretton Woods system requires an understanding of the Gold Standard and the Great Depression. The gold standard of the 1920s contributed to the 1930s Depression, making the international financial system more vulnerable. The gold standard was the mechanism through which the destabilizing impulse from the United States was transmitted to the rest of the world.

Bretton Woods is a large concept that has been studied in many ways by numerous scientists and observers. This essay will focus on the Gold Standard and the Great Depression, after which we will attempt to explain the significance of the Bretton Woods systems- three organizations World Bank, International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (World Trade Organization), and the Bretton Woods system's collapse.

The Gold Standard and the Great Depression

The monetary system prevailed between about 1870 and 1914, in which countries tied their currencies to gold at a legally fixed price. When a government goes "On gold," it

promises to exchange its currency for gold at a fixed rate. The currency of the country became gold-equivalent, interchangeable at a fixed rate with the money of any other gold-standard country. Since 1717, Britain has had a gold-backed currency. More countries were drawn away from silver and other monetary metals and toward gold, the traditional international medium of exchange, as international trade and investment increased. The United Kingdom's position as the global market leader enticed other countries to adopt the same monetary system. By the 1870s, the gold standard had been adopted by the majority of the industrial world [Jeffrey A. Frieden, David A. Lake, Kenneth A. Schultz. (2010): 13].

Only lasting from the 1870s until the start of World War I, the gold standard was in place for a very limited period. Practically every government throughout the conflict used restricted gold exports or unconvertible paper money. By 1928, however, the gold standard had essentially been restored. However, because there was a relative lack of gold, the majority of countries decided to switch to a gold-exchange standard, whereby they supplemented their central banks' gold reserves with fiat money (US dollars and British pounds) that could be exchanged for gold at a fixed rate of exchange. However, the gold-exchange system collapsed once more during the Great Depression of the 1930s, and by 1937, no nation was still entirely on the gold standard. [Barry Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters* (2003): 13]

The gold standard has benefits: (1) it restricts the ability of governments or banks to inflate prices through the excessive printing of paper money, though there is evidence that even before World War I, monetary authorities did not restrict the supply of money when the nation experienced a gold outflow; and (2) it fosters certainty in global trade by establishing a set pattern of exchange rates. The disadvantages are (1) that it may not provide enough flexibility in the money supply since the supply of newly mined gold is independent of the growing world economy's demand for the corresponding money supply, and (2) the country may not be able to protect its economy from the effects of recession or inflation in the rest of the world, and (3) the more unemployment, the adjustment process of deficit countries may be long and painful. [<https://www.britannica.com/topic/gold-standard>].

Beggar-thy-neighbor economic practices have significantly exacerbated, if not caused, the Great Depression. While the Great Crash did not result in instant mass unemployment or the abrupt halt of production lines, the events of October 1929 did expose structural problems in the 1920s boom economy [Benjamin Roth; edited by James Ledbetter and Daniel (2009): 12]. Governments from all over the world sought to defend themselves against economic crises in the late 1920s and early 1930s by erecting trade barriers and depreciating their currencies. Each nation thought that by doing this, they would somehow be able to keep their economies afloat as those of their neighbors sunk all around them. The Great Depression served as proof that this was ineffective [John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patrica Owens (2014): 245]. It was difficult to devise a system that would prevent disaster after World War II, particularly by ensuring that the Great Crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s did not become the longest and most severe economic depression in modern history. It lasted about 10 years, from late 1929 to roughly 1939, and was marked by dramatic declines in industrial production and prices (deflation), widespread unemployment, bank panics, and massive increases in poverty and homelessness rates.

The Birth of Bretton Woods and the Structure of BW institutions (WB, IMF, GATT)

The Bretton Woods Institutions were not established suddenly; the idea of having permanent institutions supervising the international economy had begun to take shape years before the Bretton Woods conference, but the instability in any field caused by the threat of possible confrontations between countries did not diminish for a half-century, rendering any kind of permanence impossible.

The two world wars, in which all of the major nations took part, had a significant impact on both economic and political equilibrium. World War I saw the end of the 700-year-old Ottoman Empire and the end of monarchy in both Germany and Russia. The advent of National Socialism in Germany, Communism in Russia, and Fascism in Italy created a hybrid political map that would last only until the end of World War II when National Socialism and Fascism were defeated. However, Communism will remain firm and ensure that its presence was felt in every sector.

In addition to the regime changes, the economic limitations of the newly independent nations following World War II compelled adjustments in both the political and economic status quo. New nations emerged new actors appeared on the scene, and the social and political ramifications of the global wars justified the need for a new stable economic system. What was needed, it was thought, was a sort of worldwide currency that would support national currencies, decrease uncertainty, and offer stability, but would not be automated. All of the aforementioned criteria contributed significantly to the success of the Bretton Woods Conference. Taking the Bretton Woods Conference was a starting point, however, for the establishment of the first organized international organization [Yiğit Sayın (2008): 161-162].

The late-nineteenth-century classical gold standard, the organically formed foundation of the first great economic globalization, had collapsed during the previous world war, with efforts to revive it in the 1920s proving disastrously unsuccessful. Economies and trade collapsed, raising cross-border tensions. Internationalists in the United States Treasury and State Department saw a powerful cause and effect and were determined in the 1930s to create a “New Deal for a New World,” in the words of Treasury’s Harry Dexter White.

Working in parallel and tense collaboration with his British counterpart, the revolutionary economist John Maynard Keynes, Dexter White set out to lay the economic groundwork for a long-term postwar global peace, one that would give governments more control over markets but fewer prerogatives to manipulate them for trade gains [Benn Steil (2013): 1-2].

During the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944, a new international monetary system - the Bretton Woods system - was devised. Following WWII, these countries saw an opportunity to form a new international order that would promote postwar reconstruction by learning from the failings of past gold standards and the Great Depression. It was an astonishing concerted effort by countries that had been putting up economic obstacles for more than ten years. In addition to avoiding the rigidity of earlier international monetary systems, they sought to address the lack of collaboration between countries with regard to such systems. The traditional gold standard was abandoned following World War I. Governments not only

conducted competitive devaluations throughout the interwar period but also enacted restrictive trade policies that exacerbated the Great Depression. Those present at Bretton Woods envisioned a worldwide monetary system that would guarantee exchange rate stability, discourage competitive devaluations, and foster economic progress. Although all parties agreed on the new system's goals, implementation plans differed. [Creation of the Bretton Woods System July 1944 <https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/bretton-woods-created>]. A collective accord was a massive international project. Preparation began more than two years before the conference, with financial experts holding numerous bilateral and international talks to reach an agreement. While the Treasury Department in the United States is in charge of international economic policy, the Federal Reserve is in charge of domestic policy [Benn Steil (2013): 11].

The Bretton Woods system comprised four major components. First and foremost, it was a system based on the US dollar. The Bretton Woods system was officially a gold-based system that treated all countries symmetrically, and it was managed by the IMF. In actuality, it was a US-dominated system with the US dollar as the major currency (the dollar's supremacy persists to this day). The relationship between the United States and other countries was very asymmetric. The United States, as the center country, provided domestic pricing stability that other countries could "import," but it did not participate in currency intervention (this is known as benign indifference; that is, the US did not care about exchange rates, which was ideal). In comparison, every other country

The second element was a peg system that could be adjusted. This means that exchange rates were typically set but were periodically modified depending on the circumstances. As a result, exchange rates were predicted to rise gradually. This was an agreement to keep exchange rates stable while avoiding mutually damaging depreciation. When there was a "fundamental imbalance," member countries were permitted to adjust "parities" (exchange rates). The term "fundamental disequilibrium," however, was not defined elsewhere. Exchange rate changes occurred significantly less frequently than the Bretton Woods system's founders predicted. Germany was revalued twice, the UK once, and France once. Japan and Italy's currency rates remained unchanged.

Third, capital controls were strictly enforced. This was a significant departure from the Classical Gold Standard of 1879-1914 when the capital moved freely. Even though the United States and Germany had relatively lax capital-account regulations, other countries imposed severe exchange controls.

Fourth, macroeconomic performance was satisfactory. Global price stability and high growth were achieved, in particular, as trade liberalization progressed. From the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, tradable price stability (wholesale prices or WPI) was nearly perfect and widespread. This macroeconomic achievement was unprecedented in history [History of International Monetary Systems: https://www.grips.ac.jp/teacher/ono/hp/lecture_F/lec02.ht].

Since its establishment in 1944 as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank has expanded into a grouping of five organizations dedicated to economic development [Jeffrey Frieden (2017): 13]. The initial use of its funds was to support the post-World War II rebuilding of ravaged nations. With time, the focus shifted from rehabilitation to development, with a focus on infrastructure like highways, dams, irrigation, and power grids. In 1956, the International Finance

Corporation was given the authority to extend loans to private businesses and financial institutions in emerging nations. Additionally, with the creation of the International Development Association in 1960, a greater focus was put on the world's poorest nations as part of a long-term effort to make ending poverty the primary goal of the Bank Group. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency was subsequently established, significantly enhancing the Bank Group's capacity to match the requirements of developing nations with available financial resources.

International Monetary Fund was established in 1946 after wartime negotiations held at Bretton Woods in the USA, with headquarters (opposite one another) in Washington, DC. The IMF was created to promote international monetary cooperation and resolve inter-war economic problems although several of these functions ended when the Bretton Woods system broke down in 1971. The IMF now has a membership of 190 countries, each of which contributes a quota of resources to the organization (proportionate to the size of their economy), which also determines their percentage of voting rights and the number of resources to which they can have automatic access [About IMF <https://www.imf.org/en/About>]. Since the 1980s, the IMF has evolved into a financial and technical assistance institution for developing and transitional economies.

A temporary agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed in 1947 with the hope that it would be replaced by an international trade organization. Since a permanent trade organization was not established until 1994, the interim GATT continued to function for 40 years as an agreement between contracting parties, supported by a tiny secretariat based in Geneva and a meager budget. In essence, the GATT served as a venue for trade negotiations. Several rounds of negotiations led up to the highly productive Kennedy Round of 1962–1967, during which significant progress was made in lowering trade barriers among industrialized nations. However, when protectionism flourished in the 1970s, the agreement proved powerless to restrain powerful members such as the USA and European countries from restricting trade (e.g. the Multifiber Arrangement 1974 restricting textile imports) and abusing the many exceptions and safeguards written into the agreement. The GATT also functioned as a forum for dispute settlement (i.e. upholding trade rules) [Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan, Steven Roach (2014): 374-375].

However, due to the requirement for agreement on any dispute resolution, it was both ineffective and slow in this regard. Due to agreements reached during the Uruguay Round (1986–1994), the final round of GATT negotiations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) took the place of the GATT. The WTO was founded on 1 January 1995, and among its duties are managing WTO trade agreements, serving as a venue for trade negotiations, resolving trade disputes, observing national trade policies, providing technical assistance and training to developing nations, and collaborating with other international organizations.

The collapse of the Bretton Woods system

The system dissolved between 1968 and 1973. The post-BW flexible exchange rate regime was put to the test by major global shocks: the oil shocks of the 1970s and 1980s; accelerated US inflation in the late 1970s reaching double-digit levels, followed by

Volcker's remarkable stabilization, reducing inflation at the cost of a sharp rise in real interest rates; and a fast-moving but deep US recession in the early 1980s.

Analysts identified structural issues with the Bretton Woods system by the early 1960s. One of these, the effort to cap the relative price of gold had the potential to end the ability of gold to be converted into dollars at official rates in the private markets. This possible issue would arise if private gold demand increased more quickly than new gold supplies, which is the traditional internal drain issue with a gold standard. Nevertheless, strangely, it was the French obsession with gold that drove its removal from the monetary system. The strongly and properly perceived conclusion that the relative value of foreigners' liquid dollar claims relative to monetary gold would unavoidably increase, however, did not prove to be the deciding factor for the fixed exchange. With the little prospect that foreign government claimants would ever obtain the remaining U.S. gold stock, the system remained fundamentally a dollar standard after 1968. Nonetheless, foreign monetary authorities placed such a high value on the system that they were willing to absorb up to \$70 billion in dollar claims to protect it, the majority of which were susceptible to exchange risk. Due to the U.S. administration's inflationary policies, a speculative attack was unavoidable, thus they were forced to take these measures. The underlying Bretton Woods system would have survived if the administration had been dedicated to less inflationary monetary measures. The very practices that the Europeans had wrongly attributed to the United States in the middle of the 1960s ultimately caused Bretton Woods to crumble [Peter M. Garber (1993): 484]

US President Richard Nixon declared in August 1971 that the dollar's ability to be converted into gold would be temporarily suspended. The Bretton Woods parity caused the dollar to suffer throughout the bulk of the 1960s, but this crisis foreshadowed the collapse of the system. The leading currencies had started to vary against one another by March 1973 after an attempt to revive fixed exchange rates failed. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, IMF members have been free to choose any type of exchange arrangement they like, with the exception of pegging their currency to gold: allowing it to float freely, pegging it to another currency, or a basket of currencies, adopting another country's currency, taking part in a currency bloc, or being a member of a monetary union.

Due to oil shocks, many scholars believed that the Bretton Woods system's demise would signal the end of the age of tremendous expansion. In reality, the switch to floating exchange rates was quite seamless and came at a good time since economies found it simpler to adapt to more costly oil when the price started to rise quickly in October 1973 thanks to flexible exchange rates. Since then, floating rates have made it easier to respond to shocks from without [Antony Best, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Joseph A. Maiolo, Kirsten E. Schulze (2008): 330].

While the Vietnam War and changing American defense doctrines undermined some of the transatlantic trust built in the years after the Second World War, the unity of the West was further complicated by the relative decline of US economic dominance. In 1945 the United States had produced roughly 50 percent of the world's manufactured goods; by 1960 its share had declined to roughly one-third of global output. Western Europe and, increasingly in the 1960s, Japan made the most progress during this period. Both had been net beneficiaries of American post-war economic policies: the Americans had, after all, directly encouraged European integration and promoted Japanese recovery.

Moreover, both Western Europe and Japan had benefited from the boom generated by the establishment of the Bretton Woods system, which was in turn underpinned by the strength of the American dollar. However, while this ability to generate prosperity was the cause of some satisfaction, particularly as it supplied useful propaganda for the battle of ideas with the Soviet Union, it did mean that, for the first time since 1945, the United States faced serious economic competition. In fact, in 1971 President Nixon ended the dollar's convertibility into gold due to the strain of maintaining the Bretton Woods system while fighting in Vietnam. The French president, Charles de Gaulle, began his campaign for West European leadership in this environment of emerging nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, growing American involvement in Vietnam, heightened European concerns about the American determination to defend Western Europe, and the relative decline of American economic power.

The successful recovery of Western Europe in the following two decades, supported by the formation of the EU, and the political challenges of the US in the 1960s put growing strains on the viability and durability of the BW agreement. In Western Europe the movement, encouraged with some foreboding by the United States, towards European integration gathered steam during the 1950s with the formation of the EEC in 1957. Helped by an influx of American capital and the successful working of the Bretton Woods system, the EEC's economic success further highlighted the division of Europe, while its institutional arrangements marked the beginning of political integration. The development of Western European integration was undoubtedly one of the most fundamental 'side effects' of the Cold War [Joshua Aizenman. (2015): 2].

In December 1971, the monetary authorities of the world's most advanced nations gathered in Washington, DC, at the Smithsonian Institution. They aimed to save the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, an international agreement that was in danger of failing. The Smithsonian Agreement was developed, but it turned out to be too little, too late. Within fifteen months, the Bretton Woods system was destroyed.

The Bretton Woods system's basic structure contained a flaw that became apparent in the early 1960s. Bretton Woods was founded on gold, but the global gold stock could not meet the world's demand for international reserves, which were required for pegged exchange rates. As a result, the United States provided dollar reserves by running a persistent balance of payments deficit and promised to do so in the future.

After 1965, the difficult and uncertain situation worsened. Rising inflation in the United States increased the country's balance-of-payments deficit and pushed even more dollars abroad. In the United States, inflation rose from less than 2% in early 1965 to 6% by the end of 1969. In the face of such inflation, the existing structure of fixed exchange rates appeared unsustainable. By the summer of 1971, speculators were shifting funds away from dollars and toward foreign currencies, and central banks were quickly converting dollars into US gold.

President Nixon "closed the gold window" in August 1971, barring foreign central banks from exchanging dollars for gold owned by the US Treasury. Nixon blamed the United States balance-of-payments deficits on unfair trade practices and other countries' unwillingness to share the burden of Cold War military expenditures, as well as the Bretton Woods Agreement's flaws and the Federal Reserve's monetary policy. He wanted the dollar to gain value against other currencies, but he did not want the currency to lose purchasing power in comparison to gold. International opinion was outraged by

Nixon's conduct. A feeling of catastrophe pervaded the atmosphere. Despite the massive intervention, several prominent foreign currencies started to gain strength versus the US dollar. Border constraints on the flow of money. Monetary officials throughout the world were concerned that international monetary relations would collapse as a result of the uncertainty surrounding exchange rates, the impending expansion of protectionism, and the looming risk of a severe recession. Officials at the International Monetary Fund quickly called for talks to restructure exchange rates and address other concerns about the international financial system.

At the Smithsonian conference, the United States resolved to reduce the value of the dollar relative to gold by nearly 8.5 percent, to \$38 per ounce. Revaluing national currencies in reference to the dollar was suggested by other nations. The end result was an average dollar loss against the other major currencies of 10.7 percent. At the Smithsonian conference, nations also agreed to continue discussions about more substantial reforms to the international monetary system. It would be investigated how important the dollar is, who is responsible for maintaining exchange rates, what gold's future function will be, how to make it easier to modify exchange rates, and how to deal with erratic financial flows. Nixon's plan to lower present trade barriers and shoulder a larger amount of the expense was likewise supported by other nations.

The Smithsonian Agreement achieved little to reestablish trust in the Bretton Woods system. Speculators pushed numerous European currencies to the upper limits of their permissible -but now wider-exchange-rate bands in 1972. Their central banks collected vast amounts of undesired dollars as a result of their intervention, which fueled inflationary pressures. Germany and Japan tightened financial-flow restrictions, and other countries began to follow suit [[The Smithsonian Agreement | Federal Reserve History](#)].

Gold prices, which serve as a measure of uncertainty, increased to roughly \$60 per ounce by mid-1972 and \$90 per ounce by early 1973. There was a lot of speculation. On February 12, 1973, with currency markets in Europe and Japan closed, the US devalued the dollar by another 10% to \$42 per ounce. When markets reopened, dollar speculation grew widespread. Almost all were completed within a month.

A committee that was formed by the IMF's Board of Governors began developing a possible member-acceptable exchange rate regime. Systems are categorized according to how flexible the exchange rates are. Exchange rates are classified into two types: fixed and flexible.

1. Fixed exchange rate system: A currency is fixed at a fixed parity to a foreign currency. The rates are kept the same. Government intervention is used to maintain a currency inside the band when it is on the verge of exceeding the limitations.

2. Flexible exchange rate system- Involves market forces rather than government action in establishing the exchange rate. Once the Bretton Woods system collapsed in January 1973, the switch from fixed to flexible currency rates.

When compared to the 1960s or even the time between 1970 and 1972, when the Bretton Woods system was becoming unstable, the period of floating exchange rates has been marked by significant economic volatility on a worldwide scale.

The Bretton Woods Conference established the fixed exchange rate system in 1944, but it started to show signs of strain in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Authorities were worried about money flows and the need for intervention notwithstanding the broad use of capital restrictions. Current account deficits seemed to convey more fundamental signs

of disequilibrium. The monetary authorities were becoming more aware of situations in which the monetary policy they believed was appropriate from a domestic perspective and the one that would achieve external balance were at odds. Par value changes and times when nations allowed their currencies to float grew increasingly common. Two currency realignments that resulted in a net decline in the value of the dollar- in December 1971 and February 1973-failed to relieve the currency's rising pressure.

In March 1973, the decision to float the exchange rate was made against this background. For nearly a year after that, the US advocated for the establishment of a modified Bretton Woods system. The Committee of Twenty on the Reform of the International Monetary System adopted the Woods system of fixed but adjustable par values. The turbulence in international money markets that followed the first oil shock convinced officials in the United States and other countries that Humpty Dumpty could not be reassembled-at least not for the time being. Negotiations in the United States shifted to legitimizing and establishing rules for conducting afloat. These efforts culminated in the Rambouillet Summit agreement in November 1975. Despite its formal demise, much of the Bretton Woods system's framework remains [Cory Mitchell: <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/floatexchange.asp>].

CONCLUSION

The Bretton Woods institutions and the system they founded tried to prevent the turmoil following the fall of the gold standard and help rebuild Europe after World War II. Accordingly, during the first two decades after its founding, the Fund operated mainly to solve monetary difficulties, while the Bank supported the reconstruction of Europe and later the development of countries with low income. The atmosphere of international cooperation that began at Bretton Woods and continued for decades certainly contributed to the institutionalized model of multilateral cooperation that became the hallmark of the world's post-WWII international political economy.

The Bretton Woods system was characterized by broad macroeconomic and financial stability from 1945 to 1971. Significant changes in global monetary and financial conditions, as well as the operations of the three core Bretton Woods organizations, have occurred since then. Nonetheless, the current global economy largely reflects the vision of the Bretton Woods Agreements' architects. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (the successor to GATT) continue to play critical roles in shaping international monetary and trade norms and laws. Rising unemployment, concerns about the sustainability of growth, and rising levels of poverty in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, on the other hand, are generating calls for a second Bretton Woods conference. It remains to be seen if this happens. The ideology of globalization appears to oppose such a proposal. However, there is no doubt that the 1944 New Hampshire conference had a considerable impact on the economic nature of the world since 1945.

As a result, the BW system became useless, and its final collapse in the early 1970s sparked the emergence of a more symmetric system-a flexible exchange rate among the major currencies of the period. With a lag, shifting multi-polarity of economic and political power overcomes pre-existing institutions, compelling them to develop in quest of greater alignment with the changing world order.

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